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ABSTRACT 
Social science usually strives to maximize the social welfare and economics as a science 
influencing in the society should strive to maximize the social welfare in the economy. 
Capitalism and the corporate form of business are among the most influential innovations 
ever made by the humankind, simply because they determine how the scarce resources of 
our planet Earth are allocated. Many publicly listed corporations are governed through 
the shareholder value maximization theory which claims to maximize the social welfare 
when the shareholder value is maximized. The question that remains unanswered is how 
social welfare becomes maximized when the shareholder value becomes maximized and 
why the scholars and practitioners are unable to conclude what should be the corporate 
objective? 
 
Articles from six major databases are systematically collected and reviewed to examine 
the viability of the shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective. In total of 68 
articles were systematically retrieved. Theoretical sampling is employed to elaborate the 
depth and quality of the synthesis. The goal is to introduce ideas, historical pathways, 
logics, inconsistencies and misunderstandings to provoke further investigation and 
discussion. The central objective of the thesis is to either justify the shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate objective or to refute its position as such. 
 
Results suggest that all existing arguments for the shareholder value maximization can be 
either deduced to the utilitarian logic or dismissed as irrelevant. The only viable 
justification for the corporate objective is that it increases social welfare in the utilitarian 
sense. The thesis provides a timeline and synthesizing graphical presentation of the 
typology of the shareholder value maximization. The typology and the timeline are 
unprecedented contributions. The timeline helps to connect different data points to the 
shareholder value maximization. 
 
The overarching conclusion is that market failures and externalities are significantly 
weakening the possibilities of the shareholder value maximization to successfully 
maximize the social welfare. However, shareholder value maximization might still be the 
best alternative providing the closest approximate of the maximum social welfare. 
KEYWORDS: Shareholder value maximization, corporate objective, corporate 
governance, agency theory, stakeholder 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
“Few people, and least of all we economists ourselves, are prone to offer us 
congratulations on our intellectual achievements.” Schumpeter (1954:5) 
It seems to be undeniably true that most of the economists are offering congratulations 
for themselves on the intellectual achievement called capitalism. We have gone to war in 
defense of our capitalistic and economic theories. Democratic capitalism is creating 
wealth in a way that no other system has (World bank 2019; Credit Suisse 2019). This 
kind of unprecedented prosperity invokes questions about how to equally distribute 
created wealth within the society and whether there are limits to sustainable growth (e.g. 
Piketty and Saez 2003)? The contemporary solution for controlling these issues in a 
democratic capitalism functions through corporate governance mechanism. This seems 
to be true because corporations are the source of this increased wealth and prosperity in 
a society.  
One of the key areas in corporate governance research is revolving around the corporate 
objective which is also the general topic of this literature review. Corporate life and 
corporate strategies are controlled and shaped by the corporate governance system which 
in turn is shaped and created by the economic science and government regulation 
(Rappaport 1986; Jensen 2001; Stout 2008; Monks and Minow 2011; Bower and Paine 
2017). The shareholder value maximization theory is currently dominating corporate 
governance system and a culmination of capitalistic and democratic thinking and 
economic science – the shareholder value maximization theory is a manifest of two 
hundred years of economic research (see Jensen 2001; Smith 1776). According to the 
shareholder value maximization theory, a manager should make all the decisions so that 
they ultimately strive to maximize the total value of the firm and the total value of the 
firm is often measured with the share price (Jensen 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). 
“The ultimate test of corporate strategy, the only reliable measure, is whether it creates 
economic value for shareholders.” -Alfred Rappaport (1986) 
The shareholder value maximization theory might have created enormous amounts of 
wealth for the society, but also conflicts and dispute persists (e.g. Dowie 1977; Ghoshal 
2005; Markham 2015; Bower and Paine 2017; Clarke, Jarvis and Gholamshahi 2018). 
Evidently, short-termism, errors and plainly bad corporate behavior within the economy 
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exist. Yet, it is questionable whether the negative consequences – misbehaving companies 
and faulty corporate governance mechanisms – are the causal result of a bad or 
malfunctioning theory. Another possibility is that the negative corporate events are 
present because the theory is merely misused to justify doubtful actions or that the 
shareholder value maximization theory is not at all applied by management. The third 
option is that the theory is unintentionally misinterpreted. No matter which the case is, it 
should be revealed and fixed. 
The influence of the shareholder value maximization for the economy – either negative 
or positive – is presumably beyond description. During the recent years, however, the 
shareholder value maximization theory has been under public attack both academically 
and politically. Put roughly, the public dispute in the news media is about juxtaposing 
profits and morals while the exactly similar alignment to two camps in academia is 
reframed to being about shareholders versus stakeholders. Whose interests should be 
acknowledged in running a corporation? The issue of the corporate governance is not 
isolated into the boardrooms of large corporations – it is the issue of interest for a much 
larger group of stakeholders – it is the issue of citizens.  
The shareholder value maximization theory has been attacked in the news media for 
example by Nocera (2012) and Stout (2015) in The New York Times, by Galston (2014) 
in The Wall Street Journal, by Denning (2017) in The Forbes and by Cossin (2011) in 
The Financial Times. The result of this literature review clearly indicates that 
academically the interest towards the theory has been steadily increasing since the 1970s 
and since the development of the explicit shareholder value theory. In the public media 
there are many attackers but quite few public defenders for the shareholder value 
maximization theory but in the academic discourse there are also fierce defenders for the 
theory. For example Friedman (1970), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Rappaport (1986, 
2006), Jensen (2001) and Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a, 2004b) are significant 
contributors academically defending the theory. Academic writers who directly pose 
criticism over the shareholder value maximization include for example Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000), Lazonick (2012) Stout (2002, 2008, 2013) and Bower and Paine 
(2017). In addition, all authors writing about the stakeholder theory – such as Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) and Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & DeColle (2011), are 
sometimes counted as direct opposition to prevailing shareholder value maximization 
theory. 
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Maybe most notably, the former chief executive officer of the General Electric and a man 
who were once titled as the ‘father of the shareholder value’ told to Financial Times that  
“… shareholder value maximization is the dumbest idea in the world” and that 
“shareholder value is a result, not a strategy … your main constituencies are your 
employees, your customers and your products.” – Jack Welch (2009) 
The title of the father of the shareholder value maximization was addressed to Jack Welch 
because he gave a speech in 1981 where he applauded the goals of profit and dividend 
increases and many believe that other chief executive officers picked that up and shaped 
their own management objectives accordingly (Welch  2009). What is this all about? 
Naturally, if current practices do not work, they should be discussed and altered. 
However, to label contemporary corporate governance system being the dumbest idea in 
the world is quite dramatic statement. Our textbooks do not argue for the shareholder 
value maximization, they announce it (e.g. Brealey, Myers and Allen 2008). So how is 
the shareholder value maximization justified or is the whole science of economics and 
capitalistic societies misled by the dumbest idea in the world?  
The challenging goal of this literature review is to review and synthesize significant 
academic literature revolving around the shareholder value maximization theory within 
quite limited number of pages. The focus of the review will be in tracing the logics behind 
the theory and in tracing how the arguments and the theory developed over the years and 
from where did the theory originate. Comprehensive academic literature reviews covering 
this issue do not exist and clear conflicts in the views of both practitioners and academics 
requires an analysis of what really happened. Is the shareholder value maximization a bad 
theory or is it merely misunderstood and hence misused? 
It would be helpful to remain the focus in the fact that the capitalism itself, the related 
institutions and the related theories are all designed by humans and that they are 
innovations of a mankind. Capitalism and related theories are innovations of economists 
rather than Truths or underlying meta-ideologies inherently attached to the correct form 
of humanity or living. While the Truths are static, innovations of economists can be 
altered. Good case could be made that the theories of economists should be altered 
whenever problems are encountered – refutation of a hypothesis is precisely the 
foundation of science. 
 Setting the stage 
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The shareholder value maximization theory holds that because the shareholders are the 
residual claimants of the corporation, the corporation should be run so as to maximize the 
value of the shareholders (Easterbrook and Fischel 1983). The current model for the 
corporate governance is to govern for the shareholders and for the capital markets. The 
current model dictates that appropriate model for distributing corporate wealth is to 
distribute it to shareholders as they are the residual claimants of the corporation 
(Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). Furthermore, the shareholder value maximization theory 
is used as a normative guide in managerial decision making, implying, that managers 
should make all the decisions so as to maximize the shareholder value (Rappaport 1986; 
Jensen 2001). This theory is labeled as shareholder value maximization theory, 
shareholder wealth maximization or simply as shareholder primacy. In short, the 
shareholder value maximization theory is used as a corporate objective. 
In the context of corporate governance, a corporation is defined and characterized by few 
important features which are; limited liability of the owners of the corporation; 
proportional and dispersed ownership based on shares that are traded without constraint; 
and the recognition of a corporation being a legal entity (e.g. Stout 2002, 2008, 2013; 
Monks and Minow 2011). As such, the corporation is among the most influential ideas of 
human beings so far, and a fundamental cornerstone of the capitalistic and democratic 
society. The corporation form of business allows the separation of ownership and 
management which is known as an agency-based system or – as they say in economics 
research – as an agency problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Berle and Means 1932). 
Without the agency theory the shareholder value maximization theory would fall apart 
because it is the agency theory that assigns the powers of ownership to the shareholding 
institution and position of an agent to the management and board of directors. 
In principle, agency setting allows any individual to establish a corporation of a 
reasonable size regardless of the initial wealth of an individual because through the capital 
markets it is possible to accumulate necessary capital. Agency setting also allows 
shareholders to diversify their holdings as they are not required to take part – or 
responsibility – in day-to-day management of corporations as the management acts as 
shareholder’s agent and the corporate board of directors elected by the shareholders is 
keeping managers in discipline. Shareholders are also able to alter their investment 
positions through efficient capital markets and to invest more to the corporation or 
withdraw their entire position in the corporation and reinvest to another. The shareholder 
value maximization theory is guiding how these agency-based limited liability 
corporations are operating in many modern capitalistic economies, most of all the 
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shareholder value maximization is dominant in the US and UK. (Clarke, Jarvis and 
Gholamshahi 2018; Bower and Paine 2017; Brealey et al 2008; Stout 2008; Sundaram 
and Inkpen 2004a; Jensen 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Friedman 1970.) 
While the capitalism and shareholder value maximization are creating rising amounts of 
wealth trough corporate form of business which is characterized by agency-based 
management and ownership, they are creating also rising concerns over the Planet Earth’s 
capacity to endure this economic prosperity and ever accelerating growth. Rising are the 
concerns over inequality, destruction of natural resources, poverty, conflicts, 
concentrating capital, financialization, erosion of the middle-class, financial instability, 
exploitation of weaker, short-termism and trade wars to mention few that springs to mind 
(see e.g. Clarke et al 2018; Davis 2018; World Bank 2018a; Clarke, Jarvis, Gholamshahi 
2018; Lazonick 2012; Piketty and Saez 2003). What is undeniably true is that the quality 
of our lives and the state of our planet are both strongly related and intertwined with 
actions of these corporations. The claim should not need more justifications than the 
notion that the corporations do control most of the world’s resources and what they do 
with them is crucial for the health of the planet.  
In the capitalistic economies of the US and UK, the shareholder value maximization is 
used to distribute corporate wealth and more importantly, the shareholder value 
maximization is used to determine corporate strategies and managerial decisions (e.g. 
Brealey et al 2008; Rappaport 2006; Jensen 2001; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). In 
essence then, the shareholder value maximization theory is used to allocate resources that 
corporations own and hence, the shareholder value maximization will determine much of 
the future health of our planet and the state of the equality and welfare in the society that 
we live in. In financial literature the resource allocation is simple; investments of 
resources are made as long as they yield more than the initial investment requires. Put 
more academically, corporations should invest if a project’s net present value is positive. 
Positive net present value is increasing cash flows and cash flows are driving the 
shareholder value and the share price (Brealey et al 2008). So, strictly interpreted the idea 
that is driving the resource allocation is totally amoral or neglecting all moral judgment 
in this clearly moral decision of where to invest and why? This apparent lack of moral 
and ethics is one of the focal points of interests in the thesis. What is the future outlook 
of the society if maximum share price is the main determinant of how resources are 
allocated and used? 
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The shareholder value maximization theory is regularly justified with general utilitarian 
logic which is common to many economic and other social science theories (Jensen 2001; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a; Jones and Felps 2013). Utilitarianism is a moral choice and 
requires moral judgement. That is, the shareholder value maximization is justified to be 
the corporate objective because that objective creates maximum wealth and well-being 
for the whole society and not just for the shareholders. In terms of how economists 
articulate; shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective is accepted and 
correct because it increases the size of the pie for all (e.g. Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). 
This thesis is simply asking the question how so? which is – surprisingly enough – not 
asked as often as one would imagine when the matter is as important as the corporate 
objective. To answer the question, historical analysis of the shareholder value 
maximization is needed. The opening quote of the thesis was from the Schumpeter’s 
(1954:5) seminal book history of economic analysis and he continues; 
“…much more than in, say, physics is it true in economics that modern problems, 
methods, and results cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of how 
economists have come to reason as they do.” 
According to the careful literature synthesis, the economic roots of the shareholder value 
maximization can be found from Adam Smith’s (1776) work and legal foundations are 
established in the US and UK during the 19th century. More recently the shareholder value 
maximization theory springs from the neoclassical desire for profit maximization (e.g. 
Weintraub 2008). Capitalistic democracy has altered the way corporations are owned and 
managed. Still on the 19th century management was clearly based on technocratic 
professionalism and corporations were founded and managed to serve the society and 
some higher cause, to build a railroad for example (e.g. Clarke et al 2018:2; Monks and 
Minow 2011). The separation of the ownership and management suggests that not only 
owners can be managers but in general anyone could be a top-manager or a director. 
Similarly, anyone who is willing to invest a small amount of money could be owner. As 
one would expect, the direct consequence is a need for a measurable goal that is 
understandable without managerial professionalism or talent and that is visible from the 
outside of the corporation. The resulting measure is the shareholder value and 
maximization of it is the objective of managers of this new democratic regime of 
management. This would be labeled as democratization of management – a phenomenon 
to which the shareholder value maximization was essential. 
According to the shareholder value maximization theory, corporations should maximize 
the value of the shareholders because shareholders are the residual claimants and hence 
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they are the only group of stakeholders that are willing to take enough risks to actually 
increase the size of the pie for everyone (Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). Through intuitive 
sense of justice and through the common sense, it would be very attractive to argue that 
many stakeholders, other than the shareholders, actually hold more meaningful stakes in 
the corporation and therefore the maximization of shareholder value is not justified and 
it may appear to be even quite dubious idea. For example, employees invest their time 
and they take responsibilities in the corporation and furthermore, their livelihoods and 
pensions are depending from the corporation’s success whereas the shareholders invest 
only a small fraction of their capital to the corporation with no responsibilities whatsoever 
and shareholders may easily withdraw their stakes in the corporation at any given time. 
Because of this intuitive or purported injustice, an alternative theory for the corporate 
governance model and for the corporate objective is available. 
The contestant is labeled as the stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995; 
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & DeColle 2011). Shareholder theory recognizes only 
one goal for the company; to maximize the value of its shareholders. Stakeholder theory 
is representing the other extreme calling for managers to take into account all stakeholders 
of the company including employees, society and customers for instance (Jensen 2001; 
Freeman et al 2011). The debate has been going on actively for over 100 years even 
though the goal of every single debater seems to be to increase the overall social welfare. 
Scholars are unable to conclude what corporate governance mechanism or corporate 
objective will lead to the increased welfare (Jensen 2001:302; Sundaram and Inkpen 
2004; Freeman et al 2011). The disagreement between the two – the stakeholder theory 
and the shareholder value maximization theory – is striking. For the others, the 
shareholder value maximization theory is momentous as the Hippocratic Oath is for 
doctors (e.g. Jensen 2001:299) while for the others, it is the sole source of the pain and 
agony in the economy and the society (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). The debate 
between shareholder and stakeholder is about juxtaposition of profits and ethics, of share 
and stake, of profitability and responsibility – if put shortly, it is about a dichotomy of 
good and evil and it is framed similarly as Hollywood movies and classic philosophical 
problems from 2500 years ago (see Ribstein 2012; Lewis 2011). This thesis will not take 
stances in this debate since it would not be fruitful – most likely there would be nothing 
to add to this vast and problematic body of literature. The thesis strives to objectively 
assess the shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective and its history and 
evolution to current dominance. 
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Depicted juxtaposition or dichotomization often arouses big emotions and unnecessarily 
obscure things and thinking. Indeed, the public and academic debate over the issue is 
quite often misaligned to consider which parties should benefit and how much from the 
results of the business and whose interests – shareholders’ or someone else’s – are the 
most important and should be fulfilled before and over the others (Bower & Paine 2017; 
Freeman 2011; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a; Lazonick et al 2000; Friedman 1970). 
Academics forget the point, which was not the battle of stakeholder groups, but to develop 
functioning theory for corporate governance that uses solid logic in maximizing the social 
welfare and simultaneously survives moral and ethical examination.  
The issue is normative and logical rather than empirical. Hence, typical for the academic 
papers connected to area is that they are rather rational constructs or normative essays 
rather than empirical analyses or positive and descriptive studies (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Jensen 2001; Jones and Felps 2013). In addition to stakeholder theory, 
the inconsistencies and intuitive injustice of the shareholder value maximization have 
aroused vast stream of literature considering corporate social responsibility to counter the 
shareholder maximization (Aguinis and Glavas 2012). Yet another stream that has 
received large part of the interest is striving to align shareholder interests with 
management’s interests (Jensen and Murphy 1990). This aligning stream is reinforced by 
regulative interests. Inequality, wealth distribution problems and physical resource 
allocation problems are rarely connected with shareholder value maximization (see 
Clarke et al 2018.). The stream that according to this research do not exist is the stream 
that would examine the link between maximum social welfare and the shareholder value 
maximization theory (see Jones and Felps 2013). 
 Research gap 
As a topic of interest, whether you are a manager, policy maker or researcher, the purpose 
of a corporation in itself is such a jungle that if you would like to read about the topic, 
you would be swamped to a methodological, ideological and philosophical chaos. There 
are no comprehensive systematic literature reviews on this issue published in major 
economic publications. Few can be found among the grey literature and for example paper 
from Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) is a literature review but not as comprehensive as one 
would hope, and it is not systematical.  
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No one seems to know exactly from where and how the shareholder value maximization 
came and when – apparently the shareholder value maximization is an idea that 
encroached as Keynes (1936:383) put it. Scholars have different views, and many begin 
the analysis with Milton Friedman’s (1970) article while some are crediting Adam Smith 
(1776) while in the news articles the credit is given to Jack Welch (Welch 2009). One 
rationale for this literature review is that the theory of such influence and dominance as 
the shareholder value maximization theory is, should be something like grounded formal 
theory (Kearney 1998). Grounded in the sense that theory wishing to set purposes and 
objectives of corporations should be grounded in somewhere – in what people and society 
desire or at least in what science and research shows. Formal in the sense that it is general 
abstraction of corporate goal regardless of a context.  
The thesis was intended to be an empirical test of the shareholder value maximization in 
Finnish context, but in the course of reading about 20 articles on this issue from accepting 
and refuting perspectives, not one author explained the roots of the theory or explicitly 
and adequately analyzed the link between maximum social welfare and maximum share 
price which is the core argument in justifying the shareholder value maximization (see 
Jones and Felps 2013). In other words, science seemed illogical and the shareholder value 
maximization seemed to be unjustified theory that is taken as given. Best elaboration of 
the link is found from Jensen (2001) but it is still shallow as he for example dismisses the 
critics of exploitation by one citation and leaves untouched the criticism for classic 
economic theories to which the shareholder value maximization certainly is vulnerable.  
It is not acceptable that corporate objective is determined by a theory that uses obscure 
logics – it should be obvious to every manager that why I am now deciding the way I am 
deciding. Corporate objective cannot be determined by a theory that unintentionally 
encroached upon us without no one noticing and arguing for it. “It is the way it is because 
it has always been” is not good enough justification. The theory through which we 
allocate our resources must be logically rock solid and under conscious control. The 
corporate governance system should be morally and ethically justified. The claimed 
amorality of the shareholder value maximization theory is clearly a false argument as the 
choice of using the shareholder value maximization for making business decisions is in 
itself a moral choice made through moral judgement. It seems that there are very few 
topics crying for a literature review as badly as the debate revolving around the 
shareholder value maximization and the corporate objective.  
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“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the 
slaves of some defunct economist.” (Keynes 1936:383) 
The thesis does not follow the general lines of the debate over the issue which is often 
constructed as being between the stakeholder theory and the shareholder theory. In 
practice such an arrangement of the problem has led to discussion about the question of 
with whose preferences in mind should companies be run? The debate then gets lost into 
the jungle of ethics and it becomes reflections on why some social group should be more 
privileged than the others and how such thinking could be justified, or the discussion turns 
into listings of pros and cons of the two rivaling theories presented as a proof in favor or 
against for one or the other. 
It seems that everyone’s best interest or intention is in creating more welfare and 
prosperity for all parties participating in business and there is no conflict whatsoever. The 
issue though, seems to be that some scholars are worried about that the current corporate 
governance mechanisms somehow prevent increasement or maximization of social and 
economic well-being (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & De Colle 2011; Jensen 2001). 
 The purpose 
What should we – as thinking, feeling, learning, caring, self-aware, remembering, 
forgetful, aspiring, fallible, and social human beings – try to accomplish in and around 
the business world? (Gilbert 1996:viii) 
The above question posed by Gilbert (1996) resonates through every single page of this 
thesis and roughly the purpose of the thesis is to address this question. The purpose of 
this thesis is threefold, as there is practical purpose, theoretical purpose and 
methodological purpose. In general, the purpose is to write, structure and examine 
critically the ontology (‘the reason for being’) of the shareholder value maximization 
theory and to provoke thinking and discussion. This sort of critical ontological analysis 
considering the shareholder value maximization theory is only rarely provided as the 
shareholder value maximization is often thought as morally neutral (i.e. amoral) way of 
making business decisions (see e.g. Dobson 1999:70). The examination of the shareholder 
value maximization literature provided by this literature review was unable to detect any 
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comprehensive attempts to critically examine the ontology of the shareholder value 
maximization. From where did it came from and why – why does it exist?  
The shareholder value maximization is grounded in the idea about world where every 
human being is a selfish agent competitively seeking their own advantage within the free 
and competitive economy and so guided by the invisible hand the economy and the 
society will achieve higher good measured by utilitarian logic (Sundaram and Inkpen 
2004a; Dobson 1999; Friedman 1970; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith 1776). The 
invisible hand exempts management from the morals and from doing moral decisions and 
moral self-examination. People, however, are inseparably moral beings and people, rather 
than corporations, make the decisions. Therefore, it is essential to exhaustively write and 
document the ontology of the shareholder value maximization theory – the justification 
of existence of the shareholder value maximization theory. 
According to the shareholder value maximization logic, if managers only react to the 
signals from consumers and from financial markets, they are not doing, and they are not 
required to do any moral judgement (e.g. Friedman 1970; Dobson 1999). For example, if 
a beverage corporation is causing pollution by not recycling bottles adequately, the 
consumers can choose not to buy the products from this corporation which then sends a 
signal to the managers of the corporation. The investors may choose to withdraw their 
investments from the corporation. The manager of the beverage corporation then 
enhances the recycling processes because the manager received a signal of decreasing 
sales and decreasing share price. When the recycling process is enhanced the manager of 
the beverage corporation receives another signal from the financial markets and from the 
product markets which shows rising sales and investments. The decisions are made only 
based on the market signals, not based on any moral judgement. So became the morals 
vanished from the shareholder value maximization theory and from the financial 
economics.  
The argument is, however, that the decision to make business decisions based on the 
shareholder value maximization theory is moral and ethical decision involved with moral 
judgement. The manager of the beverage corporation might have chosen otherwise, the 
manager might have chosen to use the stakeholder theory instead. It could be that many 
managers and directors do not actually make this decision, but they should. By doing 
business decisions based on the shareholder value maximization theory manager implies 
indirectly that the theory is accepted. This pre-decision for how to do decisions opens the 
shareholder value maximization theory for moral criticism and scrutiny. Basically, the 
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shareholder value maximization theory implies that the party that has the most influence 
over the share price will be listened; in the above example it would be consumers 
appreciating recycling. Dobson (1999:71) argues that the shareholder value maximization 
is only a narrow moral position and a subset of subset of subset of all possible moral 
positions; 
“to choose shareholder wealth maximization is to choose a specific moral context 
within the broader context of utilitarian moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, in turn, is 
simply one context or ethical determinant within the broader context of modernist 
philosophy. Modernist philosophy is simply one ethical determinant within yet broader 
contexts. Indeed, only when one steps outside this modernist context does one realize 
that such concepts as cost-benefit analysis, means-end reasoning, and individualism are 
all ethical determinants among other possible ethical determinants.”   (Dobson 
1999:71) 
Put shortly, the shareholder value maximization is not amoral in any way and therefore 
ontology of the shareholder value maximization theory can be questioned. The purposes 
of the thesis can be described as follows: 
(1) The practical purpose of the paper is to address to the managers’ question; ‘should 
I manage so as to maximize the shareholder value?’ or ‘should I create my strategy 
so as to maximize the shareholder value?’ or rather ‘can I go with this 
conventional shareholder value maximization theory or should I consider 
something else, are there legal and economic premises in place that support the 
shareholder value maximization theory?’ This practical purpose comes as a 
byproduct of theoretical and methodological purpose. 
(2) The theoretical purpose is to follow argumentative lines of the shareholder value 
maximization to the very roots and abductively conclude whether the shareholder 
value maximization is to blame for malfunctions of corporate life and capitalist 
societies. Another, rather tangential purpose is to describe the evolution and the 
history of the shareholder value maximization – to describe how the arguments 
for current model for corporate governance evolved throughout the history of 
economic research. Put shortly, the objective is to examine the ontology of the 
shareholder value maximization. 
(3) The methodological purpose is to examine applicability of meta-synthesis in the 
field of management and economic literature. The meta-synthesis could assist in 
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reducing the relevance gap between management science and practice (Tranfield, 
Denyer and Smart 2003). 
While described general lines of the discussion (stake v. share) might be useful in some 
contexts, it does not answer to the more fundamental questions of why companies are 
misbehaving and why the shareholder value maximization theory has run into difficulties 
or how it achieved the dominant position in the first place. The solution is not to choose 
between shareholder and all stakeholders, rather, the solution would be to more accurately 
or adequately understand the behavior of human beings and collections of the human 
beings (such as a firm), which, in essence, would be developing a descriptive positive 
theory of the world for economics. This can be stated simply because the stakeholder 
theory (which is practically the only offered alternative) is not free from the exact same 
faults that are built into the shareholder value maximization theory. Take the short-
termism as an example, it is quite safe to argue that managers will not suddenly transform 
to be more rational in making business decisions if the goal of ‘maximizing shareholder 
value’ becomes replaced with the goal of ‘creating as much value as possible for 
stakeholders’. Problems in the practice or in the theory, are not solved by changing 
privileged group to another or to multiple groups or disputing over different priorities. It 
is – altogether – not rewarding nor productive to arrange the thesis around the issue of 
which party should be more acknowledged in running a company.  
The thesis attempts to exhaustively re-structure the debate with explanatory ambitions to 
clarify, locate and possibly identify the problems of the shareholder value maximization 
theory and corporate objective. While there are entire books arranged around the issue 
(see Freeman et al 2011), none of them is combining perspectives as the current study. 
However, the duality makes the shareholder value maximization more challenging theory 
to examine as it involves two levels of economic activity. The analysis must include the 
examination of the behavior of individuals (i.e. shareholders, managers) and examination 
of the institutional framework (i.e. law, boards, corporation). 
1.3.1. The research questions 
The research questions for the literature review stem directly from the found research gap. 
Namely, the gap is the fact that the shareholder value maximization is treated as a given 
state of affairs rather argued for in modern managerial and financial literature (see e.g. 
Brealey et al 2008; Rappaport 1986). Furthermore, scholars do not provide enough 
evidence around the theory and how the theory is developed. Even further, the link 
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between maximum social welfare and the shareholder value maximization theory is 
dubious or at least not very clear because it is somewhat obscure that how exactly the 
social welfare becomes maximized through selfish agents maximizing their own utility. 
The debate over the corporate objective has been revolving actively since early 1900s 
starting with the US Supreme court case Dodge v.  Ford in 1919 and got on to full steam 
when professors Berle and Dodd publicly debated about the issue 1930s. Yet, the 
questions are unresolved.  
How the theory that decides how corporate resources are allocated is justified in 
economic, managerial and legal literature? What are the grounds of the shareholder value 
maximization? In general, the literature review strives to answer to the question whether 
the shareholder value maximization is viable theory for defining corporate objective, or 
should it be replaced? More specifically, the following research questions will be 
addressed by this literature review: 
1. What is the content of the shareholder value maximization theory?  
2. How the shareholder value maximization theory developed and how did it 
originate? 
3. Can the shareholder value maximization be held as responsible for corporate 
short-termism or immoral choices and their consequences? For example, excess 
pollution, pinto-madness (Dowie 1977), rising inequality (Piketty and Saez 
2003), Enron and accounting scandals (Markham 2015). 
4. Since the logic of the shareholder value maximization is utilitarian (e.g. Jensen 
2001; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a), is the shareholder value maximization as a 
corporate goal maximizing social welfare? How the social welfare becomes 
maximized through maximizing the shareholder value? 
5. What arguments are developed to accept or refute the shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate objective? 
This research synthesis uses abduction as a logical tool in drawing the conclusions from 
the analyzed and synthesized literature to answer these research questions. The notion of 
abduction might not be as clear as are deduction and induction. Therefore, abduction is 
defined here in contrast to these more accepted logical ways for arriving to conclusion. 
Deduction involves the certainty and necessity of consequences as the deduction dictates 
that if the premises are true, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false. Induction is 
somewhat weaker form of inference as induction dictates that it is improbable that the 
conclusion is false when the premises are true. Abduction is weakest of these forms of 
logical inference as the abduction dictates that it is implausible for the premises to be true 
and the conclusion to be false. Abduction is described by the words ‘inference to the best 
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explanation’ (Walton 2005:4). Inference to the best explanation is the best possible 
outcome of this research as it is impossible to know for certain how and why some theory 
has evolved and what are the consequences. The research may take an intelligent guess 
based on evidence. In short, the choice of abduction follows from the uncertainties that 
the concept of causation creates for deduction and induction (Walton 2005:158). The 
result is ‘explanatory hypothesis as conclusion’ (Walton 2005). The analysis of the 
shareholder value maximization theory’s origins is necessarily at least partly historical. 
Therefore, certainty cannot be achieved, but inference of the best explanation in general 
should be possible.  
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2. METHODOLOGY & DATA 
 Introduction 
Demand for conducting literature reviews becomes evident when considering the 
cumulative side of the science – that the science should be cumulative (Chalmers, Hedges 
and Cooper 2002:12). The ever-increasing amount of research is the reason why it became 
essential to conduct literature reviews as stand-alone studies (Heyvaert, Hannes & 
Onghena 2017:1). The pressure for stronger connection between results of policies and 
practice, and scientific evidence appeared first in medicine in 1980s’ and from there it 
spread all-over the public policy (Mays, Pope and Popay 2005:6). Clearly, it would not 
be worthwhile for every practitioner, researcher or policymaker to review all primary-
level (i.e. original studies) studies and then decide on what actions to take. Until recently, 
the approach of literature reviews, systematic evidence reviews, and meta-analyses has 
been quantitative, and the focus has been in reviewing efficiency of the given approach 
or intervention. Thus, methods for quantitative meta-analyses are well developed. 
However, in the complicated setting that managers are operating in, it is not enough to 
have quantitative meta-analysis of effectiveness of the given approach. Rather, if science 
and research hope to support the managers and policy-makers in their decision-making 
process more adequately and in the several phases of the process, a wider range of 
evidence has to be reviewed, synthesized and cumulated. Generally, issues to be 
addressed include for example; why is the corporate objective a problem in the first place; 
from where and how did the shareholder value maximization came about; how important 
this problem is compared to others; what are the effects for different social groups; is this 
appropriate; what are the possible options to address this problem (Mays et al 2005:6)? 
Traditionally literature reviews in economics have been narrative reviews, but the 
narrative approach has recently been accompanied by systematic literature reviews (Jones 
and Gatrell 2014:257). Systematic reviews are rooted in medicine and they are thus 
mainly developed for reviewing quantitative studies employing uniform and comparable 
methods and positive philosophical orientation (Macpherson and Jones 2010:110; 
Chalmers, Hedges and Cooper 2002). Macpherson and Jones (2010:110) continue by 
questioning if traditional systematic literature review methods are applicable in 
management and organization studies.  
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If the usability of traditional systematic literature reviews is questioned within the 
research domain of management, it certainly can be questioned when the review is 
attempting to combine information from several fields of studies with even more 
dispersed methods, philosophies, symbols and language which the case with the 
shareholder value maximization is. However, the view is that even though systematic 
review methods would not be fully applicable, the principles are still applicable 
(Macpherson and Jones 2010:110). Fields that are examining the corporate goals and 
shareholder value maximization are numerous and do not share common methods and 
many of the influential articles have no methods at all as they are only reasoning what 
must be true because of X things that happened in the past or because Y things that we 
know (see e.g. Jensen 2001; Jones and Felps 2013). The intention of this review is to 
utilize strengths and principles of the systematic literature review even though intention 
is not to conduct pure systematic review.  
The approach applied in this literature review is stimulated and encouraged by; (1) the 
lack of systematicity and quality in the management literature reviews (Tranfield et al 
2003; Denyer and Tranfield 2006; Macpherson and Jones 2010; Timulak 2014; Jones and 
Gatrell 2014) and, (2) the solutions that are designed to overcome these weaknesses 
(Darbi et al 2018; Heyvaert et al 2017; Suri 2011; Mays et al 2005; Tranfield et al 2003) 
and, (3) by demands to increase the usability of the researched managerial knowledge and 
theories in practice (Starkey & Madan 2001; Sandelowski et al 1997). In other words, the 
intention is to reduce the relevance gap within this particular area of interest, explore new 
research methods and to increase the quality of literature reviews in management. 
To achieve the purpose of the thesis, a qualitative research synthesis considering the 
shareholder value maximization ideology is conducted by connecting and following 
several perspectives and argumentative lines from the fields of law, management, 
organization research, economics, finance, philosophy and ethics. Rather than traditional 
narrative literature review which is generally used in the management studies, a 
qualitative research synthesis is employed for these purposes mainly to decrease biases 
and to increase transparency and therefore increase the usability of this research 
(Tranfield 2003; Suri 2011; Heyvaert, Hannes & Onghena 2017). Orientation of the 
research synthesis is qualitative meta-synthesis rather than quantitative meta-analysis to 
reflect ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the review and because 
supposedly most, if not all, of the studies considering the shareholder value maximization 
as a corporate objective are qualitative studies or armchair reasonings. The 
methodological choices and the research design are briefly summarized in the next two 
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paragraphs and the thesis then proceeds by explaining and discussing in more detail why 
these methods and this design are appropriate for the research question.  
(1) The review will systematically retrieve a sample of literature to ensure that all 
arguments refuting or supporting the shareholder value maximization as a corporate 
purpose are included and considered in the review. Next, the systematically retrieved 
sample and its bibliometrics are analyzed to introduce and familiarize the review with the 
broad outlines, categories, thematic areas, quality, major contributors, most cited papers 
and other emerging important features of the area of literature to be reviewed. The whole 
sample will be reviewed but the level of analysis for the whole systematically retrieved 
sample is limited to abstract and title reading and source and reference scanning.  
(2) Then, the review will proceed by choosing few major papers or contributors to serve 
as a starting point for the more rigorous review and argument tracing and synthesis. 
Whether a source is classified as ‘major’ is judged based on the amount of citations, age 
of the paper, author of the paper, publication source and format of the paper and, most 
importantly, inclusion among the most important sources is evaluated based on the 
informativity and relevance of the source or paper regarding to shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate purpose. Thereafter, arguments and information traces are 
followed, rigorously backtracked and forward tracked. The tracking and following 
procedure is solely guided by theoretical sampling and it continues until the data is 
sufficiently saturated to find the possible gaps in the argumentative line and to answer to 
the research questions. The purpose is to explore usability of heretical literature review 
methods in the field of management to produce information that is valuable for 
practitioners and research (see e.g. Daft and Lewin 1990).  
 Ontological and epistemological underpinnings 
Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003:208) argue that literature review should be explicit on 
the values and assumptions that are made in order to reduce bias in the review and to 
increase its usability by practitioners and other researchers. On the ontological orientation 
scale from objectivist to subjectivist, or, on the continuum from realist to idealist, this 
research is positioned somewhere in between – but clearly tilted towards the idealist and 
interpretative end – since the distinction among the extremes is not a dichotomy (Morgan 
and Smircich 1980:492).  
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There are clear reasons for this mid-way setting. First of all, corporate goal or objective 
is something that cannot be judged ex-post or a priori, nor can it be examined in with fully 
realist mindset. Managers and directors are perceived to be the sole source of the 
corporate objective in this research because the shareholder value maximization is – due 
to the agency theory – CEO and board driven goal. Thus, the top management team and 
board becomes the subject of investigation and are perceived to exercise ultimate decision 
power over the corporate actions and goals. In other words, even though there are formal 
ways to more objectively state, research and measure organizational goals (e.g. balanced 
score card, Kotlar, De Massis, Wright and Frattini 2018), in this research corporate goals 
pursued by a corporation are regarded as solely driven and decided by the top 
management through their actions and, therefore it is impossible to objectively research 
what the goal is. Kotlar et al (2018) chronicle different organizational goals, their 
antecedents and processes, which can be surveyed and described through more positivist 
and realist lenses. These other approaches to organization’s goal become quite empty if 
the top management is ‘secretly’ pursuing shareholder value maximization or, if all of the 
other goals are held only as instrumental in achieving the shareholder value maximization. 
Therefore, this literature review is interested in the shareholder value maximization as a 
normative theory rather than in describing what kinds of organizational goals and their 
antecedents there are. 
Once a manager or a director has made the decision, it is next to impossible for the 
researcher to objectively judge what has been the motivation or objective of the given 
decision. Similarly, if trying to examine the objective of a decision prior to the decision, 
the research would again be operating with the subjective and idealist part of the 
continuum since the only source for information would the (subjective and retrospective) 
interpretation of the decision maker and subsequent (subjective) interpretation of the 
researcher. That is because from the outcomes one cannot objectively deduce the 
preceding objective or purpose – towering cost cutting might imply that the company 
would be striving to maximize the short-term shareholder value, but it might well be 
something else too.  
However, one may examine theories, their assumptions, evidence, content and debate 
which are used to build the theory and then interpret or conclude whether the theory is 
(1) being used by the management based on the decisions and statements they make and, 
(2) normatively evaluate the theory and, (3) compare the theory to its alternatives. 
Additionally, raw data (i.e. interview transcripts, field notes etc..) are rarely available in 
management studies which means that the object of analysis in management literature 
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review becomes not the data as in medicine, but researcher’s conclusions and findings 
which inevitably are influenced by researcher’s subjective attributes (Tranfield et al 
2003:216). 
But, there is clearly an objective side in the case. Organizations and corporations are 
concrete things, sets of contracts, collections of human beings, bundles of buildings and 
infrastructure producing concrete tangible outcomes. For example, surveys are 
presumably highly competent way for acquiring knowledge of corporations, managers 
and human beings which would indicate more of an objectivist ontology and positivist 
epistemological view. Further, an important part of the methodology employed in this 
review – the systematic literature review part – is deeply rooted in positivist disciplines 
such as medicine and often combined with quantitative meta-analysis rather than meta-
synthesis (Tranfield et al 2003:216). It would be difficult to label this review being solely 
idealist even though the stance is that objective ex-post examination of top management’s 
decisions is impossible. However, the normative guidance and theories that science, 
business education and practice example offer for managers and researchers can be found 
from literature and meaningfully synthesized to enhance decision making. In short, some 
aspects, for example outcomes, can be surveyed, measured and examined quite 
objectively but corporate goal and conclusions are inevitably subjective, contextual and 
normative and they may not subsequently follow from the outcomes. Thus, the research 
is only interested in examining the prevalent normative guide that is established in 
literature for top management.  
According to Heyvaert, Hannes & Onghena (2017:9) idealist reviewers of literature ‘go 
often beyond’ what reviewed research has reported. This research synthesis most 
certainly transcend what the individual articles report on the shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate goal. For example, this review aims to integrate and bridge 
between legal, philosophical and ecnomic research and reveal relationships among them. 
Furthermore, the current review aims to challenge the mainstream research, not merely 
report and synthesize the findings. The realist assumption would be that only by reflecting 
what former studies have revealed one can create and cumulate such a knowledge that 
would benefit managers or policy makers, to create evidence based practice (Heyvaert et 
al 2017:9). While the pure realist or pure idealist approach might be very well appicable 
in to several managerial issues, such is not the case with the sharheolder value 
maximization – as once again – the issue is normative (i.e. should shareholder value 
maximization be the corporate goal) and one cannot construct ‘evidence based’ advice 
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from positivist studies because what is needed is normative rules for corporations or 
normative definition of corporation for theory.  
Taken together, the literature review (i.e. research-synthesis) at hand is ontologically 
somewhere in between objective and subjective, epistemologically in between positive 
and normative but methodologically qualitative rather than quantitative. In practice, the 
aim of this paper is not to cumulate empirical evidence base to create the best practice for 
managers or strictly speaking to test the theory, but to questionize and judge the prevalent 
contemporary discourse on the shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective, 
reveal connections and sources, exhibit research gaps to guide future research and, most 
importantly, to give managers a way to think and assess the goal of their corporation and 
wonder, whether it should be altered. This is hoped to be achieved by revealing the 
underlying assumptions and developments of the shareholder value maximization and its 
alternative. Epistemologically, this study presumes that historical pathways are valuable 
knowledge and that lines of arguments can be cumulated and they can be traced. Once 
argumentative lines and evidence are traced and cumulated, one may choose whether to 
act on it or not. That is the purpose this review. 
 Meta-synthesis 
Tranfield, Denyer and Smart (2003:209) are united with Timulak (2014) and argue that 
traditionally literature review in management is not systematic but rather narrative, and 
that the difference between narrative and systematic review is that the systematic review 
is “adopting a replicable, scientific and transparent process … that aims to minimize bias 
through exhaustive literature searches of published studies and by providing an audit 
trail of the reviewers decisions, procedures and conclusions”. Tranfield et al (2003:208) 
continue that systematic approach to literature reviewing is a necessity if research on the 
field of management and organizations should advance because current management 
literature reviews are lacking critical assessment and they are exposed to the author 
related bias (i.e. what is included in the review and what is excluded is not transparent 
and might be crooked). 
The amount of literature and research – especially the amount of qualitative research – in 
the field of management is accelerating, and the more it accelerates, the more it will be 
fragmented due to interdisciplinary nature of the management and epistemological 
disagreements within the discipline (Tranfield et al 2003:208; Timulak 2014:481). 
30 
 
Because of the lack of unity in the management research, still more interpretative ways 
to synthesize qualitative studies and to compensate the inability to use the meta-analysis 
(i.e. quantitative analysis and pooling of raw data from studies with uniform methods and 
research questions) are being needed by the review authors (Sandelowski, Docherty and 
Emden 1997:367; Tranfield 2003). The developed solutions for these issues (lack of 
systematicity and increasing demand for reviews) include for example; realist synthesis, 
meta-synthesis and other variations to qualitative research synthesis which position 
themselves in between of the traditional narrative review and (i.e. quantitative) meta-
analysis (Tranfield et al 2003:217). Timulak (2014:481) emphasize that literature reviews 
on qualitative research are generally lacking systematic approach and therefore several 
techniques employing differing but overlapping methods to synthesizing and reviewing 
qualitative research are being developed. Common word for these techniques is synthesis. 
Synthesis signifies that individual sources are somehow brought together. This can occur 
for example through juxtaposing sources or by recognizing and deriving common issues, 
concepts and emerging insights (Mays et al 2005:7). Synthesis is especially needed 
around the issue of shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective because 
many papers examining or reviewing the issue are not studies in their traditional sense. 
The papers addressing to shareholder value maximization are not systematic reviews or 
studies which would employ scientific methodologies to be evaluated. These papers are 
best described with words ‘academic reasoning’. Although there are internecine conflicts, 
interdisciplinary arguments, measurement issues, definition issues and other difficulties 
hindering descriptive empirical studies examining the shareholder value maximization, 
managers and policy-makers have to make their decision. 
There are quite many and in many parts overlapping definitions for the qualitative 
research synthesis, but the common feature for them is that they include creation of new 
information by synthesizing research and making connections visible by for example 
juxtaposing or combining views (Mays, Pope and Popay 2005:7). The purpose, principles 
and features of the research synthesis are quite aptly described by Suri (2011:63); 
“[the purpose of the research synthesis is] to produce new knowledge by making 
explicit connections and tensions between individual study reports that were not visible 
before. It involves purposeful selection, review, analysis and synthesis of primary 
research reports on a similar topic. In a rigorous synthesis, readers are provided with 
sufficient information about the synthesis process so that they can make informed 
decisions about the extent to which the synthesized findings may be adapted to their 
own contexts.” 
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Indeed, there are many synonymic terms and overlapping approaches to the qualitative 
meta-analysis, which could be labeled being a systematic literature review for qualitative 
studies. Qualitative research synthesis, qualitative meta-analysis, qualitative meta-
synthesis, meta-ethnography, grounded formal theory, meta-study and meta-summary are 
examples of these overlapping approaches (Timulak 2014). They are all representing 
systematic approach to synthesizing qualitative research and the most often used 
umbrella-concepts for describing them are ‘meta-synthesis’ and ‘qualitative meta-
analysis’. Approaches vary in their sampling and in their area of concentration or interest. 
For example, Dixon-Woods, Agarwal, Jones, Young & Sutton (2005) chronicle twelve 
different approaches to meta-synthesis and evaluate their orientations, strengths and 
weaknesses. The current research synthesis can be labeled as meta-synthesis combined 
with sampling methods acquired from the grounded formal theory or simply, meta-
synthesis employing theoretical sampling. (Suri 2011; Timulak 2014; Heyvaert et al 
2017.) 
According to Sandelowski, Docherty and Emden (1997:366) meta-synthesis is an 
interpretative method for reviewing literature and it is used to discover and recognize 
generalizations, grand narratives and theories. Meta-synthesis approach also allows 
comparison and integration of findings of empirical studies (Sandelowski et al 1997:366). 
Research question directly determinates the methods for this literature review. Therefore, 
meta-synthesis is chosen over the other options such as meta-analysis, traditional 
narrative review, meta-ethnography and realist synthesis. Meta-analysis (i.e. quantitative 
literature review) would allow only comparison of fully comparable quantitative studies 
and therefore meta-analysis methods would not be suitable to search justification for 
corporate objective. Presumably, most of the studies answering to research question are 
qualitative studies rather than quantitative. (Heyvaert et al 2017; Tranfield et al 2003.) 
Purely narrative review would be exposed to researcher related biases which would 
compromise the broadness of the sources that are included (e.g. researcher only include 
articles supporting his argument) and proficiency of the review. Realist synthesis is used 
to synthesize results of different study types, but it is more suitable in capturing a list of 
mechanisms or characteristics (e.g. context) of why something is working or not 
(Tranfield et al 2003:217). The objective of this thesis is not to determine mechanisms 
through which corporate objectives are working or not, but to exhaustively understand 
the shareholder value maximization ideology and its underlying assumptions, arguments 
and premises. Therefore, meta-synthesis combined with theoretical sampling is 
appropriate method for the current literature review.  
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The toughest methodological choice is made between conducting a meta-ethnography or 
conducting a meta-synthesis with grounded theory sampling methods because they are 
very close to each other’s and they are suffering from the same weaknesses and strengths. 
Meta-ethnography has three different strategies that could be used to synthesize 
qualitative studies; (1) refutational synthesis, which strives to integrate contrary 
explanations of some phenomenon, (2) reciprocal translations, which strives to translate 
concepts of comparable studies together and, (3) lines of argument synthesis, which 
strives to create ‘higher-order’-interpretation of some phenomenon which is grounded in 
individual studies. As visible, the last strategy closely reminds the one acquired by the 
current review and the method seems to be fit with the research question and purpose.  
Whereas the meta-ethnography is giving no guidance on sampling whatsoever, the 
theoretical sampling of grounded formal theory is quite established and robust guide for 
sampling. Sampling method other than exhaustive or selective is a necessity for this meta-
synthesis. Still, meta-ethnography is the most promising of the discussed qualitative 
meta-analysis approaches and it has attracted funded methodological research (Dixon-
Woods et al 2005:48). However, meta-ethnography would not deliver significant benefits 
compared to the chosen meta-synthesis approach, rather, the missing sampling guidance 
would have weakened the transparency and the validity. (Dixon-Woods et al 2005; 
Denyer and Tranfield 2006:219-221) 
According to the editors of the International Journal of Management reviews, Jones and 
Gatrell (2014:257), systematic reviews have recently attained popularity among the 
management scholars. Not only have pure systematic reviews attained popularity, but also 
more innovative mixed review methods are being tested in management research and, for 
example, Darbi, Hall and Knott (2018:302) employ initial systematic search in the 
databases Scopus and Web of Science and cumulate the information through purposeful 
sampling methods thereafter. Darbi et al (2018) used their own assessment and the so 
called ‘snowball method’ (i.e. chaining or backtracking citations) in choosing excluded 
and included articles.  
The methodology of this review corresponds with experimental strategies for a literature 
review in management that are recently employed by management scholars (see e.g. 
Darbi et al 2018). Namely, the chosen method is meta-synthesis approach to conducting 
a systematic qualitative literature review combined with theoretical sampling. The design 
of the review is twofold, and it could be described and motivated as follows; (1) initial 
systematic searches are made and the results are analyzed at abstract-scanning-level to 
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increase transparency, to create brief bibliometric analysis and, to capture systematically 
and exhaustively all relevant articles within a priori defined limits to reduce possibility of 
bias. (2) Subsequently, the review is completed by applying theoretical sampling for 
identifying sources that are rigorously read and analyzed to follow argumentative 
structures and issues with no predetermined constraints until the data is saturated or the 
research questions are satisfied (Kearney 1998; Tranfield et al 2003; Suri 2011; Timulak 
2014:484-485; Heyvaert et al 2017:77-81).  
With the initial systematic search the current research synthesis; gains valuable insights 
on influential and information rich publications; increases transparency; produces a 
general bibliometric analysis and; ensures that all relevant arguments and information are 
being acknowledged and considered. From the subsequent theoretical sampling the 
research gains in-depth and unbounded picture of the state of the shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate purpose. Furthermore, described methods and approaches 
are applied in order to tailor the methods of this review to be a perfect fit with the posed 
research questions, to increase the meaningfulness and depth of the current review 
compared to simple systematic  review and, to overcome issues posed to literature reviews 
by the epistemological and methodological disputes in the management field1  (Tranfield 
et al 2003). In short, it is questionable whether purely systematic review is applicable in 
the management studies. 
One more reason for choosing the meta-synthesis and grounded formal theory as a method 
is that management scholars have reported about the ‘relevance gap’ – that management 
science does not contribute to the practice enough and that there is no audience for the 
findings of the management or organizational sciences outside the scientist community 
(Denyer and Tranfield 2006:214; Starkey and Madan 2001; Berry 1995:104; Daft and 
Lewin 1990:1). One reason that is mentioned for the explanation of the existence of such 
a gap is that management researchers – as social scientists practicing qualitative research 
– have dispersed philosophical assumptions and they for example set research questions 
and employ methodologies differently even though they would be researching the same 
or similar problem (e.g. Sandelowski, Docherty & Emden 1997:366). This review is able 
                                                     
1 Aggregation or cumulation of research might not be possible or reasonable in the field of management 
because of differing research question statements. Tranfield et al (2003:212); “Studies in the field rarely 
address identical problems and share a research agenda or, more importantly, ask the same questions. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that aggregative approaches to research synthesis, such as meta-analysis will be 
appropriate in management research as the heterogeneity of studies prevents the pooling of results and the 
measurement of the net effectiveness of interventions.” 
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to deal with dispersed philosophical assumptions because due to the theoretical sampling 
and interpretative focus, reviewed material does not have to be completely comparable. 
To summarize, the research design and methods employed for this literature review are 
supported and inspired by these accounted characterizations of the qualitative research 
synthesis (Mays et al 2005; Tranfield et al 2003; Denyer et al 2006; Suri 2011; Heyvaert 
et al 2017), by encouraging ambience for more experimental literature reviews and 
methods in the field of management research (Daft and Lewin 1990; Macpherson & Jones 
2010; Jones et al 2014; Darbi et al 2018) and, by the explicit and distinct demand for 
literature reviews of enhanced quality in management to inform research and fill the 
reported relevance gap (Tranfield et al 2003; Jones et al 2014; Timulak 2014). Most of 
all, however, the choice of methods is driven by the research question. The underlying 
purpose of the methodological choices is to explore usability of heretical research 
methods in the field of management to produce information that is valuable for 
practitioners (see Daft and Lewin 1990). 
2.3.1. Sampling 
Sampling is among the most important methodological decisions a review author will 
make (Heyvaert et al 2017), and especially so if reviewer is not able to use exhaustive 
sampling. Pure meta-synthesis would require a strict systematic literature search and fully 
transparent inclusion and exclusion criteria and basically implementing exhaustive 
sampling or selective sampling for the whole analysis (e.g. Heyvaert et al 2017). The 
initial systematic search enhances possibilities for acquiring broad, unbiased sample of 
literature that is needed to capture all aspects of societally as influential ideology as the 
shareholder value maximization, but it does not serve the needs of deeper analysis. 
Because of the broadness of initial systematic search (i.e. it is selective and exhaustive 
sample), it would not be reasonable or possible to thoroughly review and analyze every 
single article within the sample. Rather, it is more constructive to use argumentative lines 
and informativity of the source as a criterion for exclusion and inclusion of the source in 
the rigorous review. Hence, theoretical sampling is used to follow most of all arguments, 
but also ideologies, theories, narratives, major contributors and generalizations. (Timulak 
2014; Heyvaert et al 2017.) 
In short, primary systematic search ensures that bias is minimized, and transparency is 
maximized, while subsequent theoretical sampling allows being sensible and creation of 
new insights without reviewing abundant amount of articles and without neglecting 
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important information. If strictly obeying pre-determined rules for exclusion and 
inclusion, the review would miss important material, for example, Friedman’s (1970) 
article on profit maximization as a corporate social responsibility is not included in 
systematically retrieved sample but it appears to hold great significance for the 
development of the ideology. 
Further, it is necessary to narrow the sample from the initial systematically retrieved 
sample, but it should simultaneously be also more inclusive because this review cannot 
be limited only to the top-tier scholarly reviewed papers or to the publications that are 
from some strictly defined field of science. The problem in conducting only systematic 
literature search is that the review is not able to rigorously analyze hundreds of papers, 
but the sample should still be representative. Evaluation of the shareholder value 
maximization theory requires interdisciplinarity as influential and important literature is 
not found solely from the peer-reviewed and top-ranked journals published between strict 
time frame. This review desires to include everything that is relevant rather than 
everything, because inclusion of everything is not possible and inclusion of top-tier peer-
reviewed material in the field of management is not enough to explain phenomenon as 
large as corporate purpose. The theoretical sampling and data saturation are terms 
established by the well-established grounded theory and their content is similar in this 
study even though the grounded theory per se, is not applied (Kearney 1998).  
The theoretical sampling is a technique where sources included to the analysis are decided 
simultaneously during the analysis process. Decision for inclusion of a source flows 
through a constant comparison and it is foremostly guided by relevance and possible 
contribution for the research problem (Glaser 1978; Kearney 1998:181; Goulding 
2002:79; Suri 2011; Timulak 2014:485; Heyvaert et al 2017:82-83). In other words, if 
question arises during the analysis, the answer is searched from where it most likely will 
be found, and studies are included based on their relevance in explaining the phenomenon 
rather than based on predetermined criteria. According to several meta-synthesists – or 
systematic reviewers of qualitative literature – theoretical sampling is recommendable 
and suitable sampling option for meta-synthesis (Dixon-Woods, Agarwal, Jones, Young 
& Sutton 2005:47-48; Mays et al 2005:11; Suri 2011:70). Most rigorous attempt to use 
theoretical sampling might be Kearney’s (1998) as she employs the grounded theory to 
literature synthesis. 
Another option for sampling would be chain or snowball sampling which follows similar 
logic, but it is much more limited as it is more strictly based on the initial papers or 
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contributors chosen to start with. In the snowball sampling researcher decides one or few 
core sources from which to start following information and informants. Snowball 
sampling is criticized for leading possibly too homogenous sample and for lacking 
transparency while theoretical sampling suffers only from the criticism considering 
transparency. Theoretical sampling is considered more appropriate here because sampling 
might benefit from the possibility to jump off the line of certain contributor for example. 
Regardless of a chosen sampling method, collection of data stops when the data saturation 
is achieved. (Suri 2011; Heyvaert et al 2017.) 
Data saturation is achieved when inclusion and analysis of an additional source or 
research paper does not yield new or relevant insights for the literature review (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967:61; Kearney 1998:181; Suri 2011; Dixon-Woods et al 2005). In other words, 
the data saturation appears when accuracy of the answer to the research question will no 
increase by analyzing more studies or sources. For this review, saturation might be 
deemed to have appeared when contradicting or supporting arguments for shareholder 
value maximization are becoming repetitive and new insights are not found. Data 
saturation is criticized for being unreachable for most of the literature reviews and 
therefore data sufficiency logic is designed to offer an alternative for the data saturation 
(Heyvaert et al 2017:82). Rather than when saturated, in the data sufficiency logic the 
data collection stops when the review authors themselves decide and justify when the 
point is achieved that the purpose of the literature review is fulfilled – the gathered 
evidence is sufficient enough regarding the research question. (Suri 2011.) 
The possibilities for achieving data saturation or data sufficiency are strongly linked to 
the research question. Focused research question would allow rapid data saturation while 
broad research question might never reach the saturation in terms of available resources 
and review author’s knowledge and skills. Given the research question, this literature 
review will use data sufficiency logic even though data saturation could also be 
achievable. Data saturation might appear in this case because the research question is 
narrowly surrounded by the shareholder value maximization as a corporate purpose or as 
a theory and therefore research streams studying for example processes by which 
individuals and organizations set goals or the behavioral theory of the firm are supposedly 
excluded from the analyzed sample. If the research question would be about corporate 
purpose in general rather than concentrated around this certain theory, the data saturation 
would be much less likely achieved. However, due to limited resources in terms of time 
and writing space, this review will stop data collection when sufficient amount of data is 
achieved to reliably answer to the research questions; how the shareholder value 
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maximization theory developed and how did it became dominant; in what kind of 
evidence the theory is based on (is there logical arguments, empirical evidence, law etc..); 
what are the underlying assumptions of the theory; should it be replaced?  
2.3.2. Shortcomings of the methods and design 
Since research questions in management studies vary so much (e.g. Tranfield et al 2003), 
it is unlikely that simply pooling of systematically retrieved empirical findings would be 
reasonable in terms of this literature review, especially taking into account the nature of 
the research problem being no less than the corporate objective. Hence, findings of this 
review are inevitably interpretative. Interpretative approach is not always a weakness, but 
this review aims to giving guidance and interpretation decreases credibility of the research 
for practice. Interpretative approach is a necessity for this review because of ontological 
and epistemological assumptions made. It is also possible that there are no reliable 
(descriptive) empirical findings regarding the issue given the perspective of this literature 
review being shareholder value maximization as a corporate purpose. That is, other 
researchers might have acquired similar assumptions than the current review which 
means that there are no objective and descriptive empirical studies. Examining 
shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal is certainly hindered by definition 
issues – what constitutes a shareholder value maximization-oriented firm as it might not 
be explicit – and measurement issues. 
If there is empirical evidence to be reviewed, Sandelowski Docherty and Emden 
(1997:366) are asking two very important questions; can you – and if yes – would it be 
ethically and epistemologically appropriate to – sum up qualitative data or findings? 
Sandelowski et al (1997) operate in the different discipline (i.e. nursing and health) than 
that of management, but the issues are similar in synthesizing qualitative research. They 
continue (1997:366), that diversity of the practices causes the effect where qualitative 
research seems to ‘resist synthesizing’. Sandelowski et al (1997:366) argue that since 
there are philosophically, theoretically, socially and politically varying researchers 
conducting research through varying lenses of post-positivism and constructivism, 
feminism and Marxism, and applying different theories from grounded theory to 
ethnographic studies, it might be that even ‘finding the findings can be a challenge’. 
Theoretical sampling is employed to acknowledge these challenges because it allows 
interpretation and comparison of the findings and arguments rather than pooling them. 
The aim is to follow and synthesize supporting and refuting arguments considering the 
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shareholder value maximization ideology as a corporate purpose, not to synthesize 
findings of dispersed qualitative studies. For example, the idea is not in synthesizing 
studies answering to research questions such as; ‘will the shareholder value maximization 
theory increase or decrease market value of a corporation within a certain context’. The 
idea is to extract, analyze and synthesize arguments by which the theory is justified and 
examine the quality of evidence that is supporting of refuting the theory. To ensure the 
thickness of qualitative studies the arguments will be followed to the very roots and the 
review of articles will start from the systematically retrieved pool of articles to ensure that 
all relevant arguments will be found. Arguments are traced and followed for so long, that 
the data is saturated. This method – a combination of systematicity and theoretical 
sampling – should allow to construct rigorous analysis of the validity of the shareholder 
value maximization as a corporate purpose and to give managers and researchers ability 
to frame, originate, design, compare, wonder, weigh and judge their corporate purpose 
and decide if the purpose or objective should be altered.  
The theoretical sampling is criticized for lack of transparency but as descried, the perfect 
transparency is a sacrifice that must be made in order to answer to the research questions. 
Transparency issue is handled with conducting initial systematic searches and by being 
as explicit as possible regarding the sampling. The theoretical sampling is also hoped to 
acknowledge some context issues as the shareholder value maximization as a subject of 
research is highly contextual and restricted to the geographical areas of US and UK. The 
research is also limited to large publicly listed corporations. 
2.3.3. Possible findings 
If the review finds that there are gaps in the literature, the review can contribute the 
scientific field of management by pointing to those gaps that are in need for further 
research and attention. If, say, there are no gaps, and it seems clear what the corporate 
purpose is and should be (e.g. law might dictate what it must be), the contribution of this 
review becomes even more significant, as it will be that the fields of management, law, 
finance and philosophy among others, can all stop disputing over the corporate purpose 
and channel thereby released resources to more productive targets. For practice – 
education and management – the finding would be still more impressive as corporations 
and managers could then do decisions without hesitation and professors could reliably 
instruct future leaders in business schools. Corporate purpose holds such a significance, 
that the managerial, legal and philosophical arguments that are used to build and justify 
the purpose must consist of an unbroken argumentative chain and be logically rock solid. 
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The ultimate interest of review is that, once arguments for and against are sufficiently 
cumulated, reviewed and synthesized, practitioners and researchers will be able to more 
easily decide what purpose to follow. 
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3. SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE SEARCH & BIBLIOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS 
 Scoping search [search 1] 
The initial systematic search is consulting Scopus database because it includes wide range 
of large publishers operating in social sciences which are the core source of the literature 
around the shareholder value maximization theory. There are 5000 publishers and almost 
22 000 peer-reviewed journals indexed in Scopus among which are the major publishers 
from the fields of management and economics. Major publishers include for example 
Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Taylor & Francis and Sage publishing. (Scopus 2017.)  
By using very broad, thematic keywords, with double quotation marks and limiting 
included subjects to social sciences, economics and business, the initial pilot search 
retrieved 6 385 results (see table 1). The purpose of the initial search is trifold; (1) to 
identify the countries where the shareholder value maximization is mostly researched and 
applied, (2) to compile key words for further systematic literature search strategy and, (3) 
to identify broad trends of the literature (i.e. is the pace of publications decelerating or 
accelerating, are there any major journals or authors influencing in the field). 
Table 1 Search strategy for scoping search (1) 
 
Search terms included in the initial search: 
shareholder value, stockholder value, shareholder wealth, shareholder primacy, corporate 
objective, corporate purpose, stakeholder theory, stakeholder management, stakeholder 
approach 
 
The Boolean phrase: 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "shareholder value"  OR  "stockholder value"  OR  "shareholder wealth"  OR  
"corporate objective"  OR  "stakeholder theory"  OR  "corporate purpose"  OR  "shareholder 
primacy"  OR  "stakeholder management"  OR  "stakeholder approach" )  AND  ( LIMIT-TO ( 
SUBJAREA ,  "BUSI" )  OR  LIMIT-TO ( SUBJAREA ,  "ECON" )  OR  LIMIT-TO ( SUBJAREA ,  "SOCI" ) ) 
3.1.1. Geographical analysis of the shareholder value maximization 
Not surprisingly, the countries with the most publications are U.S., UK and Canada as 
they are together representing over half – 3403 out of the total of 6 385 publications – of 
the publications retrieved by the initial search. Rest of the publications are quite well 
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scattered over the globe with publication amount per country declining rapidly after the 
three top countries.  
It is crucial for the thesis to reveal where the shareholder value maximization is being 
applied, and whether it has spread throughout the world or is it still an Anglo-American 
phenomenon used mainly in common law countries. Geographical polarization would 
have been an interesting finding, but so is observed geographical concentration. This 
concentration to Anglo-America will guide the theoretical sampling into such direction 
where less importance is given to studies outside of these countries.  
Further, it is not fruitful to examine something in a context where it does not exist – 
especially unfruitful is to examine literature that does not exist. If there are little, or no 
publications considering the shareholder value maximization from the specific country, 
the stance could be taken that the shareholder value maximization is not applied as a 
major corporate goal in that country. Though it might be, that managers are applying 
shareholder value maximization unintentionally even though the country is not formally 
under such management doctrine, the research should be focused on areas where the 
shareholder value maximization is explicit. The basic assumption, however, is that the 
theory is mainly influential in United States and in United Kingdom and not so much 
elsewhere in Europe or in Asian countries such as Japan for example. This is also backed 
up with researchers (see. e.g. Yoshimori 1995; Lazonick et al 2000; Bower 2017). Thus, 
the examination of the shareholder value maximization in this study is concentrated in 
the U.S. and UK.  
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3.1.2. Frequencies of the shareholder value maximization 
The amount of publications per year has been increasing significantly every year since 
the beginning of the 1990s’ and the pace of the publications has been only accelerating 
during the past decade as is visible in the figure 1. Already 112 publications have been 
indexed to Scopus during the current year of 2019, indicating, that the pace is not slowing 
and interest towards the topic continues to pike. The authors with most publications 
within in the sample are stakeholder theorists such as Edward Freeman with 27 
publications and his co-writer Harrison with 20 publications. The journals that include 
the most of the sample’s publications are in order, Journal of Business Ethics with 390 
publications, Strategic Management Journal with 74 publications, Corporate Ownership 
and Control with 70 publications, Journal of Financial Economics with 69 publications, 
and Journal of Cleaner Production with 61 publications. For economists, the purpose of 
the corporation seems to be rather ethical question with a strategic twist because of the 
predominance of the Journal of Business Ethics in publication amount.  
 Scoping search [search 2] 
To further elaborate the examination of broad lines of the shareholder value maximization 
literature in economics, another pilot is constructed to consult the Scopus database. The 
second search is designed to exclude stakeholder theorists, corporate social responsibility 
advocates and financial economists who are interested in effects of some specific event 
to the shareholder value. The design attempts to capture more accurately the broad lines 
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Figure 1 Thematically related publications per year 
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of papers treating shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective rather than as 
a dependent variable or parameter.  
The search strategy is described in the table 2. Presumably, by adding the term 
‘maximize’ to the thematic concepts, including only articles that are titled with 
appropriate words and by dropping the stakeholder related concepts, the results represent 
more accurately shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal. Searching with the 
described strategy returns 212 results and after further narrowing the results by excluding 
irrelevant fields of sciences (e.g. engineering) and including only articles (i.e. no book 
chapters, book reviews etc.), the final amount of results is 152. 
 
Table 2 Search strategy for scoping search (2) 
 
Search terms included: 
Shareholder value maximization, Shareholder value maximizing, Shareholder wealth 
maximization, Corporate objective, Corporate purpose 
 
The Boolean phrase: 
TITLE ( shareholder  AND  value  AND  maximi?ation )  OR  TITLE ( shareholder  AND  value  A
ND  maximi?ing )  OR  TITLE ( shareholder  AND  wealth  AND  maximi* )  OR  TITLE ( corporat
e  AND  objective ) OR TITLE ( corporate  AND  purpose ) 
3.2.1. Publishing frequency analysis 
The yearly distribution of publications is again presented in the figure 2 to illustrate an 
interesting but unsurprising finding; based on the number of publications per year, the 
interest towards the shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal is peaking when 
the recession hits the economy or right after a recession, and along with the recovering 
economy, the interest towards the theory fades (see figure 2).  
The phenomenon holds also for a broader set of publications (6 385 pcs) but it is not as 
clear and visible as with stricter search terms and fewer results. For example, the recession 
of early 2000s’ is quite observable in the larger sample of 6 385 publications (figure 1), 
as the amount of publications is only moderately increasing from 60 pcs to 76 pcs between 
the years 1996 and 1999, whereas soon after the recession, the publication pace clearly 
picks up speed and over the next five years, the amount of publications per year doubled. 
Also, some major critiques concerning the shareholder value maximization – such as 
Lazonick et al 2000 – were published right after the recession of early 2000s’.  
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Publication amount per year rises from 110 in 2000 to 600 in 2018 which depicts the 
sustained rise in the interest toward the topic and efforts to make sense of the corporate 
purpose and yet, the systematic literature review of the current literature is lacking. 
Similarly, in the smaller sample of 152 articles, the amount of publications before the 
Great Recession (2007-2009) is low, and then peaks considerably immediately after the 
recession and returns to the lower levels when upturn in economy is achieved around 
2012. 
 
 
In other words, whenever there is a wide economic downturn, prevailing and dominant 
theory considering the corporate objective, the shareholder value maximization theory, is 
getting greater attention than at peaceful times. Obviously, this is a natural course of 
action in a society as if something seems not to be working, it should be fixed or replaced 
but it is also creating a clear starting point or context for articles published at those peak 
times and it might harm the objectivity of the articles if they are inspired by economic 
downturns. Timing of the publication of the material is therefore guiding theoretical 
sampling. 
Recessions and economic losses are surefire case for big emotions and therefore it is 
relevant to acknowledge the possible influence of these emotions or biased perspectives. 
It seems that the publication pace has not slowed but accelerated even further as the years 
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have passed after the last peak brought by the great recession. That may indicate, that the 
purpose of the corporation remains unresolved and the shareholder value maximization 
is still disputed among scholars and that qualitative research synthesis producing rigorous 
analysis of the origins and premises of the shareholder value maximization might have 
far-reaching implications for research, management and policymakers.  
To summarize, the shareholder value maximization is presumably used mainly in U.S. 
and UK because most of the research is from those countries and the presumption is 
supported by scholars. Therefore, the analysis will be concentrating on those countries 
and theoretical sampling is guided by this assumption. Another critical finding is that 
ethical considerations supposedly are among the greatest concerns of economists even 
though economics should be positive science (e.g. Friedman 1953). This has huge 
implications on the succeeding prospects of a theory. Thirdly, economic downturn might 
influence in the literature and attention has to be accounted for the publication year of the 
material when sampling. Finally, the interest towards the issue and the thematic area of 
the shareholder value maximization is still increasing and it has been increasing since the 
early 1990s’. 
 Systematic search [search 3] 
3.3.1. Keyword construction 
The point of the third search is to capture everything that management and related fields 
have to say about the shareholder value maximization theory. To construct keywords for 
the systematic search, the articles, abstracts and titles of the list of 152 results retrieved 
by the search 2 are scrutinized. Unsurprisingly, the word ‘shareholder’ is the most often 
mentioned word in the whole sample (titles and keywords) with 67 occurrences. In the 
author’s own keywords, the word ‘shareholder’ is most often followed by the word 
‘primacy’ or ‘value’. Shareholder primacy clearly indicating legal orientation and 
shareholder value economic or management orientation. Both orientations are considered 
as relevant but only ‘shareholder value’ is included as search parameter to ensure that the 
search will capture the core managerial and economic papers rather than the legal ones 
because managerial point of view is the core of this review.  
The legal standpoint is nevertheless recognized as an important field of study for the 
shareholder value maximization. Therefore, the legal aspects and roots of the shareholder 
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value maximization are carefully analyzed and discussed, but using theoretical sampling 
starting from the results of the systematic literature search (Suri 2011:69).  
‘Shareholder’ is considered to be an essential element of the search string because 
synonymic words such as stockholder or stockholder were not mentioned in author 
keywords. Maximization in some form is also an essential part of the search string 
because otherwise search will retrieve too many irrelevant results. There is for example 
abundant stream of literature in the field of finance citing to ‘shareholder value’ in some 
context, not related to the corporate objective. 
Second broad term identified is ‘corporate governance’ which is mentioned 30 times 
within the whole sample. Corporate governance is rather broad and separate field of 
studies in itself, but it also has crucial implication for the corporate goal. Only articles 
that are combining corporate governance and shareholder point of view should be 
considered relevant. Thus, corporate governance literature concerned with precisely 
managerial view of shareholder value maximization is thought to be included in terms 
like “corporate objective”.  
Third large body of literature identified from the sample was the stakeholder theory with 
the word ‘stakeholder’ represented 11 times in keywords and 21 times in the whole 
sample (i.e. title, abstract and keywords), even though the search strategy was 
intentionally trying to exclude stakeholder theory from the results of the second scoping 
search. Based on experience from the initial search 1, the risk that shareholder value 
maximization theory would be swamped by the abundant literature on stakeholder theory 
within the final sample, the stakeholder theory would not be included in the search 
strategy. However, stakeholder theory represents at least as remarkable theory of the 
corporate goal as does the shareholder value maximization that it cannot be excluded from 
the analysis of corporate goal. Thus, stakeholder theory part of this research synthesis is 
covered with theoretical sampling technique using comprehensive book by Freeman et al 
(2011) as a starting point (Kearney 1998; Suri 2011). The Freeman et al (2011) was 
identified as major contributor in scoping searches.  
Finally, corporate objective is mentioned 39 times, corporate purpose 16 times and, 
corporate goal 9 times. When examining synonyms for the word ‘corporation’ it turned 
out that corporation (i.e. ‘corporate’) is the word that is exclusively being used in this 
context. For example, separately the word ‘firm’ was mentioned 15 times and the word 
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‘business’ appeared 33 times, but neither is followed by the word ‘objective’ or by any 
relevant words. Thus, there is no need to use synonymic terms of the corporation.  
3.3.2. The results 
The final search string to gather relevant articles is formulated in the table 3. The search 
is focused in titles only, because literally thousands of journal articles are using some 
combination of given search terms in their abstracts and keywords and the list of results 
would not be reasonably sized for this literature review.  
Table 3 Search strategy for systematic search 
 
Search terms included: 
shareholder value, shareholder wealth, maximizing, corporate objective, corporate goal, 
corporate purpose 
 
The Boolean phrase: 
"shareholder* value maximi?ation*" OR "shareholder* wealth maximi?ation" OR "maximi?ing 
shareholder* value" OR "maximi?ing shareholder* wealth" OR "corporate objective" OR 
"corporate purpose" OR "corporate goal" 
The databases that are consulted with the search string constructed in the table above are; 
EBSCO Business Source Premier, ProQuest/ABI Inform, Scopus, Wiley, JSTOR and 
Emerald. The databases were chosen because of their comprehensiveness in the fields of 
management and economics. Retrieved results per database are presented in the table 4. 
Interestingly, two of the chosen databases retrieved zero results while three out of six 
databases are representing almost all of the results. Total amount of hits is 544 from all 
databases and the number of titles that is imported for closer scrutinizing is 487 as some 
titles are discarded immediately for being for example clearly irrelevant or being written 
in language other than English.  
After title reading, deleting duplicates (77pcs), deleting press releases (56pcs) and, 
deleting irrelevant articles (253 pcs) there are 96 results in the sample. Abstract reading 
further reduced the amount of publications to 68 pcs which is the size of the final sample 
(appendix 1). The exclusion and inclusion criteria stem directly from the research 
questions. Everything that does not clearly relate to the shareholder value maximization 
as a corporate objective are considered as irrelevant. Unpolished results include for 
example many event studies examining shareholder value effects in case of some 
happening (e.g. whether corporate social responsibility has positive effect on shareholder 
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value), analyses of shareholder value maximization in some very narrow or special 
industry (e.g. bank industry), lean-management papers, unavailable papers (e.g. many 
working papers were not available for download), regional analyses other than U.S. or 
UK and, financial restructuring recommendations which maximize the shareholder value. 
These are all considered irrelevant and they are removed. 
Table 4 Retrieved results per database 
 
Database Number of hits Imported for analysis Included after title reading 
ProQuest 294 271 37 
Scopus 143 138 44 
EBSCO b-s 98 69 7 
Wiley 9 9 8 
Emerald 0 0 0 
JSTOR 0 0 0 
TOTAL 544 487 96 
3.3.3. Supportive searches 
Heterogeneity of the final sample clearly indicates lack of discussion and lack of 
cumulation of arguments. Simultaneously it indicates a need for synthesizing literature 
review. Heterogeneity then becomes a desired feature of the final sample as the issue is 
broad and grey literature and other sources might be equally informative as are journal 
articles. However, to ensure representativeness, exhaustiveness and the quality of the 
gathered sample of 96 articles, two supportive searches are conducted in Scopus database. 
These supportive searches are somewhat broader in terms of inclusion than the systematic 
search [search 3]. 
To ensure the quality of the final sample retrieved by the systematic search, two 
supportive or confirming searches are conducted in databases Scopus and ProQuest 
ABI/Inform. Both supportive searches are consulting only the highest ranked journals in 
the fields of business, ethics & management, strategy, organization studies, business 
education, social science and finance. Fields and journal rankings are according to 
Academic Journal Guide (2018). Fields enumerated above are chosen because they are 
seen as central for the shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective. ‘Highest 
ranked’ stands for 3-4* ranks in the ABS (2018) guide (see table 5). The search strategies 
for the supportive searches are visible in the table 5. The search strategies describe used 
keywords and search terms and the following fields describe included top-ranked journals 
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per field. The Boolean phrase is a search strategy 1 or 2 combined with Boolean operator 
to include the source titles of the top-ranked journals listed in the table 5.  
The supportive search is conducted to ensure that the literature captured by the primary 
search strategy is broad enough to represent exhaustively the whole spectrum of the 
shareholder value maximization as a corporate goal. The difference between the first 
supportive search and the primary systematic search [search 3] is that the supportive 
search is broader in terms of keywords and that the keywords do not have to be included 
in title but instead in the title, abstract or in the keywords. On the other hand, the first 
supportive search is narrower in terms of included sources as it only retrieves articles that 
are published in the top-ranked journals.  
The first search attempts to capture articles that are about profit maximization more 
generally and articles that are about shareholder value but not maximization. 
Maximization is not combined with the shareholder value. The second supportive search 
is otherwise similar, but it searches from title, abstract and keywords also terms ‘review’ 
and ‘literature review’ to ensure, that possibly existing literature reviews are captured. 
Table 5 Supportive searches 
 
Search strategy (1): Scopus (549 results) and ProQuest ABI/Inform (294 reults) 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "shareholder value"  OR  "shareholder wealth"  OR  "profit maximi*"  OR  "maximi* 
porfit*"  OR  "shareholder* value maximi?ation"  OR  "shareholder* wealth maximi?ation"  OR  
"maximi?ing shareholder* value"  OR  "maximi?ing shareholder* wealth"  OR  "corporate objective"  
OR  "corporate purpose"  OR  "corporate goal"  OR  "organi?ation* purpose"  OR  "organi?ation* goal"  
OR  "sharheolder primac" )  AND  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( maximi?ing  OR  maximi*  OR  pursu* ) 
 
Search strategy (2): Scopus (83 results) 
TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "shareholder value"  OR  "shareholder wealth"  OR  "profit maximi*"  OR  "maximi* 
porfit*"  OR  "shareholder* value maximi?ation"  OR  "shareholder* wealth maximi?ation"  OR  
"maximi?ing shareholder* value"  OR  "maximi?ing shareholder* wealth"  OR  "corporate objective"  
OR  "corporate purpose"  OR  "corporate goal"  OR  "organi?ation* purpose"  OR  "organi?ation* goal"  
OR  "sharheolder primacy" )  AND  TITLE-ABS-KEY ( "literature review"  OR  "review" ) 
 
Included journals by field: 
(1) Business, ethics and management journals: 
"Academy of Management Journal" OR "Academy of Management Review" OR "Administrative 
Science Quarterly" OR "Journal of Management" OR "Academy of Management Annals" OR "British 
Journal of Management" OR "Business Ethics Quarterly" OR "Journal of Management Studies" OR 
"Academy of Management Perspectives” OR "Business and Society" OR "California Management 
Review" OR "European Management Review" OR "Gender and Society" OR "Gender, Work and 
Organization" OR "Harvard Business Review" OR "International Journal of Management Reviews" OR 
"Journal of Business Ethics" OR "Journal of Business Research" OR "Journal of Management Inquiry" 
OR "MIT Sloan Management Review" 
 (2) Strategy: 
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“Strategic Management Journal” OR “Global Strategy Journal” OR “Long Range Planning” OR “Strategic 
Organization” 
 (3) Organization studies: 
"Organization Science" OR "Human Relations" OR "Leadership Quarterly" OR "Organization Studies" 
OR "Organizational Research Methods" OR "Group and Organization Management" OR "Organization" 
OR "Research in Organizational Behavior" OR "Research in the Sociology of Organizations" 
 (4) Education: 
"Academy of Management, Learning and Education" OR "British Educational Research Journal" OR 
"Management Learning" OR "Studies in Higher Education" 
 (5) Social science: 
“American Journal of Sociology” OR “American Sociological Review” OR “Annual Review of Sociology” 
OR “Economic Geography” OR “Journal of Economic Geography” OR “Risk Analysis: An International 
Journal” OR “Social Science and Medicine” OR “Sociology” OR “Sociology of Health and Illness” OR 
“Antipode” OR “British Journal of Sociology” OR “Development and Change” OR “Economy and Society” 
OR “Electoral Studies” OR “European Sociological Review” OR “Global Networks - A Journal of 
Transnational Affairs” OR “Industrial and Corporate Change” OR “Journal of Development Studies” OR 
“Journal of European Social Policy” OR “Journal of Social Policy” OR “Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society Series A” OR “Kyklos” OR “New Political Economy” OR “Politics and Society” OR “Progress in 
Human Geography” OR “Public Opinion Quarterly” OR “Quarterly Journal of Political Science” OR 
“Review of International Political Economy” OR “Social Forces” OR “Socio-Economic Review” OR 
“Sociological Methodology” OR “Sociological Review” OR “Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change” OR “Theory Culture and Society” OR “West European Politics” OR “World Development” 
 (6) Finance: 
“Journal of Finance” OR “Journal of Financial Economics” OR “Review of Financial Studies” OR “Journal 
of Corporate Finance” OR “Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis” OR “Journal of Financial 
Intermediation” OR “Journal of Money, Credit and Banking” OR “Review of Finance” OR “Annual Review 
of Financial Economics” OR “Corporate Governance: An International Review” OR “European Financial 
Management” OR “European Journal of Finance” OR “Finance and Stochastics” OR “Financial Analysts 
Journal” OR “Financial Management” OR “Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments” OR 
“Financial Review” OR “Insurance, Mathematics and Economics” OR “International Journal of Finance 
and Economics” OR “International Review of Financial Analysis” OR “Journal of Banking and Finance” 
OR “Journal of Empirical Finance” OR “Journal of Financial Econometrics” OR “Journal of Financial 
Markets” OR “Journal of Financial Research” OR “Journal of Financial Services Research” OR “Journal 
of Financial Stability” OR “Journal of Futures Markets” OR “Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money” OR “Journal of International Money and Finance” OR “Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics” OR “Journal of Risk and Insurance” OR “Mathematical Finance” OR 
“Quantitative Finance” OR “Review of Asset Pricing Studies” OR “Review of Corporate Finance Studies” 
OR “Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting”  
Results of the supportive search confirm that the primary search is successful in gathering 
exhaustive, reliable and representative sample of literature concerned of shareholder 
value maximization as a corporate objective in the fields of economics, management, law 
and ethics. The results of supportive searches are reviewed by scanning titles, publication 
years, authors, citations and abstracts to detect relevant and influential articles and most 
importantly, results are scanned for indications that streams of relevant research exist that 
are not captured by the primary systematic search [search 3]. Such indications are not 
found. Only five articles are collected through the supportive searches of which only one 
is literature review. 
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 Final sample: an analysis 
All conducted searches and analyses indicate evident demand for literature review on 
corporate objective and more precisely, on shareholder value maximization. First of all, 
there are no literature reviews published in journals other than the recently published 
Kotlar, De Massis, Wright and Frattini (2018). Some literature reviews can be found from 
grey literature, but they are of poor quality. Despite of the systematic and iterative 
approach to literature search and article gathering, the final set of results is not as 
impressive as one would assume when the research topic is as colossal and of such an 
extraordinary importance as the corporate objective is. The results are very heterogeneous 
as they are; published fragmentedly between 1969 and 2019 (‘recession peaks’ are 
visible), published in various publications and various forms (i.e. articles, books, theses, 
dissertations) and representing varying views (law, economics, management, 
contractarian, communitarian).  
The shareholder value maximization is extremely academic topic and most of all 
managerial topic. Final sample consists of 68 results from the systematic search [search 
3]. The systematic search returned 96 results after title reading, but further analysis on 
articles revealed 28 articles being either duplicates or irrelevant. The final sample of 68 
articles is listed presented in appendix 1.  
Out of the final sample of 68 results 59 can be identified to be either scholarly law 
publication or ABS ranked source for business and economics. There are three results 
representing grey literature, two books and one dissertation. Out of those results that are 
ABS ranked (45 results), 51% are top-rated journals with rank of 3 or above, which 
reflects serious academic interest in the topic of shareholder value maximization as a 
corporate objective. In the unpolished data there were abundantly not classified sources, 
meaning that they are neither law journals nor ABS ranked management journals. 
However, one by one the amount of these not ranked sources diminished as they proved 
to be irrelevant. Many considered narrow geographical areas and others, for example 
several working papers, were simply unavailable for analysis. The set of 23 articles that 
are included and published in a journal having a rank ABS rank of 3-4* is presented in 
the table 6. This set of articles serves as a foundation for the analysis of the arguments 
supporting or refuting the shareholder value theory. 
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Table 6 3-4* ABS ranked articles in the sample 
 
Author Title Journal ABS Empirical 
Sundaram & 
Inkpen 
(2004a) 
The Corporate Objective 
Revisited 
Organization 
Science 
4* no 
Sundaram & 
Inkpen 
(2004b) 
Stakeholder Theory and The 
Corporate Objective Revisited: A 
Reply 
Organization 
Science 
4* no 
Freeman, 
Wicks & 
Parmar (2004) 
Stakeholder theory and The 
corporate objective revisited 
Organization 
Science 
4* no 
Jones & Felps 
(2013) 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
and Social Welfare: A Utilitarian 
Critique 
Business 
Ethics 
Quarterly 
4 no 
Jensen (2001  
& 2002) 
Value maximization, stakeholder 
theory, and the corporate 
objective function 
European 
Financial 
Management 
4 no 
Hansen & Lott 
(1996) 
Externalities and corporate 
objectives in a world with 
diversified shareholder/consumers 
Journal of 
Financial 
and 
Quantitative 
Analysis 
4 no 
Budde, Child, 
Francis & 
Kieser (1982) 
Corporate Goals, Managerial 
Objectives, and Organizational 
Structures in British and West 
German Companies 
Organization 
Studies 
4 yes 
Hsieh (2015) The Social Contract Model of 
Corporate Purpose and 
Responsibility 
Business 
Ethics 
Quarterly 
4 no 
Chambers & 
Lacey (1995) 
Corporate Ethics and Shareholder 
Wealth Maximization 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
3 no 
Dobson (1999) Is shareholder wealth 
maximization immoral? 
Financial 
Analysts 
Journal 
3 no 
Beggs & Lane 
(1989) 
Corporate goal structures and 
business students: A comparative 
study of values 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
3 yes 
Poitras (1994) Shareholder wealth maximization, 
business ethics and social 
responsibility 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
3 no 
Redwood, H. Setting corporate objectives Long Range 
Planning 
3 no 
Mendelow 
(1983) 
Setting corporate goals and 
measuring organizational 
effectiveness-A practical 
approach 
Long Range 
Planning 
3 no 
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Lazonick & 
O'Sullivan 
(2000) 
Maximizing shareholder value: A 
new ideology for corporate 
governance 
Economy 
and Society 
3 no 
Kury (2007) Decoupled earnings: An 
institutional perspective of the 
consequences of maximizing 
shareholder value 
Accounting 
Forum 
3 no 
Cantley (1970) The choice of corporate objectives Long Range 
Planning 
3 no 
Argenti (1969) Defining corporate objectives Long Range 
Planning 
3 no 
Parmar,  
Keevil & 
Wicks (2019) 
People and Profits: The Impact of 
Corporate Objectives on 
Employees' Need Satisfaction at 
Work 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
3 yes 
Bento, 
Mertins, & 
White (2017) 
Ideology and the Balanced 
Scorecard: An Empirical 
Exploration of the Tension 
Between Shareholder Value 
Maximization and Corporate 
Social Responsibility 
Journal of 
Business 
Ethics 
3 yes 
Clarke, Jarvis 
& 
Gholamshahi 
(2019) 
The impact of corporate 
governance on compounding 
inequality: Maximising 
shareholder value and inflating 
executive pay 
Critical 
Perspectives 
on 
accounting 
3 yes 
Denis (2016) Corporate Governance and the 
Goal of the Firm: In Defense of 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
Financial 
Review 
3 no 
Findlay & 
Whitmore 
(1974) 
Beyond shareholder wealth 
maximization 
Financial 
Management 
3 no 
 Typology of the shareholder value maximization literature 
Based on the systematic literature search, there are two academic ways to look at the 
shareholder value maximization theory. One could examine shareholder value 
maximization as a lawyer’s problem or as an economist’s problem. This thesis attempts 
to address both views with emphasis on economic view. Apparently, the economic part 
of the literature is roughly dividable to four categories; (1) managerial and business ethics, 
(2) finance, (3) efficiency and, (4) philosophy of economics. Alternatively, if only 
considering typology of economic literature of the shareholder value maximization, one 
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could combine efficiency and philosophy of economics under the category of 
‘economics’. Then the typology would probably be clearer and more accurate, but it 
would totally neglect legal examination of the shareholder value maximization theory 
because for example management is not equal category with law in this context (see figure 
3).  
The typology is provided in the figure 3 and the figure is then followed by brief 
discussion. The figure 3 is not exactly a hierarchical typology of the shareholder value 
maximization theory. Rather, it is mind map and ordered categorization of related and 
important concepts and literature streams that clearly emerged from the literature 
retrieved by the systematic search. These concepts, theories and ideas are needed to 
comprise the shareholder value maximization literature. And more precisely, authors 
contributing in these concepts and areas might be those that take stances and contribute 
for the shareholder value maximization and corporate objective. One analyzed article 
might be in several categories. The typology of the literature considering the shareholder 
value maximization as a corporate objective is one of the major findings and contributions 
of this literature review. It may be used as a basis for further literature reviews and as a 
guide to what is already examined at some level. Most of all it works as template to see 
what is already connected to the shareholder value maximization theory and what issues 
around the theory should be examined more. 
The first category is managerial studies and business ethics. The most prominent literature 
streams of all subcategories measured by fame and publication amount seems to be the 
stakeholder theory and the corporate social responsibility. The stakeholder theory is often 
seen contrary to the shareholder theory. However, there are three kinds of stakeholder 
theorists as Donaldson and Preston (1995) suggested. For some, the stakeholder theory 
offers competitor for the shareholder value maximization, for the others the stakeholder 
theory is instrumental in achieving the shareholder value maximization. The realization 
of the fact that other stakeholders have stakes in the corporation and that these stakes can 
be even more meaningful and riskier compared to shareholder’s stakes is the reason for 
these stakeholder positions and their prominence among the shareholder value 
maximization literature and in corporate objective literature in general. The same idea is 
behind the corporate social responsibility – because corporations control the resources 
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and they act within a society, they should be contributing socially as the society is having 
a stake and a risk in corporation. And similarly, as with the stakeholder theory, for the 
Figure 3 The typology of the shareholder value maximization 
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others the corporate social responsibility is the goal and for the others corporate social 
responsibility is instrumental in achieving financial superiority and shareholder value. 
Some see shareholder value maximization being an impediment for corporations taking 
the social responsibility. (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Freeman et al 2011; Smith and 
Rönnegard 2014.) 
The second categorization of the literature mentioning shareholder value maximization is 
financial literature. Along with the managerial corporate objective and strategy literature 
the financial literature is very important category. Simply because one can find the origins 
of the modern form of the shareholder value maximization from the financial literature 
(see e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Friedman 1970; Jensen 1990; Jensen 2001; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). Financial literature has concentrated largely in agency 
problem and agency costs and to aligning managerial interests with shareholder’s 
interests. Resulting literature revolves around designing compensations for chief 
executive officer to which managerial literature has responded with criticism (e.g. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan; Clarke et al 2018). On the other hand, financial literature or 
financial theories provide shareholder value maximization theory with basic things such 
as measurement instructions and definition (Friedman 1970; Findlay and Whitmore 1974; 
Rappaport 2006; Brealey, Myers and Allen 2008). For example, Brealey, Myers and 
Allen (2008) is one of the most used finance textbooks and it gives definitions for the 
shareholder value and instructions how to measure it with net present value methods.  
Third part of the typology is efficiency literature and fourth is philosophy of economics. 
These two are strongly interrelated and they are not generally connected with the 
shareholder value maximization but according to this literature synthesis, they are 
necessary elements of the evolution and viability of the shareholder value maximization 
theory. That is, the shareholder value maximization theory rests on philosophical 
abstractions of the human nature that economics assume. For example, economics assume 
that people are driven by self-interest and that they make rational choices based on perfect 
information as they pursue selfish goals (Smith 1776; Jensen and Meckling 1976). Then, 
the whole agency system – separated and dispersed ownership – is relying on this 
selfishness and rationality assumption. The shareholder value maximization is the 
ultimate test for classic economics in that sense. Classic economics also drive the desire 
for efficiency. Academic literature on economics, finance and management is 
impregnated with texts considering efficiency and how to achieve it and some even argue 
that the whole scientific discipline of management is based on efficiency (see Martin 
2019). Shareholder value maximization also strives to increased efficiency and for the 
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shareholder value maximization theory to work and be justified there must exist efficient 
capital markets and (almost) perfect competition (e.g. Jensen 2001; Jones and Felps 
2013).   
In the field of law, the shareholder value maximization has been a topic of interest for a 
bit longer than in the field of economics. That is because the law addresses problems of 
ownership and responsibility more directly than economics. For example, as the modern 
corporate form of business were established in 19th century (Millon 1990:206), the 
problem of minor shareholder oppression became an issue. Then courts were obliged to 
take stances in cases like Ford v. Dodge (see chapter 4.6.1.). The full establishment of the 
shareholder value maximization in the field of law was the Berle versus Dodd debate 
during early 1930s where these two professors debated what should be the corporate 
objective (Berle and Means 1932; Macintosh 1999).  These are the issues of the field of 
law still today, for example Stout (2002, 2013) addresses the problem that shareholders 
do not actually own the corporation as they only own the share they bought. Legally 
examined, the corporation owns itself as a legal entity. The other stream within the law is 
regulation. There is great deal of regulation that tries to address these legal academic 
problems of responsibility, accountability and ownership.  After all, legal framework is 
all that a corporation is. The other constituencies statutes are the most prominent 
regulation directly influencing to the corporate objective and the shareholder value 
maximization (see chapter 4.6.2.). 
Together, law and economics are comprising the literature mostly concerned with the 
shareholder value maximization theory. These all categories are addressed and discussed 
in this review with emphasis given to the managerial and strategic view. The field of 
literature considering the shareholder value maximization seems to be quite vast and 
dispersed and the origins of the theory are not precise. Therefore, there are no direct 
founders or school of thoughts from where the ideology of maximizing the shareholder 
value emerged. It means that literature must be synthesized and analyzed to create a 
chronological and maybe even causal stream of thinking combining law and economics 
if one wishes to define the origins of the shareholder value maximization. It might also 
mean that the shareholder value maximization encroached upon us without no one 
noticing as Keynes (1936) worded the problem.  
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4. THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MAXIMIZATION THEORY 
This chapter reviews and synthesizes economic, organizational, managerial and legal 
literatures on shareholder value maximization as the corporate objective. There are two 
major and competing theories, the shareholder value maximization theory and the 
stakeholder theory. This alignment has often led the research and discourse in general to 
sidetracks and away from the corporate purpose and above all, away from the unavoidable 
normative content of such debate. If treating these theories as independent variables in 
regression analysis, the debate considering corporate objective is probably not advanced. 
The important question is the what should be the objective of corporation and on what 
grounds? What is the justification of its existence? It is not the question of with whose 
interests in mind corporations should be run or which party is or should be more 
privileged than the other. It is not the question of how to create financial returns through 
ethical actions. The question is about normative content of the theory of the corporation 
and its responsibilities. 
“The company can pursue the simple goal of maximizing value” (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen 2008:3) 
The theory of maximizing shareholder value is being taught in virtually every business 
school in the world while scholars are increasingly arguing that the theory is destroying 
societies and leading to serious problems in form of short-termism for instance (Smith 
and Rönnegard 2016:468; Bower et al 2017; Ghoshal 2005; Lazonick et al 2000). The 
textbook by Brealey, Allen and Myers (2008) is one of the most used textbook in finance 
and it has sold millions of copies and it has been used as a reference by even more business 
students and professionals. The starting point for the whole book is value, and the notion 
that the only acceptable goal for a limited liability company is to maximize the value of 
its shareholders. The incredible influence of shareholder value maximization is visible for 
example in how it has altered legislation and corporate strategies and executive behavior 
(e.g. Clarke et al 2018; Smith and Rönnegard 2016; Rappaport 2006; Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). This invokes many critical questions; why the fundamental financial 
theory, shareholder value maximization, has got under so much objection and why it 
gained so much authority in the first place?; why are financial theories formulating our 
corporate strategies and why are the financial markets so powerful instance that it can 
decide who benefits and how much?; why is the shareholder value maximization taught 
in business textbook without challenging it or arguing for it?. 
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Based on the analysis of the collected literature, these questions remain largely 
unanswered. There are many interpretations, opinions and discussions but they are 
unfinished. The major argument for the assertion that the corporate objective should be 
shareholder value maximization is the utilitarian argument which claims that shareholder 
value maximization makes the whole society better off. This argument is posed in many 
papers and by many authors, but it is discussed shallowly (e.g. Jensen 2001; Sundaram 
and Inkpen 2004a). The utilitarian argument is countered with evidence from practice 
(e.g. Bower & Paine 2017) but also logically (e.g. Jones and Felps 2013). The most well-
known argument against the shareholder value maximization is the stakeholder theory 
claiming that shareholder value maximization is unethical and immoral and neglecting 
the interests of the broader society. The claim is in direct opposition of what the 
shareholder value maximization theory claims to be (Freeman et al 2011). The 
stakeholder theory is quite promising in the sense that is has gathered a lot of interest and 
attention. However, stakeholder theory seems to be vulnerable to similar problems than 
the shareholder value maximization theory as there are no better solutions for preventing 
mistakes made by the managers for example. 
Systematic literature review reveals that it might be that the theory is misunderstood and 
misinterpreted by management as the shareholder value maximization is not necessarily 
pushing corporations to behave badly nor to engage in harmful short-term actions – as the 
criticism often goes (e.g. Bower and Paine 2017; Rönnegard and Smith 2016; Lazonick 
2012; Stout 2002, 2008; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Indeed, the most influential and 
famous shareholder value maximization advocates do not support short-term practices 
that increase the stock price in the short-term but which in turn are value destructive 
actions in the longer-run, nor do they support immoral or unethical procedures to increase 
earnings per share (e.g. Friedman 1970; Jensen 2001). However, short-termism exists as 
the world is running quarter by quarter as one looks for example cases like financial crisis 
in 2007-2008 (Clarke et al 2018), Enron (Markham 2015), Carillion (Financial Times 
2018a), Valeant (Bower and Paine 2017). It remains unclear whether the misbehavior is 
systematic and intentional or sincerely accidental and whether the shareholder value 
maximization theory is to be blamed or is it just framed.  
Another, significant finding of the literature review is that there is little or no empirical 
evidence on functionality or dysfunctionality of the maximizing shareholder value theory. 
Most of the core publications are plainly theoretical constructs and mathematical 
representations (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976) and very little column space is left for 
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actually testing the consequences of adopting the theory. It is a rational debate with huge 
practical impacts. 
The chapter is divided in to five main sections. The first section (4.1.) describes the 
contents of the shareholder value maximization and along with some definitions it 
addresses to the research question number one; ‘What is the content of the shareholder 
value maximization theory?’. The second section (4.2.) addresses the research questions 
two and three by defining origins and development of the shareholder value maximization 
and by discussing whether the shareholder value maximization is responsible for 
misconducts in markets. Sections (4.3.) and (4.4.) further elaborate some issues regarding 
the shareholder value maximization and especially its responsibilities. The section (4.5.) 
outlines what legal literature have to say about the shareholder value maximization 
theory. 
 Content, meaning and definition of the theory 
Shareholder value maximization theory is a way of assessing success – a way of deciding 
between better and worse. The shareholder value maximization theory is a tool for 
weighing between decisions but simultaneously the weighing is restricted by the rules of 
ethics and the rules of law (Friedman 1970). It is not a way to decide what to do and how 
to do those chosen things. This is the key issue and key misunderstanding as people tend 
to think shareholder value maximization being the reason to all bad things in the world 
(see e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Freeman et al 2011; Lazonick 2012; Bower and 
Paine 2017). Adequately used shareholder value maximization theory cannot override 
ethics, long-run assessment or law. If decisions are short sighted or unethical, they are not 
in accordance with the shareholder value maximization. Rather, the manager is exercising 
his own interests or making plain mistakes. It would be important to notice that for 
example short sighted decisions that are invoked entirely or partially by the incentives 
that are tied to share price of the corporation are not maximizing shareholder value. 
Shareholder value maximization is not the correct subject of criticism if management 
misbehaves and maximizes its own value through incentives while neglecting the 
shareholder value maximization (Jensen 2001: 308; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). 
Rappaport (2006) describes the problem quite intriguingly in his article: 
“When executives destroy the value they are supposed to be creating, they almost 
always claim that stock market pressure made them do it. … The reality is that the 
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shareholder value principle has not failed management; rather, it is management that 
has betrayed the principle.”. – Alfred Rappaport (2006) 
The shareholder value maximization theory tells managers what to do and why, while it 
takes no stance in how those things should be done. Means are restricted by larger society, 
moral custom and long-termism for example (Friedman 1970; Jensen 2001; Sundaram 
and Inkpen 2004a).  Shareholder value maximization does not justify the things that are 
being practiced in corporate life, for example, ending research and development or 
sacking employees in the name of increasing share price nor does it justify sacrificing 
dignity and values over profits (cf. Markham 2015; Fuhrman 2016; Bower and Paine 
2017). Put simply, shareholder value maximization does not justify bad corporate 
behavior. One can not maximize the value of shareholders without taking into account all 
stakeholders (Jensen 2001).  
Superficially, the content and definition of the shareholder value maximization seem to 
be well established. Neither the sample collected through systematic search nor the 
sample collected through theoretical sampling found evidence that there would be 
conflicts about the content of the shareholder value maximization. One commonly cited 
definition is given by Jensen (2001:299);  
“value maximization says that managers should make all the decisions so as to increase 
the total long-run market value of the firm”. 
The reason for the conflict is that the concept of ‘maximizing the long-term shareholder 
value’ includes four terms of which only two are clear-cut and unambiguous. Shareholder 
is the one who owns the share of a company, there is no trouble here. Then maximization 
is defined as actions striving to maximize the amount of something with certain resources. 
But the terms ‘long-term’ and ‘value’ are more difficult to define in this context as they 
clearly include some normative, moral and ethical content and they can be, and most 
likely are, varying between individuals and corporations based on for example 
demographics. One cannot objectively state what is ‘long-term’ or ‘value’ for a company 
or an individual while one can mathematically state what is maximizing and one can 
legally state what is owning a share and then define rights and responsibilities resulting 
from the ownership. It becomes plain visible, that unless these definitive problems are 
solved with common consent, one cannot place the very same objective for all 
corporations. Put otherwise, we cannot demand that all corporations use one corporate 
objective unless it is clearly defined.  
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The offered solutions are for example that value stands for the value of the total value of 
the firm or market value of the firm. According to Jensen (2001), total value of the firm 
is the ‘sum of the values of all financial claims on the firm’. Finance has a solution for a 
definition of the ‘long-term’ because financially thinking, one does not have to think time 
horizons of any management decision as long as the net present value for the decision is 
positive (Jensen 2001; Brealey et al 2008). 
The long-term value maximization means basically investments to the future of the 
company – in other words it means investments to the subjects of corporate social 
responsibility. Under the idea of long-term shareholder value maximization corporations 
are not prevented to invest for example in employee amusement, charities and keeping 
suppliers in business or otherwise improving the general welfare (American Bar 
Association 1990:2257-2258). The logic is that these investments are also in the best 
interest of the shareholders in the long run. For example, keeping employees satisfied and 
community’s education system in a good shape through donations could ensure the source 
of competent employees and enhance the employer image, just to give an example. It is 
explicit that these not-shareholder-related actions should be such that there exists 
‘rationally related benefit accruing to stockholders’ or legal actions can be taken against 
them (Revlon, Inc v. MacAndrews & Forbes holdings). 
In short, definitive problems exist between authors but they are not generally about the 
definition of the theory or about the statement that the shareholder value maximization 
makes, but about the meaning or interpretation of the words like long-term for example.   
Furthermore, the shareholder value maximization is not clear objective in terms of how 
to achieve it or how to measure it. Argenti (1969:25) crystallizes the ambiguousness of 
the objective of maximizing profits quite compellingly; 
“when, for example did a chief accountant ever say to the chairman “I have examined 
our accounts for 1969 and in my opinion we maximized our profits”. This objective is 
not clear, not precise, not unambiguous and certainly is not verifiable.” 
Argenti (1969) conclude that the shareholder value maximization on the other hand is 
clear, precise, unambiguous and verifiable – only acceptable goal for a corporation. 
However, the shareholder value maximization is not free from the criticism Argenti 
(1969) placed upon the objective of profit maximization as it would be hard to think that 
the chief accountant would say to the chairman that “I have examined our accounts for 
2018 and in my opinion we maximized the value of our shareholders”.  
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 History & development 
To understand the ideological roots of the shareholder value maximization, the 
information of how the shareholder value maximization ideology developed is extracted 
from analyzed articles. What follows is an interpretation of history and interpretation of 
only one author. The value of the timeline and history will be in clarity and novelty – it 
is presented in graphical form and there is no such historical path on the shareholder value 
maximization ideology presented so far. For example, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) 
provide a literature review and history of the shareholder value maximization ideology 
but it is not very comprehensive. Schumpeter (1954:5) offered his justification for 
chronicling economic history; “much more than in, say, physics is it true in economics 
that modern problems, methods, and results cannot be fully understood without some 
knowledge of how economists have come to reason as they do “. This is especially true 
here because clearly, only few seem to understand the logics of shareholder value 
maximization. For example Freeman et al (2011) and Bower and Paine (2017) are 
criticizing shareholder value maximization theory for things and consequences that are 
not allowed by the shareholder value maximization. Researching economic history seems 
to be worthwhile effort in order to understand the implicit logics of the shareholder value. 
The shareholder value maximization is held as an ideology (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000). Ideology means something that we breath, something that is overarching of all. 
Ideology is not attributable to any one person and therefore it is important to track how it 
evolved. It is not as in physics that one could say that it was Milton Friedman (1970) who 
decided that shareholder value maximization theory will be used and what is its content. 
Physicist may declare that Newton created the theory about mechanics, but this review is 
unable to declare that some guy created the theory about shareholder value maximization. 
Instead, this review is able to present one possible sequential and at least partially causal 
interpretation of what could have reasonably happened. Shareholder value maximization 
is a result of “200 years of research in economics and finance” and therefore its 
development follows quite general path of economic history (Jensen 2001:299).  
Depending from the source, the journey of the shareholder value maximization theory to 
the current dominance can be interpreted to have started as early as in 1776 and precisely 
it is rooted in the work of classic economist Adam Smith (e.g. Jensen et al 1976; Jones 
and Felps 2013). Adam Smith (1776) wrote about the issue of having managers separate 
from the owners and suspected, that managers who manage other people’s money never 
handle it with such a care as they would handle their own money. Nowadays this issue is 
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known as an agency problem and it is widely recognized (e.g. Jensen et al 1976; 
Eisenhardt 1989). The agency problem is also one of the corner stones of the shareholder 
value maximization theory because it is the logic behind management’s incentive plans 
which in turn are one of the complications in the shareholder value maximization theory. 
More generally, corporation’s ownership structure follows from the agency problem. 
Adam Smith wrote about selfishness and its link to utilitarian argument among the 
dispersed ownership problem and division of work. Here is how Smith (1776) thinks: 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their self interest. We address ourselves not their 
humanity but to their self-love…” (1776:11) 
 “He [a person] … is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention” (1776:260) 
“By pursuing his own interest, he [a person] frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (1776:260) 
The bottom line is depicted in three quotes. This is the root of the shareholder value 
maximization theory and the root of modern economics – self-interest, competitive 
markets and proper division of labor. In addition, investors invest only to the industries 
that will yield the highest returns for themselves. Self-interest drives people to act 
correctly and morally in the larger setting creating more social welfare. To create superior 
social welfare the self-interest mechanism needs markets and those markets need to be of 
certain kind. In short, markets must be competitive for economy to be efficient and self-
interest to deliver a social welfare. To elaborate the position of self-interest as a heart of 
the modern economic principles one more quote from Adam Smith (1759:9) is adequate:  
“The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition...is so powerful, that 
it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society to 
wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent obstructions with 
which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its operations.” 
Smith (1759) underlines that there is no need for the government to intervene as the self-
interested agents will make better decisions in allocating and distributing resources and 
wealth.  
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Then what could be seen as a rough follow up to Smith’s (1776) work is David Ricardo’s 
(1817:90-92) comparative advantage. Comparative advantage takes Smith’s (1776) 
division of labor idea forward as Smith (1776:14) applied it to tribes and within a nation. 
Ricardo thought that nations should focus on what they do best and that this would lead 
to more prosperity for all. The simple argument that Ricardo (1817:90-92) set forward 
here is that since Portuguese are better at producing wine than they are at making cloth, 
they should concentrate on that and because English are better at making cloth, they 
should concentrate on that. Then English and Portuguese trade with each other’s and they 
both will have more wine and more cloth to consume. The intention is to increase 
efficiency. In the introduction chapter of Schumpeter’s (1954) History of Economic 
Analysis, Mark Perlman (1981) offers an opinion that Ricardo (1817) referred to Smith 
(1776) and used tighter reasoning and “thus it seemed classical economics was assembled, 
if not actually born”.  
Martin (2019) argue that industrial revolution was also driven by the desire for efficiency 
and self-interest.  
“These insights [Smith’s and Ricardo’s] both reflected and drove the Industrial 
Revolution, which was as much about process innovations that reduced waste and 
increased productivity as it was about the application of new technologies”. (Martin 
2019:44) 
Then the work of Smith (1776) and Ricardo (1818) was picked up by management 
scholars like Winslow Taylor who established the modern science of management in his 
seminal book The Principles of Scientific Management published in 1911 (Ciannantonio 
and Hurley-Hanson 2011). If something – shareholder value for instance – is to be 
maximized, processes should be as efficient and wasteless as possible. The whole point 
of ‘Taylorism’ is to increase efficiency in corporate and individual levels and even though 
the content of Taylor’s scientific management is debated and questioned by many, the 
influence of Taylor’s work for the practice and for the management science goes without 
doubt (Ciannantonio and Hurley-Hanson 2011). Management science further emphasized 
efficiency and eliminating waste when Edward Deming put out Total Quality 
Management approach in the 1980s which was then replaced by other efficiency striving 
principles such as Lean manufacturing 1990s’ (Shirdhara 2009). The stamp of economic 
efficiency and pursue of economic results is clearly visible in management and 
management science.  
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The efficiency desire is essential for shareholder value maximization. The logic of 
financial economists is that when waste appears in a corporation, it will be ousted from 
the markets as shareholders sell their holdings or it will be the target of merger or 
acquisition. Mergers and acquisitions are labeled as ‘market for corporate control’ which 
refers to the idea that when a corporation is run badly (inefficiently) shareholders will sell 
or they will buy the whole corporation and replace the management (Jensen 1990). In 
other words, if the corporation is inefficient and inefficiently managed it is not 
maximizing the shareholder value and therefore the problem will be solved through 
market for corporate control. 
Shareholder value maximization theory renders application of Ricardian model of trade 
to corporations as shareholders pursuing for their self-interest should reallocate their 
capital if inefficiencies appear in a corporation. They should invest in companies that are 
doing what they are most efficient at doing in. The amount of outsourcing and the number 
of suppliers in contemporary business models neatly describes this continued strive for 
ever increasing desire for efficiency and furthering ever more fine-grained division of 
labor (e.g. Webb 2018). Many companies do not have their own caretakers and simple 
production processes might be transferred to offshore locations because these processes 
are not what they do best – they are not their core competencies nor sources of competitive 
advantage which are essentials of contemporary strategic management (e.g. Peteraf 
1993). Described characteristics depicts modern capitalistic economy and system which 
has created enormous amounts of wealth (see e.g. World Bank 2019). Is there any limit 
for how long efficiency is desirable, and division of labor should be continued? One 
undertaking this issue is challenging the modern economic theory. For example, the field 
of management is quite reliant on the concept of efficiency and endless pursue of 
specialization and better organizing of work and organizations themselves (Martin 2019).  
So far, the reviewed intellectual or theoretical roots has been economical and managerial, 
roughly answering to the question of how the shareholder value maximization fits in the 
management science and to the minds of managers – because the root of management is 
in economics and the root of economics lays in assumptions like self-interest (Smith 1776; 
Ricardo 1817). Indeed, outlined writings and authors seem to be the root of the 
shareholder value maximization or at least they describe the ideological and theoretical 
frame in disciplines of economics and management that is required for the shareholder 
value maximization and how this frame developed. The fit between shareholder value 
maximization and management is not obvious because the shareholder value 
maximization is foundationally financial theory and not management theory. 
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Management science evolved to desire efficiency and competition and accept the 
economic assumptions. Accepting modern economics seems to be necessary condition 
for the shareholder value maximization to be adopted by managers.  
In the remaining of this chapter the financial theories are reviewed shortly and finally the 
graphical timeline is presented. Despite of the early recognition of the problems in 
dispersed corporate ownership (e.g. Smith 1776), quite recent literature from 1970s’ 
considering corporate governance is where the shareholder value maximization theory is 
fully founded and articulated. It became mainstream of corporate governance when 
financial economists picked up the problem corporate objective. Nobel laureate Milton 
Friedman (1970) is quite often credited (or blamed) for articulating the shareholder value 
maximization theory out loud for the first time and with huge influence. Most of the 
papers and influential authors researching the evolution of the shareholder value 
maximization, such as Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) and Stout (2013), conclude that 
it was the notorious piece from the nobelist Firedman (1970) published in The New York 
Times that pushed the ideology forward. To its truly dominant position, shareholder value 
maximization got during 1990s. One of the greatest arguments for adopting the 
shareholder value maximization theory was the excessive pay checks that managers were 
receiving while the pay was not tied to performance (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, 
Shin 2012). The logic is that executive pay should be tied to shareholder gains so that 
executive managers would not waste shareholder’s money. (Lazonick et al 2000; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a.) 
In financial theory, the origin of the shareholder value lays in the agency theory crafted 
for these purposes by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The work of Berle and Means (1932) 
could be seen as a preliminary work for Jensen and Meckling (1976) to fully establish 
agency theory. Other widely cited and influential papers in establishing the agency theory 
and placing finance in the center of the corporate governance are papers from Fama 
(1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b). Antecedent of the agency theory literature 
is the property rights literature and the realization of corporation as a nexus of contracts 
(Fama 1980). Agency theory is the source of the assertion that shareholders own the 
corporation and they are therefore entitled to decide what the corporate goal should be, 
and they should receive the residual of corporation’s income (Jensen and Meckling 
1976).2 Besides the assumption of ownership, the agency theory is a root cause of 
management’s compensation packages. Without the agency theory, the shareholder value 
                                                     
2 This assertion is however debated as it is not clear how one could own something without bearing 
no responsibility whatsoever (Stout 2008; Bower and Paine 2017). 
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maximization theory would also be defunct. If replacing agency theory for example with 
the view that corporations are an entity that owns itself, the whole idea of maximizing 
shareholder value becomes quite weird. An agency relationship is defined by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976:308) as follows; 
“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” 
Since the management is only an agent of the shareholders, it is easy to see how this idea 
of shareholder wealth maximization is attractive logically and empirically. An obvious 
and unavoidable problem arising from the agency theory arises from Smith’s (1776) 
assertion of self-interests. This self-interest problem is the one that directed discourse and 
large part of the scholar’s work is directed to solve the self-interest problem in an agency 
relationship (Bower and Paine 2017). Shareholders should enforce or monitor that 
management – as their agent – is behaving according to shareholder’s best interest and 
that management is not simply maximizing their own welfare as the economic theory 
suggests. However, there would be huge costs if all diversified shareholders would 
monitor agents of all their holdings. Shareholders would not be able to do anything else 
than monitor mangers and still the result might not be satisfactory which would mean that 
modern capital markets would not function – at least not efficiently. The solution is to 
create conditions in which manager’s and shareholder’s desires are aligned and to 
establish a board of directors that is elected by the owners of the corporation.  This is the 
contemporary form of corporate governance. To be able to trust more on managers acting 
adequately on behalf of the shareholders, the agency theory resulted as incentive 
compensation packages for executive managers that are tied to shareholder wealth (in 
practice, to share price).  This solution – the executive compensation packages and boards 
– is widely debated (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). (Friedman 1970; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Bower and Paine 2017.)  
Both, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Friedman (1970) take the assumption of self-
interest and apply it without questioning to the management and to the shareholders. 
Shareholders – regardless of their investment horizon, demographics or risk tolerance for 
instance – desire only maximum monetary profit and nothing else. Friedman (1970) 
acknowledges ethical custom while Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not mention such 
aspects of the problem. 
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“[managers] responsibility is to … make as much money as possible while conforming 
to their basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in 
ethical custom.” Friedman (1970) 
Lazonick’s and O’Sullivan’s (2000) criticism for the shareholder value maximization is 
one of the most cited and it also provides the most comprehensive historical analysis of 
the development of the shareholder value maximization theory. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
operate at the more general level than that of individual authors and writings. They claim 
that because of the shareholder value maximization, corporate strategy transformed from 
being “retain and reinvest” to what could be called “distribute and downsize”. For the rise 
of shareholder value maximization in the United States, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) 
blame financial economists who crafted theories about corporate governance. For 
example, they were economists who created the idea of markets for corporate control and 
they were economists who created the idea that financial markets are inevitably better in 
allocating corporate resources than corporations themselves. 
As a result of the merger wave of 1955-1970 in the U.S., there were giant conglomerate 
companies such as the General Electric. The performance of these conglomerates was 
decreasing compared to preceding decades (e.g. Jensen 1990; Martin 2019). Japan posited 
innovative and competitive pressures upon U.S. companies. According to Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) this was the very reason why there were space and some sort of 
‘vacuum’ for the agency theory and other financial theories to appear and gain such an 
influence. These giant U.S. corporations were demonstrating poor financial results in 
terms of earnings per share, and hence, the market for corporate control was needed to 
discipline management and reallocate the resources that are used inefficiently (Jensen 
1990). U.S. also experienced financial deregulation and the rise of an institutional investor 
as for example pension funds got permitted to invest in corporate equity and to below 
investment grade bonds which was strictly limited before (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 
2000). Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000:18) describe the results:  
“Under the new regime, top managers downsize the corporations they control, with a 
particular emphasis on cutting the size of the labour forces they employ, in an attempt 
to increase the return on equity.” 
In short, Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that it was the takeover markets, or 
markets for corporate control that fully enabled the shareholder value maximization to 
claim a position of an ideology. Market for corporate control needed deregulation which 
gave arise to the institutional investors as pension funds, insurance funds and savings & 
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loans companies could now invest significantly more freely, stock repurchase became 
possible and options became beneficial after-tax changes in 1950s, and creation of ‘junk 
bonds’. According to Lazonick and O’Sullivan, this all led to major job cuts and in general 
to downsizing instead of growing.  
Shareholder value maximization has altered the allocation of resources and profits. 
Generally, payout ratio – the dividends and repurchases – has skyrocketed, share price 
based compensation is larger portion of CEOs’ salary than the ‘regular’ salary and CEOs 
and boards are biased to increase share price instead of other goals. (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000.) 
In 1999 OECD published ‘The Principles of Corporate Governance’ declaring that: 
“Common to all good corporate governance regimes, however, is a high degree of 
priority placed on the interests of shareholders” (OECD 1999:6). 
The widely cited criticism by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000:14) conclude that OECD 
“emphasizes that corporations should be run, first and foremost, in the interests of 
shareholders”. The interpretation is quite exaggerated as the OECD also acknowledged 
that there is no single best way for conducting corporate governance and continue that 
(OECD 1999:6):  
“In addition, the best-run corporations recognise that business ethics and corporate 
awareness of the environmental and societal interest of the communities in which they 
operate can have an impact on the reputation and long-term performance of 
corporations. Competitiveness and ultimate success are the result of teamwork, 
involving contributions from employees and other resource providers. Reflecting such 
considerations, the Principles recognise the role of these stakeholders and encourage 
active co-operation with them in creating wealth, jobs and financially sound 
corporations.” 
Encouraging to co-operation and to involving contributions from other stakeholders is not 
exactly disregarding these other stakeholders and over emphasizing shareholders’ 
primacy. However, the OECD might not be the best source for shareholder value 
maximization advocacy, as it has several member countries from Europe other than the 
UK, where the shareholder value maximization is not as prominent ideology and instead 
the corporation itself is in center of the decision making (e.g. Mintz 2006, Maassen 2002). 
From the latest version of Principles of Corporate Governance (2015), the OECD has 
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removed the whole idea of “high degree of priority placed on the interests of 
shareholders” (OECD 1999, 2015). 
Current state of the shareholder value maximization is best visible in the news and other 
sources than OECD reports. Business Roundtable consists of U.S. CEOs and it claims to 
be an “authoritative voice on matters affecting American business corporations” 
(Business Roundtable 2016). The Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate 
Governance (2016) describes the current sentiment quite well: 
“These [contemporary] investors seek a greater voice in the company’s strategic 
decisionmaking, capital allocation and overall corporate social responsibility, areas 
that traditionally were the sole purview of the board and management.” 
While OECD (1999, 2015) might not push the shareholder value maximization, the 
Business Roundtable certainly does. For example, Business Roundtable (2016) argue that 
“Corporations are for-profit enterprises that are designed to provide sustainable long-
term value to all shareholders”. Further, Business Roundtable (2016) believe that greater 
shareholder participation is the direction where the American capitalism and corporate 
governance systems are headed. The report rises very important question which cries for 
more attention in the future: how does the responsibilities of the shareholders evolve and 
change if they will exercise more power over the corporations and its strategy? Currently, 
corporations still use this theory and it is still taught in business schools (Rönnegard and 
Smith 2016; Ghoshal 2005). It is still an ideology even though OECD has removed it 
from the principles.  
The most recent developments are quite promising for the shareholder value 
maximization theory as shareholder activism and the so-called responsible shareholder 
have emerged. It stands for the idea that shareholders should demand corporations to act 
responsibly (see e.g. Eccles and Klimenko 2019). Shareholders are forming influential 
groups together with institutional investors such as Climate Action 100+ (Climate Action 
100+ 2019). Climate Action 100+ is an international group of investors which has pushed 
for example British Petrol to align its strategy with Paris agreement on climate (British 
Petroleum 2019; Climate Action 100+ 2019). Another exemplar case would be that Royal 
Dutch Shell tied its executive compensation to carbon emission targets as a first 
corporation in the world and accordingly it was solely because of pressures from the 
shareholders (Financial Times 2018b). In other words, the shareholders themselves act 
based on their personal values and demand that the corporation reduces the sales of the 
product that it produces (or creates other businesses). This is promising direction for the 
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shareholder value maximizing corporations even though Business Roundtable (2016) 
stated that “shareholders should not expect to use the public companies in which they 
invest as platforms for the advancement of their personal agendas or for the promotion 
of general political or social causes”. It is a large part of the shareholder value 
maximization theory that investors, managers and consumers all use their own judgement 
in comprising the market signals, therefore, Business Roundtable (2016) statement is not 
very strong. The shareholder value maximization in 2019 is very different compared to 
what it was hundred or two hundred years ago. Maximum shareholder value is no longer 
straightforwardly money and share price – the shareholder value can also be breathable 
clean air and less pollution. Maximum shareholder value is equal to maximum 
shareholder welfare. 
4.2.1. The notion of corporation – contract, relationship or entity 
It is important to understand that financial economists, starting from Smith (1776) and 
culminating to Jensen (2001), are not and were not establishing a theory of the firm. They 
were establishing a mechanism that works for determining and forecasting prices. The 
firm itself has been a ‘black box’ for financial economists (Jensen 1990; Findlay and 
Whitmore 1974). Kotlar et al (2018) provide a great review of the theories of the firm 
developed in management and organizational science but often these theories describe 
only one specific problem and they are not generalizable. So far it seems, that no one has 
deliberately created shareholder value maximization theory and that the shareholder value 
maximization theory is not intended to be used as a theory of the firm as it currently is 
used in the US. Lawmakers or regulation have not forced it as it is not in any way a legal 
obligation and economists or management scientists have not formulated it to be a rule 
for corporate governance and yet it dominates thinking of managers and teaching in 
business schools (Ghoshal 2005). Financial markets are creating enormous pressures as 
almost everything depends from the stock market (e.g. savings and loans are backed by 
prospering stock market, if the growth hinders, consequences are dramatic see Lazonick 
and O’Sullivan 2000). 
However, without knowing what the corporation is and why would it exist, it is difficult 
to determine objectives for it. Based on the analysis in this literature synthesis, a 
corporation can be nexus of contracts as shareholder value theory proposes (Jensen 2001), 
nexus of relationships as stakeholder theorists (Freeman et al 2011) propose or an entity 
as some others propose (Donaldson 1982; Fort 1996). Differences in the definition of 
corporation definetely creates tensions and misunderstandings when scholars are debating 
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about what should be to goal of such an entity as the corporation. There seems to be deep 
disagreement about the concept of corporation. They are shortly outlined here to function 
as a frame for discussion of shareholder value maximization. Jensen (1990) called for 
financial economists to create a theory of the firm in his 1990 article, but he still referred 
to the nexus of contracts in 2001 which was already established in the article by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). Therefore, it seems that financial theory of the firm is still in 
progress. 
One author is trying to combine law and economics (Fort 1996, 1997). Fort (1996:150) 
describes a corporation being mediating institution which has economic function, but 
which also has a purpose of ‘mediating between persons and society’. Fort (1997:174) 
attempts to combine his theory of the firm as mediating institution, the stakeholder theory 
and other constituency statutes claiming that, put together, these produce a 
comprehensive view of a corporation.  Fort (1996) argues that in the past, people had 
more time outside the working environment and business life and therefore people got to 
fulfill their social needs to cultivate their identity – which they do not get to do now. 
Hence, the conclusion that businesses and corporations should be seen and organized as 
mediating institutions which should provide advantages and fulfill individual’s 
fundamental social needs similarly as family or religious group does (Fort 1996:151). The 
implication for the corporation is that they should be organized so that either they are very 
small-scale, or that they have small subparts that allow people to create and feel 
friendship, negotiate and to be recognized (Fort 1996:153). Fort’s assertion is, that 
companies can simultaneously benefit all stakeholders through his concept of the 
corporation, stakeholder theory and other constituencies statutes, but that corporations 
should prioritize in serving internal stakeholders – employees and shareholders – and 
conclude that employees should be included in the board of directors (Fort 1997). 
From the perspective of the stakeholder theory, the corporation is seen as a collection of 
relationships among those that have a ‘stake in the activities that make up the business’ 
(Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar & De Colle 2011:24). It is not very far-off definition 
of a company when compared to its ‘rival’ from the shareholder camp offered by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) who described the company being a nexus of contracts. Of course, 
if one does not perceive a contract being a relationship, these two definitions are very 
different. At least it is safe to argue, that where there is a contract, there is also a 
relationship as for example employees, suppliers and investors have explicit contracts 
with the company and they do have also a relationship with the company. Community 
and society could also be perceived to have implicit contract with the company stating it 
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will at minimum, obey laws and follow norms. Freeman et al (2011:24) continue, that the 
business is about how stakeholders interact and create value. Again, not very far from the 
competing camp as Jensen (2001:309) describes his take on the enlightened value 
maximization theory as follows; ‘We cannot create value [maximize the shareholder 
value] without good relations with customers, employees, financial backers, suppliers, 
regulators, communities, and so on. Jensen (2001:309) then continues, that the choice 
between competing interests among stakeholders – or contract holders – should be made 
with shareholder value criterion and reminds, that managers and employees need ‘a 
structure’ which keeps them away from tempting, but value destructive short-termism. 
The structure might be for example a purpose, policy, strategy or something equivalent. 
4.2.2. The timeline 
The timeline is constructed to be able to compare data and relate it to the shareholder 
value maximization theory and to formally satisfy the research questions two and three. 
For example, data from income distribution and data from incentives of chief executives 
are often connected with the shareholder value maximization theory (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2012; Clarke et al 2018). The formed timeline reveals that 
these phenomena might indeed be connected to the shareholder value maximization and 
its development. The timeline is significantly stronger argument for connecting these data 
points to the theory than only stating that the shareholder value maximization was 
established in 1970s and at the same time something else happened. With the timeline it 
becomes visible what happened and when, and how the idea of the shareholder value 
maximization originated. The timeline does not prove causality, but it gives the 
perspective. The timeline could be used as a template for any data that researchers want 
to connect to the shareholder value maximization. 
One of the goals of this research is to increase practitioner’s ability to judge the current 
regime of corporate governance. With the timeline it becomes visible that in what kind of 
thinking and events the shareholder value maximization is based on – what is the history 
of the current model for corporate governance. The timeline is one of the significant 
contributions of this research as such does not exist. Furthermore, a list of bullet points 
does not increase understanding as a picture depicting possibly existing causalities does. 
The implications of the timeline are consistent with the overall conclusions of this 
literature review. The idea of shareholder value maximization starts from classic 
economists’ work and thinking, and it assumes everything that classic economics assume. 
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Assumptions start from the work of Adam Smith (1776) and include self-interest and 
limitless rationality of economic agents. These assumptions are forwarded by other 
economists and U.S. Supreme court judges who influenced heavily in creation of current 
form of corporation and corporate control. One landmark case was the 1919 case Ford v. 
Dodge where court explicitly expressed legality of the shareholder primacy. Issues were 
debated in Berle and Dodd debate in 1930s which was followed by a brief quiet time 
through which the shareholder value maximization dominated the thinking. Since 1950s 
serious concerns over corporate behavior and corporate social responsibilities have risen 
among which the stakeholder theory is included.  
To its full flourish the shareholder value maximization got between 1970s and 1990s. 
Globalization and increasing competition decreased the profitability of Western 
corporations which cleared space for new corporate governance regime (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000). This regime was the shareholder value maximization and it was offered 
by financial economists like Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Rappaport (1986) but also 
by practitioners like Jack Welch (2009). This development was supported by legal and 
regulative institutions and through easing financial regulation as for example share 
buybacks became legal. Option based executive compensation models were advocated by 
shareholder theory and agency theory and they became cost effective through tax 
legislation changes. Institutional investors such as funds grew in size and in influence 
which significantly increased the pressures of the financial markets on corporations (e.g. 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Clarke et al 2018). 
To date, the shareholder value maximization has prevailed as dominant model for 
corporate governance in academia, education and in practice. However, new wave of 
thinking has arrived in form of activist shareholders. The widespread criticism over the 
shareholder value maximization theory has led to the awakening of the shareholders 
themselves. Shareholders have formed activist groups to increase their influence and even 
notorious institutional investors are part of activist shareholders movement (Eccles and 
Klimenko 2019). Latest achievements of activist investors in battle against externalities 
and market failures include for example that the Royal Dutch Shell tied its executive 
compensation to carbon emission targets. 
It seems, that shareholders might be the source of resolution for the tensions in and around 
corporations and corporate behavior. The shareholder value maximization has always 
been able to modify itself and develop over the time so that it has been consistent with 
the needs of society. The next modification might be shareholder awakening. Most 
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importantly, from what the maximum social welfare consists of changes over time. In 
1776 the goals of corporations were different from what they should be today, but the 
shareholder value maximization might still be able to deliver the closest approximate of 
currently desired maximum welfare in society. Some parts of the battle over the 
stakeholders and shareholders and corporate responsibilities in general are caused by this 
transformation process of the shareholder value maximization and capitalism in general. 
Corporations need to address more on social responsibilities and things other than money, 
but that does not mean that the theory does not work. The new – responsible investor is 
arising ahead of new form of capitalism.  
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 Figure 4 The development of the shareholder value maximization theory 1776-2019 
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The thesis provides two examples of empirical usability of the timeline, but future 
research might test different data sets and hypotheses against the timeline. The 
comparison between the timeline in figure 4 and Piketty’s and Saez’s (2003) work in 
figure 5 is exemplar. These two comparisons are also direct statement for research 
question 3, posed to reveal if the shareholder value maximization could be held 
responsible for problems like inequality in society. From the 1970s, when the shareholder 
value maximization theory and the agency theory were fully established in Friedman 
(1970) article and in Jensen and Meckling (1976) article, the income share of the top 10% 
has increased dramatically. If one would place Piketty’s and Saez’s (2003) income share 
figure and the shareholder value maximization’s development timeline superimposed, the 
rising income inequality and the establishment of the shareholder value maximization 
start from exactly same point. The inevitable conclusion is that the shareholder value 
maximization as a corporate governance mechanism is causing the rising inequality in the 
U.S, at least partially. The figure 5 is based on Piketty’s and Saez’s (2003) famous work, 
but it is updated to year 2017 by Fraser institute (2019). 
 
Figure 5 Income share of the top 10% in the US 1917-2017. (Abducted from 
Fraser institute 2019) 
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Another simplistic example of the significance of the timeline is the data from chief 
executive compensation from the U.S. The chief executive compensation ratio to workers 
calculated by Clarke et al (2018:10) is depicted in the figure (6). There are 350 largest 
U.S. based corporations included ranked by sales. Again, if the executive compensation 
ratio by Clarke et al (2018) and the shareholder value maximization timeline would be 
placed on top of each other, one would see simultaneous events. Not surprisingly, the rise 
of the chief executive compensation also begins from the 1970s simultaneously with the 
publication and establishment of the shareholder value maximization theory and the 
agency theory.   
 
 Classic economics, assumptions and philosophical setting 
The intention of this chapter is to outline connections between classic economics and 
shareholder value maximization theory and to address to some important philosophical 
problems. The chapter is created to answer to the question of whether the shareholder 
value maximization is able to maximize the social welfare or not. The shareholder value 
maximization requires for example assumptions of self-interested and rational agents, 
perfectly competitive markets, efficient capital markets and equilibrium. Each of these 
assumptions need a list of sub-assumptions to work. Some of these are discussed to show 
the point which is that the shareholder value maximization theory is not perfect, and it 
Figure 6 CEO compensation ratio to workers 1965-2010 
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cannot work perfectly and that is not something we should expect. Yet, the shareholder 
value maximization might approximate the best possible outcome. 
The shareholder value maximization originates from the classic economics, from Adam 
Smith 1776 for example, and in a way the shareholder value maximization is a 
culmination of the modern economics springing from the classic economics as it rests on 
economic assumptions such as self-interest, rationality, competition, equilibrium, 
efficiency and maximization. Economic theories are designed to work with a given set of 
assumptions which are often quite far away abstractions of real-world conditions. For 
example, two probably greatest economic assumptions are that people are rational and 
driven by the sole self-interest (Smith 1776; Miller 1999). Self-interest is the fundamental 
assumption and force that must hold for the shareholder value maximization to work. 
Self-interest is a basis for the agency theory which in turn defines the ownership structure 
of the corporation and places emphasis on shareholders and promote the organizational 
design in which incentive systems are necessary (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Incentive 
systems then create pressures to downsize for instance, because managers and directors 
were enacting what they thought they should be enacting – the self-interest (Miller and 
Ratner 1998; Miller 1999; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). 
However, people might not be as self-interested or selfish as economic theories assume, 
rather they become self-interested as they believe that is how they should act and that is 
how the others are acting (Miller and Ratner 1998; Miller 1999; Ferraro et al 2005). There 
is whole discipline criticizing these assumptions, especially the rationality of humans and 
how good they are for example at avoiding on minimizing risks (see Kahneman and 
Tversky 1979). The discipline is called behavioral economics and it strives to bring 
humanity and human error into the economic modelling. In that sense it would mean that 
all traditional economic theories are based on self-fulfilling false assumption of a human 
nature. It also means that economic theories are not descriptive theories as they are 
claimed to be (Friedman 1953; Hands 2012). 
4.3.1. Self-fulfilling nature of the shareholder value maximization theory 
Findlay and Whitmore (1974) chronicle numerous reasons backed by empirical studies 
for why the shareholder value maximization is not a descriptive theory. Yet, it is regarded 
as one over 40 years since Findlay’s and Whitmore’s (1974) suggestion not to do so. It is 
like an ideology – declared but not necessarily justified. It seems that Ferraro et al (2005) 
are correct in their claims that economic and financial theories can become self-fulfilling 
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and to start to live their own life in the minds and language of people. Then the theory is 
no more controllable, and the impact is much greater as the theory goes without question 
and misunderstandings cumulate. For example, Clarke et al (2018) claim that, 
“… there is the debilitating displacement of goals as the objectives of the corporation 
under the leadership of equity incentivised CEOs switches from the single minded focus 
on the development and success of the company to highly individualistic CEO strategies 
on how to align the performance of the corporation with the maximisation of their 
personal earnings”. 
Clarke et al (2018) point for example to the financial crisis of the 2008 and claim that the 
bankers were fulfilling agency theory and shareholder value maximization theory as they 
used bank’s money reserves for share buybacks and increased risks of their investments 
to return higher yield for investors and thereby sacrificing the resilience and the future of 
the bank. These bankers got rich in the process. In other words, the claim is that bankers 
caused a financial crisis not because they were self-interested in the first place but because 
that is what the shareholder value maximization theory advocated and financial markets 
required, that is how they were taught and that is how people spoke and expected them to 
act. The incentive system is stemming directly from the agency theory and shareholder 
value maximization theory. 
The idea or conception that corporations are obliged by law to maximize profits or the 
shareholder value is an interesting and exemplar case of self-fulfilling, faulty and 
unquestioned theory that nevertheless prevails. Part of the motivation for conducting the 
literature review on this topic sprung from the realization that surprisingly many fellow 
business students actually believed that corporations are obliged to maximize profits. The 
obligation of profit maximization is so pervasive that with one search on Google for “legal 
obligation and profit” one returns more than 65 million hits and the first three include 
New York Times publications and Cornell Law school’s website writing about ‘common 
misunderstandings about corporations’.  
“There is a common belief that corporate directors have a legal duty to maximize 
corporate profits and “shareholder value” — even if this means skirting ethical rules, 
damaging the environment or harming employees.” (Stout 2015 in NY Times) 
“Some widely-held beliefs about business corporations are erroneous. … corporate 
directors are not required to maximize shareholder value” (Cornell Law School 2019 
website) 
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It is a belief that clearly springs from the neoclassical economic theories – from the desire 
for profit maximization, from the ideal of optimizing and maximum efficiency – and from 
some hundred years old U.S. Supreme court declarations (e.g. Ford v. Dodge; Weintraub 
2008). For example, the profit maximization in literature can be termed as “profit 
maximization rule” (see for example Keen and Standish 2006:82). However, this 
literature review was unable to detect a source for the misunderstanding in the theory or 
in the law, meaning, that in the sample, there was not a single paper or source that would 
have confirmed that managers are obliged to maximize the shareholder value. Therefore, 
it is relatively viable argument that such source that would claim that corporations are 
obliged to maximize profits or shareholder value do not exist. The conclusion is that the 
language that corporate law and financial and economic theories use revises and 
influences significantly in the way people think and act as Ferraro et al (2005) and Keynes 
(1936:383) argue. Maximizing shareholder value has become a self-fulfilling prophecy 
in that sense. The two quotations below neatly describe this. 
“The firm doesn’t have to worry about the investment horizons and risk tolerances of its 
shareholders. The company can pursue the simple goal of maximizing value” (Brealey, 
Myers and Allen 2008:3) 
“Language affects what people see, how they see it, and the social categories and 
descriptors they use to interpret their reality. It shapes what people notice and ignore 
and what they believe is and is not important” Ferraro et al (2005:9) 
First quote is from widely used finance textbook and it is followed by the argument made 
by Ferraro et al (2005) for their theory about self-fulfilling economics. They kind of cross-
proof each other. 
4.3.2. Economic assumptions 
Many authors examining the corporate objective from the normative point of view start 
their analysis with nobelist Milton Friedman’s (1970) article published in the New York 
Times where he articulates that the corporate social responsibility is to increase its profit 
(e.g. Jones and Felps 2013; Bower and Paine 2017; Clarke et al 2018). Milton Friedman 
(1970) describes roundaboutly some of these economic assumptions that must hold. Most 
often cited parts of the article are those that describe corporate objective quite strictly 
while the article offers ethical considerations too. The article is worth quoting at length 
because it mirrors basic economic assumptions that are foundational for the shareholder 
value maximization theory and they still represent contemporary state of the economics 
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and teaching in the business schools (Rönnegard and Smith 2016; Ghoshal 2005). In his 
article Friedman (1970) writes; 
"…there is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and 
engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of 
the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or 
fraud… 
What does it mean to say that the corporate executive has a "social responsibility" in 
his capacity as businessman?... that he is to make expenditures on reducing pollution 
beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the corporation or that is required by 
law in order to contribute to the social objective of improving the environment… 
…the corporate executive would be spending someone else's money for a general social 
interest. Insofar as his actions in accord with his "social responsibility" reduce returns 
to stockholders, he is spending their money. Insofar as his actions raise the price to 
customers, he is spending the customers' money. Insofar as his actions lower the wages 
of some employees, he is spending their money… 
…But if he does this, he is in effect imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how 
the tax proceeds shall be spent, on the other.” 
The three fundamental economic principles and assumptions underpinned by Friedman 
(1970) in his article and partly in the above quote are; (1) the corporation should 
externalize all costs that it is not forced to internalize by the government; (2) economic 
agents are rational and only self-interested utility maximizers and hence, they maximize 
the total value for themselves and consequently for the society; (3) the corporation is seen 
as a nexus of contracts (see also Jensen 2001 for economic assumptions). Fourth 
important assumption – not quite visible in Friedman’s (1970) article – made for the 
shareholder value maximization is that resources are scarce because that justifies eternal 
desire for efficiency (Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a:356). The goal of efficiency justifies 
almost any action in the name of efficiency made by the current management as the 
market for corporate control would step in if the current management would resist 
increasing efficiency (Jensen 1990). These principles and assumptions must be in place 
for the shareholder value maximization theory to be appropriate and functional. Even 
though these principles might still be representative of the mainstream economics, they 
are not without recognized problems.  
Friedman (1970) was arguing that what is now known as ‘corporate social responsibility’ 
is in government’s responsibility and companies contribute through legal system and 
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taxation. Contrary to what is often held as a Friedman position in this debate, Friedman 
(1970) is not suggesting that companies should start misbehaving, hurt moral customs or 
ethics nor pay abundant bonuses to chief executives – quite the opposite. Friedman (1970) 
did not suggest that companies should be run with short time-horizon and thus undermine 
the future of the company and future cash flows.  
4.3.3. The concept of objective 
What is more to these huge economic assumptions and requirements, also the word 
‘objective’ and timeframe in which the shareholder value should be maximized are 
causing problems for the shareholder value maximization theory. The word objective and 
its practical or operational definition is well articulated by Cantley (1970:37). Cantley’s 
(1970) practical setting reveals some of the reasons for debates around shareholder value 
maximization theory and stakeholder theory. Operational definition of the corporate 
objective: 
“1. Objectives are used to rank alternatives. This is their central function in decision-
making, i.e. in choosing between the forecast outcomes of alternative courses of action. 
2. Objectives are used as measures – for targets, and for subsequent assessment of the 
satisfactoriness of performance, i.e. for control. 
3. Objectives provide common framework of reference to ensure the consistency of 
decisions and measures in different parts of the organization.” (Cantley 1970:37.) 
Cantely’s (1970) operational roles for the corporate objective are paradoxical. The last 
two operational roles imply that corporations should have variety of objectives for 
different business areas and units. However, the first operational role insists one single 
scale for how to measure utility for the ranking. Practically thinking, corporations must 
make decisions on daily basis and they are most likely confronted with set of alternatives 
from which they must choose. Are corporations choosing from these alternatives 
consistently to achieve some uniform corporate utility? Is the shareholder value 
maximization explicit and consistent corporate utility in every situation? At least the 
shareholder value maximization does not fulfill Cantley’s (1970) requirements for 
objective’s operational roles. The operational role number one roughly equals the 
shareholder value maximization and the reason why the stakeholder theory exists is that 
the shareholder value maximization is unable to address to these last two operational roles 
of objective.  
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Scholars are disagreeing on time spans of the objective. At least artificially disagreeing – 
artificially because it is difficult to believe that scholars examining the field for 30 years 
would not understand what the shareholder value maximization means by the word long-
term (i.e. the best interest of the corporation) (cf. Friedman 1970; Freeman 2011; 
Lazonick 2012). This means that the critics of the shareholder value maximization use 
examples of short-termism as examples of how the shareholder value maximization 
theory is a bad theory and causing bad corporate behavior (see e.g. Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000; Bower and Paine 2017; Clarke et al 2018). Short-termism means for 
example sacrificing research and development to achieve higher profits for quarter or 
otherwise harming the corporation’s long-range plans in order to achieve monetary return 
in short-term, for the corporation or for the management. The short-termism is not 
allowed by the shareholder value maximization theory.  
The reason for this conflict in short- and long-term in assessing the shareholder value 
maximization is found from the paradoxical nature of the classic economics. As Cantley 
(1970:38) states, “classical economics is static”. It means that the objective from classic 
economics, the profit maximization, is assuming that maximization of this year’s profits 
is irrespective of next year’s profits. In other words, the classical economics leaves no 
tools for comparing short-term and long-term because it assumes that maximizing profits 
for this year is exactly the same as maximizing profits for any forthcoming year. Also the 
word maximize is by no means unproblematic as it neglects the uncertainty and assumes 
that managers are able to make decisions that return the greatest profit or the greatest 
value to the shareholders (Cantley 1970). However, the maximizing actions cannot be 
observed. This apparent lack of ability to rank objectives and rank decisions between 
short-term and long-term opens the space for the stakeholder theory and for criticism 
towards the shareholder value maximization. 
4.3.4. Philosophy – positive and normative economics 
Philosophical examination helps to deal with unrealistic assumptions of economics and 
to explain the concept of abstractions without which the shareholder value maximization 
theory does not function. Philosophically, the issue of business and ethics is quite old one 
as some 2500 years ago Aristotle were writing about commerce and its objectives that the 
money-making is only practiced because it is compulsory (Dobson 1999:71).  
“Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; it is merely useful and desired for the 
sake of something else.” (Aristotle in Lewis 2011:3) 
86 
 
Presumably, the reason – or part of it – why the shareholder value maximization theory 
has run into problems academically and practically can be found from the intersection of 
philosophy and economics and more precisely, from the prevailing conditions in 
economic research and teaching. Status quo is, and has been, that economics is positive 
science and it has no normative content or at least that ‘mainstream/standard/positive 
economics’ will explicitly distinguish from normative economics (Hausmann 2018; 
Hands 2012; Gul and Pesendorfer 2008; Friedman 1953). Some, for example Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2007:102), do not even recognize ‘normative’ being a thing in their 
exhaustive textbook on research methods for business and management. However, the 
case is that economics is normatively prescribing corporate objective to being ‘maximize 
the long-term shareholder value’. Might this disorder be one explanation for the problems 
in the theory? 
Contrary to the traditional and mainstream economics and finance conception that 
economics is positivist science (Brealey et al 2008; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Friedman 
1953) – the core microeconomic theories, and particularly the shareholder value 
maximization theory, is perceived to be normative theory as it is not positive in the sense 
that it would describe real economic agents, firms or individuals for example. Nor is the 
theory of the shareholder value maximization based on empirical observations of real 
individual agents’ behaviors which are then generalized as would positivist theory be 
developed. It is questionable if it would be even possible to observe ‘maximization’ or 
‘preference’ or ‘utility curve’ or ‘rationality’ which are all essential concepts of economic 
theories relevant for the shareholder value maximization. Rather, the theories are 
normatively describing an ideal of an agent – what the agent should be like. Recognition 
of the normative nature of the shareholder value maximization theory will allow 
understanding not only the problems within the theory, but also problems that it has in 
relation to its alternating stakeholder theory and the dispute whose privileges are more 
important. 
Analyzed literature reveals that authors advocating shareholder value maximization 
theory often believe that economics – and; especially finance – is intended to be purely 
positive and descriptive discipline of science (e.g. Friedman 1953) but shareholder value 
maximization is by no means value-free and often it is even formulated with using words 
such as ‘should’ (e.g. Findlay and Whitmore 1974; Jensen 2001). Shareholder value 
maximization seems to be a normative ideal of corporate behavior in financial economics 
which does not, however, describe reality but is still widely used not only in finance but 
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also in other disciplines as a descriptive theory. Models, for example valuation models, 
that assume positive shareholder value maximization are then exaggerating the problems. 
Financial economists are held responsible for the development of the shareholder value 
maximization theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Jensen 
2001). However, the shareholder value maximization theory is not consistent with 
underlying theories nor with the claims that economics is purely positivist science. For 
example, utility functions of each individual and investor are unknown. Yet, the utility 
maximization is the principle which outlines one homogenous goal common for all 
heterogenous investors and stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In other words, 
classic economics allows the assumption that all agents want their utility – the financial 
return in case of the shareholder value maximization theory – to be maximized (e.g. Smith 
1776). If classic economics would allow an idea that shareholders might desire something 
else than financial returns, or that these financial returns should come under certain 
conditions the shareholder value maximization theory would not exist. In Jensen’s (2001) 
‘enlightened shareholder value maximization theory’ there are some indications about 
development into this direction where utility curve of the shareholder value maximization 
theory might include also something else than financial returns. This is because Jensen 
(2001) proposes maximizing the whole enterprise value in a long-term rather than 
maximizing share price and the enterprise value can include various determinants. In 
short, shareholder value maximization theory is very simplistic and straightforward using 
all of the major classic economic assumptions and abstractions. This raises problems for 
applicability of the shareholder value maximization theory in practice. 
Furthermore, the shareholder value maximization is regarded as a corporate objective and 
sometimes it is even regarded as being an only such objective for a corporation (e.g. 
Friedman 1970). This is true even though the shareholder value maximization is not a 
viable descriptive theory of the corporation and it was never intended to be such a theory 
as financial economists refer to the theory of the firm with the words ‘black box’ (e.g. 
Jensen 1990; Jensen and Meckling 1976:306). Yet, shareholder value maximization is 
regarded as an objective and as a purpose of the firm and it has influenced in how 
management thinks and how business school students are educated and how they will be 
thinking in the future (Ghoshal 2005; Rönnegard and Smith 2016). To be clear, a theory 
that is not defining or describing the firm is defining and describing the objective for the 
firm. How this inconsistency could possibly have taken place is one of the major interests 
of this literature review.  
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The misconception between normative and positive and between what is thought to be at 
hand and what actually is at hand seems to be the root cause of the problems around the 
shareholder value maximization theory (Hands 2012). Practitioners are using theories that 
are taught as being positive descriptions of business mechanisms and they are living up 
to that which leads to unwanted results visible everywhere (e.g. Friedman 1970; Jensen 
2001; Welch 2009). For example short-termism is allegedly caused by the shareholder 
value maximization doctrine (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Lazonick 2012; Clarke 
et al 2018), could it be, then, that the short-termism is alive and well because the 
shareholder value maximization theory – when interpreted positively – requires that 
managers are rational enough to persist such a short-term endeavors while in reality, they 
are not (it is visible for example in numerous accounting scandals in the corporate history 
e.g. Markham 2015). So, we have a normative theory that we think, and more importantly, 
enact as a positive descriptive theory. In some sense, the theory has become self-fulfilling 
(Ferraro et al 2005).  
In many academic papers and books, the shareholder value maximization is implicitly 
thought to be separate and lone-standing theory that is setting the corporate objective 
function and guide for managers and corporate governance. In other words, scholars 
implicitly express that they do not need to consider preceding economic theories and their 
assumptions because they do not do it – they only accept and apply without arguing (e.g. 
Jensen 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a). However, the philosophical examination of 
the problem reveals that the shareholder value maximization theory can be seen merely 
as an extension to the (normative) rational choice theory accompanied with the agency 
theory, or, more simply, as the rational choice theory applied to corporations and their 
governance (Vanberg 2012). Now it becomes visible that shareholder value maximization 
is vulnerable to all criticism concerning its preceding theories. The shareholder value 
maximization theory assumes similarly to rational choice theory that aggregated social 
welfare is a result of individual’s rational, self-interested, utility maximizing and 
consistent decisions. Vanberg (2012:505) reminds that while the rational choice theory is 
intuitively very appealing way to explain agent’s behavior (i.e. it would be hard to 
imagine anyone acting against their preferences), it has no empirical content and therefore 
the theory is irrefutable and so it cannot explain real world. In other words, the argument 
that people choose what they prefer cannot be refuted. Then, the whole system of the 
agency theory and the shareholder value maximization theory with all its presuppositions 
are questionable as well. For example, do all shareholders prefer maximum monetary 
return on their investment over and above everything else, social concerns for example. 
Are monetary and share price-based compensation models in essence, guiding managers 
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to take desired actions if managers are not rational self-interested maximizers of their own 
benefit – if they are not rational individuals set forth by the rational choice theory. What 
is more to this, the dichotomy of normative and positive economics is again at play. 
One of the most important critiques for the rational choice theory from this standpoint 
accrues from ontological considerations of an individual and whether critical entities for 
the economics and the shareholder value maximization theory exists. For example, it is 
quite questionable if ‘Homo economicus’ – defined as mainly self-interested and rational 
being described through utility function – actually exists (Davis 2012). Davis (2012) 
employs Artistotle’s existence conditions to evaluate ontology of the homo economicus 
and concludes that it does not fill these conditions and cannot exist.  If the homo 
economicus does not exist, then our corporate governance mechanisms are based on a 
construct of academic reasoning with no relation to real world nor real individuals or 
corporations – a loose approximant at best.  
Making constraints of an individual more relaxed or giving more resources for the 
individual might cause that the decisions of the individual are closing the decisions that 
the rational individual would make. For example, missing knowledge or lack of time 
prevents agents from making utility maximizing decisions and this fact is undermining 
Jensen’s (2001) arguments about objective function of a firm. Similarly the decisions 
would improve if more time and information are given. 
The purpose of economics is to analyze institutions, such as trading mechanisms and 
organization structures, and to ask how those institutions mediate the interests of 
different economic agents. This analysis is useful irrespective of the causes of 
individiuals’ preferences. Standard economics ignores the therapeutic potential of 
economic policies and leaves it to therapists, medical professional, and financial 
advisers to help individuals refine their goals.” Gul and Pesendorfer (2008:32). 
The above Gul and Pesendorfer (2008) quotation is from an influential paper published 
in an economics handbook. What it says is that it is not economists’ task to define policies 
nor goals. Yet that is exactly what economists have done – they have defined the corporate 
purpose as it does not follow from the law or from other policies or scientific disciplines. 
If economists would have only been asking how companies are run and how their 
objectives are defined to ‘mediate the interests of different economic agents’, they would 
have ended up with descriptive theory. Now they ended up crafting a normative theory 
while apparently imagining that they were only describing the state of the world in 
positive sense.  
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The intention of the thesis is not to say that all economic theorizing starting with the 
rational choice theory is doubtful or unnecessary (maybe the contrary), but to examine 
why the theory about shareholder value maximization is under huge dispute and why so 
many corporate malpractices have emerged. Corporate objective and its influence over 
the state of the affairs is beyond description as corporation is at the very heart of 
democratic and capitalistic form of society. One reason for complications in the 
shareholder value maximization theory certainly is that economists and practitioners think 
that they have a positive theory while in fact, they have for that very reason, flawed 
normative theory (presumably, one cannot accidentally develop functioning normative 
theory with intention to develop positivist descriptive theory). 
The argument is, that if the economists writing about shareholder value maximization or 
criticizing it, would understand the premises behind the theory, they could understand 
why it is problematic and under so much debate and more importantly, it could be taught 
better in business schools over the world to shape mindset of soon to be managers. In 
other words, it should not come as a surprise that there are problems in practice and badly 
behaving companies, if the principal theory for the corporate governance is thought to be 
positive theory based on other positive theories and it is taught as such, but actually it is 
based on loose assumptions and normative content. Furthermore, shareholder value 
maximization theorists should address more to the underlying heavyweight theories and 
their empirical validity and content. Ontological consideration of the shareholder value 
maximization should be taken seriously. 
The shareholder value maximization is a normative theory that is resting on the shoulders 
of other normative theories, but it is treated as a positive description of the reality as 
almost all contemporary economic theories are, excluding behavioral economics (e.g. 
Hausman 2018).  Any theory is foredoomed to failure if its preceding theories are misused 
or misunderstood in the process of developing the theory. For example, if one believes 
that the rational choice theory adequately describes the real individual and individual’s 
preferences and one then accumulates theories over that untruthfully strict positivist view 
of the economy, the resulting theories cannot be very adequate in practice – at least not 
adequate in the positivist sense. 
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 Financial markets and the shareholder value maximization 
“Our suggestion is that the financial academic community formally recognize the 
inadequacy of the SWM [shareholder value maximization] model as a description of 
reality and begin to research the possible avenues for redressing the imbalance of 
power within the firm.” Findlay and Whitmore (1974:33) 
One field of literature that is clearly distinguishable within the sample is finance. In this 
chapter, the issues aroused by authors in the sample are discussed, synthesized and 
analyzed. Theoretical sampling is applied to increase depth of the analysis. Corporations 
are not only influenced by the pressures of the industry that they operate in, but they face 
significant demands and pressures form the financial markets. Financial markets is the 
institution that is demanding for corporations to maximize the shareholder value. 
Financial markets is also the clear reason for why societies and especially managers think 
that the shareholder value maximization is a legitimate objective for corporations. 
Suchman’s (1995) definition for legitimacy is depicting how the shareholder value 
maximization is legitimized by the institution of financial markets; 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman 1995:574) 
Finance as a field of science and its innovations from collateralized debt obligations and 
derivatives to the shareholder value maximization theory have substantially influenced in 
lives and livelihoods of everyone in the globalized economy, most notably the last 
financial crisis caused large impacts (Clarke 2010; Dunbar 2011; Akerlof and Shiller 
2009). The financialization is a quite new term. Financialization means that non-financial 
corporations are becoming more like investment banks and financial organizations rather 
than productive industrial corporations (Clarke et al 2018; Davis 2018). Maybe one the 
most momentous examples would be the General Electric and its financing arm. 
Financialization relates to the shareholder value maximization and it makes the finance 
and financialization to be global and universal issue, more so than before (Clarke 2018; 
Davis 2018). The shareholder value maximization theory urges corporations to turn 
themselves to financial institutions because shareholder value maximization theory is 
strongly intertwined and dependable on capital markets. 
Markets tend to reward those companies who invest in short-termism and quarter profits 
(e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Bower and Paine 2017). It is somehow interesting, 
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how companies do not actually use the shareholder value maximization as a positive 
theory that it strives to be. For example, under the shareholder value maximization 
regime, dividends should not be constant or rising steadily as dividends are issued from 
the residual which necessarily fluctuates. Quite the opposite, corporations have steady 
dividend streams and dividends might even be boosted when the earnings decrease which 
means that it is a managerial decision and not driven by the shareholder value 
maximization (Findlay and Whitmore 1974). 
Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) argue that there are huge share buybacks and that it 
describes the transition of corporate strategies from retain and reinvest to the downsize 
and distribute. Authors report how the amount of share buybacks and dividends increased 
dramatically between 1978 and 1996 (2000:24) and that the buybacks were actually 
illegal manipulation of the share price before Reagan’s government. The increasement in 
the payout ratio is higher than would be justified in relation to increasement in profits. 
The important notion is that dividends and buybacks are paid after investments are already 
made. Dividends and buybacks should be paid only from the residual in its literal 
meaning. However, the financial theory is again making huge assumption: corporations 
should have preference in retainment, innovation, investment and growth over the 
distribution of wealth and boosting the share price. The logic is that once the corporation 
cannot make investments that would yield more that the required cost of capital, it must 
distribute the money back to the shareholders. Then, the increased dividends and 
buybacks means that US corporations stopped being innovative. (e.g. Brealey et al 2008.) 
The shareholder value maximization theory provides numerous financial hypotheses that 
can be empirically tested. Studies conducting these tests might exist, but this analysis 
identified none. For example, the shareholder value maximization provides direct 
hypothesis for corporate investment that; whenever the rate of return for a corporation 
increases, the payout ratio should decrease and the amount of retained earnings should 
increase because the corporation is able to increase shareholder wealth through its own 
investments more than by distributing it to the shareholders. Does it happen in practice 
and is there studies examining this? None were identified by this review. Hypotheses 
derived from the shareholder value maximization theory should be investigated in order 
to test empirical validity of the shareholder value maximization. The conclusion of this 
review is that if these empirical tests exists in the financial literature, they are not 
connecting the research with the shareholder value maximization theory. The connections 
should be made for obvious reason to enhance corporate objectives, strategies and 
investment decisions. The conclusion that these studies exist in some form but that they 
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are not connected with the shareholder value maximization theory is very likely true as 
for example dividend policy and investments are popular topics among finance scholars. 
One interesting financial point is made by Hansen and Lott (1996) who argue that 
imperfect competition in product markets, investors holding diversified portfolios and 
existence of externalities lead to a rejection of the value maximization as a unanimous 
preferred goal among shareholders. Not only do they reject the value maximization, but 
they also give suggestion about what the corporate objective should be under those 
conditions. Simply, the argument that Hansen and Lott (1996) provides for the corporate 
goal discussion is that shareholders should want corporations to maximize value of a 
portfolio rather than value of the single company. Value maximizing company would 
externalize as much costs as possible. If there are externalities arising from actions of a 
company that have adverse influence in other companies, shareholders would want 
corporations to internalize these externalities. Argument is attractive but Hansen and Lott 
(1996) fail to elaborate how the idea will work in practice. 
4.4.1. Net present value and the discount rate 
Jensen (2001) suggests that corporations should maximize the value of the firm and that 
it would be essentially same as maximizing the shareholder value. The way how finance 
is most often valuing corporations is through the net present value (NPV) of the 
corporation which is achieved through discounted cashflow method. Discounted cash 
flow method is the most often used valuation tool and it is strongly connected to the 
shareholder value maximization theory in two ways; (1) managers should make the 
resource allocation decisions based on discounted cashflow method in order to maximize 
shareholder value (2) shareholders value the share price with the discounted cash flow 
method (Brealey et al 2008; Jensen 2001; Findlay and Whitmore 1974).  
Discounted cash flow method can take into account all factors from the cost of capital to 
the ethical values of the person doing the valuation or even prevailing weather conditions 
if necessary. These are extreme examples, but the point is that everything could be 
included in the value of a corporation or in the value of an investment when applying 
discounted cash flow method to valuation. The ability to address the endless range of 
factors is the greatest strength of the discounted cashflow method but it is also its greatest 
weakness. The ability to address several factors is based on alteration of the discount rate. 
Discount rate is also very vulnerable to any biases of the person doing the valuation. 
Under shareholder value maximization, corporations should make investments that are 
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yielding more than the cost of capital to maximize the value of the shareholders (Findlay 
and Whitmore 1974:26). Thus, the shareholder value maximization and discounted 
cashflow method are determining how corporations allocate scarce resources. 
To elaborate little bit further, an investor who is thinking of buying a share must make 
the valuation of the share to see if it is worthwhile to by the share at the price that it is 
currently trading. While the investor is doing the valuation the discount rate should be 
carefully established. At the minimum, the discount rate acknowledges the risk related to 
cashflows that are being discounted. However, an investor might increase or decrease the 
discount rate based on investor’s own discretion. For example, if valuing an oil 
company’s shares, it might be reasonable to adjust the discount rate upwards a little bit 
because oil is part of the large environmental problems and it is likely that sales of oil 
will be diminishing in some time frame in the future. More importantly, if the investor is 
personally environmentally and socially inclined, the investor might alter the discount 
rate based on that. For example, if the investor believes that a corporation is acting counter 
to his morals and ethics, the price of the share of that corporation appears to him less 
appealing than of some other corporation acting more aligned with the investors personal 
values. This is what some hope to be happening as institutional investors and activist 
investor groups are using their influence over corporations that are perceived to be 
socially or environmentally irresponsible (e.g. Eccles and Klimenko 2019).  
As the shareholder value maximization theory is often criticized for being concentrated 
in the short-term or at least that it is causing short-termism, one important notion should 
be explicitly made here. The present value method is inherently long-term – if all 
shareholders and investors use the discounted cash flow method in evaluating the present 
value, the share price takes into account every single cashflow to the corporation, also 
those accruing in future (Brealey et al 2008). Another similar criticism often put forward 
is that these financial models, shareholder value maximization and present value as a 
decision rule cause short-termism (see e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Bower and 
Paine 2017; Clarke et al 2018). It is however very important to understand if the theory 
is poor or if something else is wrong. The claim of this thesis is that the shareholder value 
maximization theory is not the reason for short-termism. Executives that are maximizing 
their own utility through stock options and short-term share price increasement attained 
for example by cutting research and development or firing employees are not maximizing 
shareholder value. The inconsistency is that shareholders should then be able to price this 
short-termism of the executives, but they do not. That might be because it would be very 
hard to tell when the executive is behaving only to exercise their own stock option. The 
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criticism should be pointed for executives, not for the shareholder value maximization 
theory if the executives are not behaving according to the theory. Consumers should not 
buy products that are produced counter to their ethics and investors should not invest or 
at least the distinction between investors values and corporation’s behavior should be 
priced through modification of the discount rate. 
 US corporate law & the shareholder value maximization theory 
Purely economic analysis of the corporation would not be enough to explain shareholder 
value maximization and essence and evolution of the corporation. The examination of the 
legal story of the shareholder value maximization is well informed to begin with the 
quotation by Stout (2008:176); 
“Corporations are purely legal creatures, without flesh, blood, or bone. Their existence 
and behavior is determined by a web of legal rules found in corporate charters and 
bylaws, state corporate case law and statutes, private contracts, and a host of federal 
and state regulations.” 
Law is so important field of literature for corporations and for the shareholder value 
maximization theory that both would cease to exist if legal institutions would cease to 
exist. Another – although quite childish – point for conducting legal analysis is that the 
shareholder value maximization theory is normatively prescribing the corporate 
objective. The shareholder value maximization is fundamentally a normative statement 
or theory because it is not based on observed empirical evidence but to idealized result of 
an economic theory. This means, that economics is not liable for placing such a theory to 
the center of our corporate governance system since the economics claim to be purely 
positive science and accordingly, it leaves all normative guiding for the other scientific 
disciplines such as arts or for completely different domains such as policy makers or 
regulators (Friedman 1953; Gul and Pesendorfer 2008). Therefore, if the usual suspect – 
economics – is not the source for the persistence of the shareholder value maximization 
in current corporate practices, it is essential to examine what legal and regulative aspects 
there are considering the theory. 
Shareholders are having legally very special position if compared to other stakeholders. 
Other stakeholders (e.g. supply contract, employment contract) have contractual 
relationship with the corporation, but the law ensures that shareholders can exercise 
certain actions – choose the board, approve crucial transactions – over the corporation 
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without explicit contracting (Smith 1998). In addition, there are significant regulations 
and institutions affecting to corporate governance such as business judgement rule, 
property rights, fiduciary duties and different antitrust laws for instance (see Monks and 
Minow 2011; Stout 2002;2008). Through the analysis of legal texts, understanding of the 
necessary institutional conditions for the shareholder value maximization will be 
established for the purposes of the evaluating the viability and argumentation of the 
theory. Reviewing the legal aspects is especially helpful because law and legal cases 
depict early developments and history of the shareholder value maximization very well. 
The proper reason for reviewing legal details at length, is concerned with the idea that 
some of the most prominent arguments supporting the shareholder value maximization 
theory – such as, that shareholders own the corporation and are therefore rightful residual 
claimants (e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel 1983; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a) – are legally 
dubious or indefinite (Stout 2002). It is also equally meaningful finding if the law dictates 
that companies are obliged to maximize the shareholder value because then economics 
and management or other sciences and corporations themselves are less able to modify 
the practices of corporate governance and corporate actions. It seems necessary to 
understand what the legal boundaries are when assessing current corporate governance 
theories – it is not a fault in the theory or governance model, if the model cannot be 
applied in reality because legal environment is preventing it. For example, if legal bodies 
expect that companies pay dividends rather than use the retained earnings to expansion 
strategies, then the implications for how to improve governance model are different than 
if the companies are choosing freely what do with their earnings (see Dodge v. Ford). 
The purpose here, is not to interpret the legality of the rulings or to assess the validity or 
the morals of the presented legal texts. The purpose is to adequately account to important 
legal concerns regarding arguments in favor of the shareholder value maximization and 
to depict important events considering the theory and its related concepts, and, to support 
the construction of the timeline presented in the chapter 4.2.2. One last point for the 
support of legal analysis is that going through a regulative point of view and legal debate 
is a necessity if one wishes to understand present regime of corporate governance, 
because fundamentally, corporations are a legal constructions – what would a corporation 
be without law? Further, understanding the present regime is an absolute necessity if one 
wishes to conclude what should be the purpose of the company.  
Legal examination is concentrated in – but not constrained to – the Anglo-American 
countries (U.S. and UK) because the shareholder value maximization originated there. 
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Outline of the early developments of the shareholder value maximization theory and 
conditions for the theory are outlined here through U.S. court rulings. Common law is 
based on declarations of judges and therefore rulings made by U.S supreme court judges 
are considered to hold great significance for corporations and therefore for the 
development of shareholder value maximization theory (Duhaime’s law dictionary). The 
thesis is not arguing that these following rulings in particular, are those, that have 
influenced significantly to the development of the shareholder value maximization, but 
the rulings are suitably and comprehensively describing the concepts of corporation, 
corporate objective, ownership and managerial responsibilities, which are all essential 
parts of the shareholder value maximization. Only the implications for the shareholder 
value maximization are analyzed, meaning, that the rulings are not generally or factually 
(i.e. what are the facts of the underlying case) presented as it would not be necessary 
because the most of the cases are not concerned with corporate law or corporate 
governance per se, but the implications for the shareholder value maximization come as 
a side effects or collateral results. 
4.5.1. U.S. Supreme court rulings 1800-1919 
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward 
First, in the 1819 United States supreme court ruling in Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. 
Woodward, the supreme court concluded that a corporation is an artificial person that is 
not tangible. And furthermore, because of existing only through legal perspective, it can 
only hold those features or characteristics that are given to it in its charter (i.e. in articles 
of incorporation). Stated otherwise, a corporation is nothing but a legal construct that is 
constituted through a contract between a state (i.e. or government) and a corporation. This 
means for example, that a state could at any time close down the corporation if it did not 
obey. Further, justice Story defined a corporation being a collection of individuals that 
possess certain features that they do not hold as an individual, such were possibility to 
perpetual succession and ability to being sued or sue based on this collectivity. In short, 
a corporation is a collection of individuals who has made an agreement with the state and 
it will pursue only those objectives that are prescribed in its charter. This is the aggregate 
theory of the corporation (i.e. aggregation of the individuals) in which important feature 
is that the corporation cannot be separated from its owners (Millon 1990:201; Fort 
1996:149). (U.S. Supreme Court ruling 1819.) 
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Above court ruling adequately depicts two important corporate procedures of the 19th 
century; corporations were operating under predetermined rules and they were created 
and strictly controlled by the state. These government-controlled procedures had two 
important and direct consequences; (1) corporations were mainly serving public interests 
(railroads, banks, ferries, canals etc.) and, (2) they were restricted by predetermined 
charters filed with the state (Supreme court ruling 1819; Berle and Means 1932:32; Fort 
1996:149; Sundaram et al 2004a:356). In other words, corporations were founded to serve 
all stakeholders following the state’s decision.  
Corporations founded for private interests were extraordinary at the time (e.g. Sundaram 
et al 2004a; Monks and Minow 2011). An illustrative example of how exceptional the 
private corporation was at the time can be found from the corporate governance textbook 
by Monks and Minow (2011:107), where they relate early corporations to municipalities 
and the given examples of those municipality-like early corporations are universities and 
towns. These early corporations were created to be a counter force for the otherwise 
unlimited power of the king and basically the only reason for their establishment was to 
serve public good – the state or the citizens would not have approved the corporation 
otherwise. Monks and Minow (2011) continue that still on the eighteenth century, 
corporations that wanted to raise capital through a stock issue needed a permission from 
the state. This means that the state could decide what was being practiced in a corporate 
form as it specifically approved each new corporation and its purpose. 
Dodge v. Woolsey 
The state’s overseeing power over companies were further reinforced in the supreme 
court ruling in the 1885 case Dodge v. Woolsey. The case is about collecting taxes, but it 
ended up confirming that states do exercise superior power over corporations. More 
importantly for the shareholder value maximization, the case concluded that; 
“A stockholder in a corporation has a remedy in chancery against the directors, to 
prevent them from doing acts which would amount to a violation of the charter or to 
prevent any misapplication of their capital or profits which might lessen the value of the 
shares, if the acts intended to be done amount to what is called in law a breach of trust 
or duty.” 
A chancery is a division of the High Court of Justice which decides on cases that are 
related to principle of equity (Oxford dictionary of English). Here the ruling clearly says 
that there is a relationship between directors and shareholders which gives a very strong 
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position for the shareholders. Shareholders are promised to have reparations or 
compensation if the management is behaving adversely or unfavorably – with the 
condition that the actions of management must fulfill the concept of breach of trust. The 
court ruling protects shareholders from ‘misbehaving’ directors, but it also strengthens 
significantly shareholder rights and further defines ownership of the company. (U.S. 
Supreme court ruling 1885.) 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. co. 
Finally, only one year after, in the 1886 court ruling chief justice Waite declared explicitly 
that corporations are natural persons suggesting, that they are enjoying similar rights 
than individual human beings – quite clear change to the previous stance that corporations 
are only legal construct and a contract between a state and a corporation. More precisely, 
Mr. Waite said that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution applies to 
corporations. The Fourteenth Amendment says that a state cannot forbid equal protection 
of laws from any person within its jurisdiction.  
In the ruling, it is visible that the contractual relationship between a corporation and a 
state, where the state is superior party, ended, and it was replaced with the idea of 
‘corporate personhood’ or ‘corporate entity and identity’. The corporation is no longer a 
contract or group of individuals, it became an individual in itself. Fort (1996:149) named 
this as a ‘real entity approach’ which ended the era of aggregate theory of the 
corporation. Aggregate theory signified that corporations did not exist separately or 
outside of its owners (cf. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward). This decision 
logically complicated the sharing of responsibilities in the corporation and obscured 
ownership as it arouses questions like; if a company is comparable to the individual 
human being, how can it be owned and who bears the responsibility of its actions? Human 
beings, individuals, cannot be owned. While shareholders ‘own’ the corporation, they do 
not control it (e.g. Stout 2002). (U.S. Supreme court ruling 1886.) 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Company  
The facts of the Dodge v. Ford Motor Company are as follows, Henry Ford was the 
majority shareholder of the Ford and he also founded the corporation while John and 
Horace Dodge were minority shareholders. Mr. Ford wanted to withhold the dividend and 
use the excess retained earnings for the benefit of the company and the other stakeholders; 
to build better and cheaper cars, expand the business and to offer increased pay to 
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employees.  Dodge brothers laid charges against Ford in court, claiming that Ford 
unnecessarily restricted dividend payments and violated shareholder rights regardless of 
the fact that Ford Motor Company was extremely profitable. Allegedly, Ford had also 
other reasons for preventing the dividend than benefiting the company as he pursued for 
buying back the shares of the Dodge brothers and to shrink the amount of liquid assets 
that the Dodge brothers held because Dodges were trying to launch their own car factory 
(Stout 2008:167). The court’s decision was in favor of the Dodge brothers and the Ford 
Motor Company was ordered to pay special dividend instead of reinvesting in the Ford 
company. (Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 1919; Stout 2008) 
The ruling in itself would probably not have been very influential for the corporate law, 
because the ruling does not suppose that there is some general primacy of the shareholders 
over the others, rather the decision is about minority shareholder oppression which was a 
well-established legal custom (Stout 2008; Smith 1998). The reason, why the case is used 
as a justification of the shareholder value maximization and why it became so famous 
authority in the field of corporate law – it is taught in a number of corporate governance 
and law courses and in business schools – is that the decision text explicitly states (or 
plainly remarks as Stout (2008:165) put it) that; 
“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the 
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The 
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and 
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other 
purposes.” (Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 1919:684) 
Lynn Stout (2008; 2002) is one of the most prominent critics of the shareholder value 
maximization. Stout (2008:165; 2002) represents the legal side of the debate, and she 
argues that this one single Michigan supreme court ruling is accountable for the current 
predominance of the shareholder value maximization. To support this argument, Stout 
(2008:165) referenced to two books and to one law article (none of which are available 
for the current study) which supposedly verify that the Dodge v. Ford Motor Company 
ruling is the one and only legal authority for the shareholder value maximization. 
According to Macey (2008:180) the Dodge v. Ford case is the only case that is 
‘operationalizing the rule that corporations must maximize the profits’. Further, the point 
is made that Michigan court did not have to take a stance in a way that it did in a quotation 
above as Stout (2008:165) continue, that “this was merely judicial dicta [i.e. legal saying], 
quite unnecessary to reach the court's desired result”.  
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This is further elaborated by Smith (1998:320) as he concludes that the Michigan court 
in Dodge v. Ford did not think that they are articulating a ‘meta-principle of corporate 
law’ – which it unintentionally ended up doing. The court was deciding on a dispute over 
majority and minority shareholders and the legal premise for the ordered special dividend 
was that Ford, ‘as a controlling shareholder, had breached his fiduciary duty of good faith 
to his minority investors’ and not because Ford had violated his duty to maximize 
shareholder value or profit creation purpose of the company (Stout 2008:167). Majority 
shareholders are not allowed to oppress minority shareholders. Given the presented 
analysis of the Dodge v. Ford ruling so far, it seems that there has never been any legal 
authority for the proposition that corporations’ foremost purpose is to maximize 
shareholder value and that managers have legal duty to do so. Yet, the Dodge v. Ford 
decision is “routinely” cited as a legal authority for the shareholder value maximization 
and managerial duties. (Stout 2008:167; Sundaram et al 2004a:351.) 
The inconsistencies in the Dodge v. Ford case do not end to the fact that it is widely 
misinterpreted. The most sophisticated corporate courts in the U.S. are found from the 
Delaware, and most of the U.S. companies are therefore incorporated in Delaware and 
Delaware courts are therefore kept as a superior and as the most respected authority for 
the corporate law in the U.S. (American Bar Association 1990; Stout 2008:167; Monks 
and Minow 2011). One dubious feature of the Dodge v. Ford is, that given the Delaware’s 
leading status in corporate law, why would Michigan court have such an influence on 
corporate law?  
Stout (2008:166) argue that the Dodge v. Ford case is not being cited by Delaware courts 
anymore and that the case is deemed to be irrelevant as a source of corporate law, and 
elaborates further (2008:266), that only one unpublished Delaware court case has cited 
the Dodge v. Ford during the last thirty years and it was related to minority shareholder 
oppression, not to corporate objective. Accordingly, only ‘laypersons and many law 
professors continue to rely on the Dodge v. Ford’ (Stout 2008:166). Indeed, it is 
disturbing then, that for example Yoshimori (1995:34), in his survey sent to 418 large 
companies in several countries, found that 75,6 % of companies in the U.S. and 70,5 % 
in the UK think that ‘the shareholder interest is the first priority of companies’ over the 
interest of all stakeholders. In other words, people in the U.S. and in the UK think that 
shareholders value maximization holds some sort of primacy over the others, even though 
there are no legal grounds for that kind of thought because even at the time of the 
Yoshimori’s (1995) survey, it had been some twenty years since Dodge v. Ford case was 
cited by a Delaware court (even then, not to argue for corporate purpose and shareholder 
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value maximization, but concerning minority shareholder oppression). According to 
Stout (2008:176) law professors are still using the Dodge v. Ford case because it offers a 
nice and simple explanation to corporation’s purpose and existence and thus, a true 
conversation about it can be avoided. 
Put shortly, in the first decision the court defined a corporation being a contract between 
a state and a corporation and the state oversees and grants or terminates the contract (U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling 1819). This was the situation of early corporations. The second 
decision about 70 years later raised explicitly the position of ownership of the corporation 
over the directors and shielded shareholders against the actions of management while 
leaving responsibility and other related issues untouched (U.S. Supreme court ruling 
1885). The third decision considered human beings and corporations being equal in the 
face of law, meaning, that corporations are enjoying similar rights than human beings. 
The third decision raised the question of how to solve the conflict between shareholder’s 
property rights and personhood’s rights? (U.S. Supreme court ruling 1886). And finally, 
and most importantly, the Dodge v. Ford case in 1919 set forth once and for all the 
principle of the shareholder value maximization but not with adequate legal premises but 
through a misunderstanding. The whole principle seem not to have any legal sovereignty 
whatsoever. 
With these four decisions it became obscure where the corporate responsibility lies, with 
the control or with the ownership?3 And further, it is unclear if shareholders can be 
thought to be owners of the company as if being precise, they only own the share they 
bought, they do not own a corporation. This is the exact opposite to views advocated by 
several extremely influential economists supporting the shareholder value maximization; 
Milton Friedman (1970), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) 
all argue that shareholders own the company, and because of the ownership, shareholders 
are rightful residual claimants. If one would own something, one could control it, and, 
for example, shareholders should be able to enter to the company’s facilities. Similarly, 
it would be clear that once you own and control something you are responsible for any 
returns, losses or other results and consequences of that something. 
 
                                                     
3 Before corporate form of business and these laws, businesses were organized as partnerships where 
the relationship of responsibility and ownership is much clearer (e.g. Monks and Minow 2011). 
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4.5.2. Are corporations legally obliged to maximize shareholder value? 
Stout (2008:169) argues that shareholder value maximization is not a modern principle 
of corporate law nor corporate governance. To see if the argument holds, the three parts 
that constitute the U.S. corporate law – (1) internal law of the corporation (i.e. the articles 
of incorporation, (2) state corporate codes and, (3) corporate case law – are all reviewed. 
Law scholars are not able to agree what the law intents the corporate purpose being as for 
example; Stout (2008) arguing that the law do not require corporations to pursue 
shareholder value maximization is in sharp contrast to Macey (2008) who insists that legal 
authorities and law are unmistakably presupposing corporations to maximize the 
shareholder value. Not only are the law scholars unable to solve this fundamental question 
of ‘what the law requires and states’, but the situation became even more complicated 
when the state corporate codes were gradually supplemented with the so called ‘other 
constituencies statutes’ (e.g. Hansen 1991; Millon 1991; McDonnel 2004). 
First, the internal law of companies is quite straightforwardly covered in this setting if 
one perceives the company being a nexus of contracts articulated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) which is the understanding of a corporation of many law scholars (Easterbrook 
and Fischel 1983:401; Macey 2008:179). The whole corporation is contract-based 
institution and therefore shareholders and stakeholders may freely choose what goals to 
pursue while the shareholder value maximization represents a default rule (Macey 
2008:179). In other words, the internal law is crafted by corporations themselves and if 
they wanted, they could cite the Ford v. Dodge case and define in the charter that the 
corporate purpose is to create maximum profits for the shareholders. Companies, 
however, do not use such a language but the organizational purpose is mostly defined to 
be ‘anything lawful’ (Delaware law: tit. 8 §101; Stout 2008:169).  
The interpretation taken here, is that because the corporations do not commonly elaborate 
their purpose any further, the default rule (maximizing shareholder value) will apply to 
those corporations. This is contrary to Stout’s (2008:169) view that because corporations 
do not specify that their purpose is ‘to maximize shareholder value’ it means that the rule 
would not apply to them. Still, in a free economy and society, a contract-based institution 
has a legal possibility to choose its goals and therefore the view of the current research is 
that of Macey’s (2008) namely, that unless stated otherwise, the default rule applies. And 
default rule is needed because ‘conducting all lawful actions’ does not constitute a 
purpose at all as doing everything could not be counted as purpose. However, the 
difference in defining objectives in the articles of incorporation or charter is notable when 
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comparing to the original forms of corporation as the corporation’s charter used to be 
restrictive and controlled by state (Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward). Now any 
limitation in objectives is avoided and simultaneously any actual definition of the 
objectives is avoided as corporation’s objective is anything lawful. Based on this change 
in a pattern from a small, clear and restricted to large, ambiguous and unlimited the 
corporations are perpetuating themselves and the survival of the corporation becomes 
acceptable objective. Limiting charters would not be serving the goal of survival as 
surviving necessarily means that corporation must be adaptive.  
Second, if the internal articles of incorporation or charters do not force the doctrine of the 
shareholder value maximization upon corporations, neither does the state corporate codes. 
Codes are not requiring companies to maximize the shareholder value, rather the contrary 
is true as a result of so called ‘other constituencies statutes’ which are explicitly allowing 
(i.e. permitting, not requiring) the boards to consider also interests of the other 
stakeholders such as employees, suppliers and customers (Freeman et al 2011:164; Stout 
2008:169; McDonnel 2004:131; Hansen 1991:1355; American Bar Association 1990). 
The condition, however, for accounting to interests of these other constituencies is that 
actions taken must still be in line with the short-term and long-term interests of the 
shareholders (Dodge v. Ford 1919; American Bar Association 1990: 2262; Macey 2008). 
Delaware courts have also concluded that there have to be ‘rationally related benefits for 
the shareholders’ (American Bar Association – Committee on corporate laws 1990:2269). 
Discourse around the other constituencies statutes is a legal counterpart of the economics 
and management debate about corporate purpose, and more specifically, counterpart of 
the debate between stakeholder theory and shareholder value maximization, and it 
therefore needs further elaborating. Other constituencies statutes are asking the same two 
questions as are the stakeholder theory and shareholder value maximization; (1) what is 
the purpose of the corporation – is it to serve only shareholders vs. serving society at large 
and, (2) for whom are the directors and managers responsible – for the shareholders only 
or for the society and stakeholders at large (see Orts 1992:123). 
Other constituency statutes differ among states, but generally their implication is that 
managers and directors may consider effects of their business decisions also from the 
view point of other stakeholders than shareholders as long as the decision serves the 
corporation’s best interest as well (American Bar Association 1990:2262; Hansen 
1991:1355). McDonnel (2004:1231) and American Bar Association (1990:2268-2270) 
are rising several critical points regarding these statutes that over 30 states have acquired; 
(1) they are vague in how managers and directors should balance or weigh the interests 
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of these different constituencies, (2) the interests of the different constituencies are 
inevitably conflicting, (3) the accountability of managers will be diminished as the 
objective becomes obscure and unmeasurable, (4) the decision making process would 
presumably be poorer and slower as the amount of discretion increases, (5) and most 
disturbingly, directors are not suited or mandated for reallocation of wealth.  American 
Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws conclude (1990:2271), that other 
constituencies statutes are not recommendable way to enhance position of other 
stakeholders and further, that other constituencies statutes would only explicitly address 
the stance that the courts have already held, but unnecessarily empowering managers as 
a byproduct.  
What is extremely interesting and captivating considering the structure and organization 
of the current research, is that the five points of criticism for the statutes – presented above 
– are following almost precisely the same logics and patterns as is the criticism 
confronting the stakeholder theory in the economic literature (see e.g. Freeman et al 2011; 
Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a; Jensen 2001; Friedman 1970). Captivating, because lawyers 
and economists are principally going through the exact same debate around exactly the 
same issues without almost never intersecting with the exception of the collaboration of 
Berle and Means (1932). More cooperation might have been fruitful but since there is 
none, this kind of literature research might be able to combine these ‘different’ fields of 
study and create a new framework. For example, stakeholder theorists Freeman et al 
(2011:163) state that law is not very frequently linked with business, but it is still 
‘important for the study of organizations’ and continue (2011:164), that the importance 
of the legal theory of the theory of the firm is the reason why the stakeholder theory has 
gained foothold in the field of law. So why is it that economists and lawyers do not read 
each other’s texts? 
Orts (1992:41) is having a different, but connective, view that the law is not manifesting 
for either one option, but the other constituencies statutes allows the managers and 
directors to choose with which criterion to manage (only shareholders or more broadly 
stakeholders) by increasing legal validity of decisions concerned with other stakeholders 
than shareholders. This would mean – strictly interpreted – that the business judgment 
rule and the duty of care would be expanded to span also stakeholders other than the 
shareowners. For example, managers, if contested in court, should be then able to show 
that they have considered all relevant information considering all stakeholders and their 
interests. According to Orts (1992) this is not the case as the other constituency statutes 
are only an explicit recognition of the idea that managers are allowed to consider all 
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stakeholders (see Freeman et al 2011:168). Further, Millon (1991) argues that statutes 
provide enforceable rights to stakeholders other than shareholders. This view is not 
approved by McDonnel (2004:1231) for example, as accordingly several states have 
explicitly denied the right from enumerated stakeholders to sue based on the other 
constituency statutes and in others the embargo is implicitly expressed. Millon (1991:225) 
also interpreted that because of constituency statutes a manager may freely turn down any 
profitable business plan if it would harm any of the stakeholders. This is not supported 
by Delaware courts (American Bar Association 1990:2269). 
In short, the other constituencies statutes are created by most of the states in in the U.S. 
for protection against hostile takeovers. They have since spanned to consider other 
situations and all management decisions in general. Constituency statutes and the modern 
case law are allowing, but not requiring, managers to take into account also other 
stakeholders when doing business decisions. There are serious criticisms concerning the 
statutes but also many that believe them being a beneficial for society at large. It does not 
come quite clear within the scope of the current research, whether the constituency 
statutes are enforceable in court or are they only for broadening the discretion of the 
managers. Similarly, it does not come clear within the scope of this research if those 
statutes actually expand management’s fiduciary duties to cover also others than 
shareholders. Most of the articles considering the statutes are quite dated as they were 
written in the 1990s. Stout (2008:170) argue that other constituency statutes mean that 
corporations need not to maximize shareholder value under the state codes, but does not 
elaborate what they mean for the management more broadly. According to Macey 
(2008:179) other constituency statutes cannot be used as a rational justification in a 
situation where managers would benefit other constituencies at the expense of the 
shareholders.  
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 
The analysis of whether the law forces corporations to maximize shareholder value or not 
is concluded with the recent Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores case from the 2014. Quote 
from the court opinion describes the current state of the U.S. corporate law; 
“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make 
money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit 
at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.” (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores Inc 2014:23) 
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“… there is no apparent reason why they [for-profit corporations] may not further 
religious objectives as well.” (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc 2014:23) 
The U.S. courts came from treating corporations as profit-making machines to treating 
them as organizations that may pursue any lawful goal – even religious ones. Normative 
conclusions following the conceptions about what constitutes a corporation have totally 
changed over time. The fact that there is no requirement for shareholder value 
maximization should be emphasized in business schools and law schools because 
misunderstanding seems to widespread and detrimental if managers do believe that they 
are obliged to maximize shareholder value at over and above everything else (see Stout 
2015 and Cornell Law School 2019). 
4.5.3. Conclusion 
Shareholder value maximization is only a default rule to which shareholders may make 
any alterations if they wish because the corporate law and the corporation itself are totally 
contractual concepts (Macey 2008:179). Accordingly, shareholders do not usually do any 
altering to the default rule in public corporations implying that shareholders want 
corporations to maximize the shareholder value even though it is not forced by law. 
However, the Dodge v. Ford represents what many seem to believe that corporation’s 
objective should be if the corporation wishes to prosper which might create the sense that 
the law would be forcing corporations to shareholder value maximization. In other words, 
the Dodge v. Ford case created normative discourse around the corporate objective (Stout 
2008). Macey (2008:179) believe that legally the problem of the shareholder value 
maximization rule is that it is not enforceable. The conclusion is that corporations are not 
forced to maximize shareholder value based on internal charters or based on state 
corporate codes. The corporate case law which was third option for enforcing 
corporations to do something, is contrarily allowing corporations to pursue any lawful 
objective (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc). 
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5. THE ARGUMENTS 
This chapter confronts the core research questions posed for the literature review as it 
strives to capture and explain the utilitarian logic of the shareholder value maximization 
theory and to depict argumentative lines for, and against the theory. It is very important 
to understand the behavior of corporations and equally important would be understanding 
the justification of it. Therefore, arguments are synthesized from the most appreciated 
sources. The conclusion is that there is only one acceptable argument for or against the 
shareholder value maximization theory. The argument is that the theory guides 
corporation’s behavior so that social welfare becomes maximized and hence the theory is 
justified. The only viable counter argument for this is that the shareholder value 
maximization theory does not maximize the social welfare. Everything else is guiding the 
discussion away from the goal of economics and social sciences and more importantly, 
away from the contents of the shareholder value maximization. For example, the 
shareholder value maximization theory is should not be blamed if chief executive officers 
are not behaving according to the theory. 
 The argument for the shareholder value maximization 
Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) revisited comprehensively the debates concerning the 
corporate objective and then they offer an opinion about what the corporate objective 
should be based on logic and previous analyses. Sundaram et al (2004a:353) constructed 
a set of five arguments to support shareholder value maximization. The pro-shareholder 
theory arguments are as follows per Sundaram et al (2004a:353); (1) ‘the goal of 
maximizing shareholder value is pro-stakeholder, (2) maximizing shareholder value 
creates the appropriate incentives for managers to assume entrepreneurial risks, (3) 
having more than one objective function will make governing difficult, if not impossible, 
(4) it is easier to make shareholders out of stakeholders than vice versa, and, (5) in the 
event of a breach of contract or trust, stakeholders, compared with shareholders, have 
protection (or can seek remedies) through contracts and the legal system.  
The initial intention of this chapter was to use these five arguments as a template or 
framework to categorize all arguments from other authors who are defending the 
shareholder value maximization in the set of retrieved final sample of articles. This was 
because most of the arguments appeared to be very similar with each other, but their 
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presentation or reasoning seemed to vary. Thus, categorizing them under determined 
labels would increase the intelligibility and strength of those arguments and such labelling 
and categorization of shareholder value maximization arguments is not provided by any 
author so it would have had novelty value in that sense. Also, if the attempt to classify 
fails, it could be interpreted to signify that there is no consensus what constitutes the 
justification for the shareholder value maximization. Either way, the finding would be 
valuable and have implications for this thesis but also for the management practice and 
for the future research.  
The categorization attempt failed. The interpretation is that the attempt failed not because 
of the lack of similarity in arguments but because the thesis would be less valuable if it 
would sacrifice the brilliance and expertise that authors provide in details. Details matter, 
because almost all of the arguments defending the shareholder value maximization could 
be deduced to utilitarian argument of enhancing social welfare. Nevertheless, Sundaram’s 
et al (2004a) paper is offering a wide range of credible and broad arguments and therefore, 
if those arguments are supported also by the other scholars, they could be accepted and 
applied. The article is widely cited, and it is published in a highly appreciated 
Organization Science. 
This chapter answers to the research questions numbers four and five. For this purpose, 
articles from the systematically retrieved sample are ranked based on Academic Journal 
Guide (2018) and highest ranked articles are thoroughly read and analyzed. The analyzed 
articles and their main contents are presented in the table 7. The surprising finding is that 
there are not variety of viable arguments for and against the shareholder value 
maximization theory – there is only one argument for the theory and one argument against 
it. Either the theory maximizes the social welfare and it should be accepted as corporate 
objective, or it does not maximize the social welfare and the theory should be altered or 
replaced. For example, the arguments from Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) paper, other 
than the utilitarian argument, are arguing for details how the shareholder value 
maximization could create value. Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) are not arguing that 
shareholder value maximization should be the corporate objective because “maximizing 
shareholder value creates the appropriate incentives for managers to assume 
entrepreneurial risks”. Rather, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) are arguing that the 
shareholder value maximization should be the corporate objective because “maximizing 
shareholder value creates the appropriate incentives for managers to assume 
entrepreneurial risks” and that in turn creates social value more than any other system. 
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Thus, only the utilitarian argument either for, or against is relevant for this literature 
review. Other arguments are only instrumental for the social welfare argument. 
The first column of the table 7 shows the authors of the paper in question. Second column 
indicates whether the paper contains empirical evidence or not and in to the third column 
there is marked “a” if the paper accepts the shareholder value maximization or promotes 
it and “r” if the paper is refuting the idea of shareholder value maximization and “-“ if the 
author takes no stance on shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective. The 
two last columns are describing the goal of the analyzed paper and shortly the main 
contents. ABS rankings, titles and publishing journals for these articles are presented in 
the table 6. As visible, only 5 out of 23 most important articles are containing empirical 
evidence. The portion of accepting or refuting the shareholder value maximization theory 
is surprisingly evenly distributed as there are 9 articles accepting and 10 articles refuting 
the theory and 4 articles did not express any opinion or normative statement about what 
the corporate objective should be. In general, if the study is empirical, it takes no stance 
on accepting or refuting the arguments of shareholder value maximization.  
Table 7 Main contents of 3-4* ABS ranked articles for synthesis 
 
Author Emp a/r Goal Main content 
Sundaram & 
Inkpen 
(2004a) 
no a  To justify the 
shareholder theory 
The corporate objective should be maximizing shareholder value 
through maximizing long-run cashflow. Exploitation is thus 
inconsistent with the shareholder value maximization theory. 
Sundaram & 
Inkpen 
(2004b) 
no a To justify the 
shareholder theory 
Same as Sundaram and Inkpen 2004a. 
Freeman, 
Wicks & 
Parmar (2004) 
no r  To justify the 
stakeholder theory 
Calls for managers to take into account all stakeholders in the 
decision making. The argument is that the shareholder value 
maximization allows misconducts and immoralities for the 
corporations by separating ethics and business. The language 
used by the shareholder value maximization is detrimental. 
Jones & Felps 
(2013) 
no r To offer utilitarian 
critique for shareholder 
value maximization 
The shareholder value maximization is based on utilitarian logic 
and it would be adequate corporate objective in some strict 
conditions. For example, perfect competition would be required 
for the shareholder value maximization to work, but it does not 
exist. 
Jensen (2001  
& 2002) 
no a To prove that 
shareholder value 
maximization is only 
logical option for firm 
objective 
To show that corporations cannot have more than one objective 
against which managers must weigh their decisions. The 
shareholder value maximization maximizes the firm value and 
through that it will maximize the social welfare also. 
Stakeholders should be acknowledged in the process. 
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Hansen & Lott 
(1996) 
no a To prove that 
shareholders prefer 
portfolio maximizing 
over single firm value 
maximization 
The maximization of the value of one single firm means that it 
must externalize some costs and these costs will be paid by some 
other corporation. Diversified investor will not want this as if one 
investment gains the other might lose, thus, investors prefer 
portfolio maximizing over single firm value maximizing. 
Budde, Child, 
Francis & 
Kieser (1982) 
yes - To determine if 
managerial policies vary 
systematically between 
countries 
The main goals of corporations in Britain and Germany are profit 
maximization and profitability. Financial manager and executive 
officers were interviewed.  
Hsieh (2015) no r To use social contract in 
justifying corporate 
objective 
Offers an option for Friedman's (1970) shareholder primacy in 
which the purpose of the corporation is not to increase its 
profits, but to create social value. Society would be limiting the 
actions of corporations. 
Chambers & 
Lacey (1995) 
no a To justify ethical side of 
the shareholder value 
maximization  
Offers an idea where the shareholder value maximization works 
ethically through markets. That is, if people care about ethics, 
they will price them. Investors pay less for shares that appear to 
be unethical to them because they are less desirable. Consumers 
may not buy products from corporations that are misbehaving 
according to their moral.  
Dobson (1999) no a To reveal that the 
shareholder value 
maximization theory is 
not value free or amoral 
The shareholder value maximization is not positive theory or 
value free. The shareholder value maximization is moral through 
markets. Financial markets translate the moral concerns of 
society to financial signals based on which corporations alter 
behavior. 
Beggs & Lane 
(1989) 
yes - 
  
To analyze importance 
of the corporate 
objectives among future 
corporate leaders  
The business students and CEOs perceived by the students rank 
long-run profit maximization and a survival of the corporation to 
most important objectives. 
Poitras (1994) no r To evaluate ethicality of 
the shareholder value 
maximization theory 
Based on financial theory, ethical issues should be reflected by 
the markets share prices should fluctuate based on ethical 
choices the corporation makes. 
Redwood, H. no a To show that efficiency 
is necessary for 
corporations’ survival 
and how to design 
corporate objective 
Corporations must use its resources efficiently and being 
efficient needs objectives. These objectives are inevitably 
financial. 
Mendelow 
(1983) 
no r To create a system for 
determining objectives 
for a corporation at the 
strategic planning level 
A system for integrating stakeholder demands to strategic 
planning and to prioritize these demands against each other's. 
Lazonick & 
O'Sullivan 
(2000) 
no r To show negative 
consequences of 
adopting shareholder 
value maximization 
theory 
Shareholder value maximization has taken the position of an 
ideology and it is uncontrollable. Shareholder value maximization 
has led to the destruction of American middle-class and 
prosperity as corporations have changed their strategic emphasis 
from investing and growing to downsizing and short-term 
profitability. 
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Kury (2007) no r To examine how 
institutional frameworks 
has driven accounting 
scandals 
Institutions create pressures for managers. For example, 
Worldcom and Enron are the result of institutional pressure 
which is induced by the shareholder value maximization theory. 
Cantley (1970) no - To test viability of 
common corporate 
objectives such as profit 
maximization 
Defines operational roles for the corporate objective to test 
viability of different objectives. Operational roles of corporate 
objective are paradoxical. 
Argenti (1969) no a To review most common 
corporate objectives 
Argues that the shareholder value maximization is clear and 
verifiable objective and thus only one that is acceptable until 
capitalism vanishes. 
Parmar, Keevil 
& Wicks 
(2019) 
yes r To examine whether 
corporate goal 
influences well-being of 
employees through the 
self-determination 
Value creation for all stakeholders of the firm as a corporate 
objective increases well-being and competence of employees 
compared to firms that use shareholder value maximization as a 
corporate objective. 
Bento, 
Mertins, & 
White (2017) 
yes - To understand how 
ideologies may influence 
in appraisal in 
companies and 
implementation of CSR 
measures to balanced 
scorecard 
Managerial evaluation translates into bonus decisions and 
people tend to emphasize financial measures over corporate 
social responsibility measures.  
Clarke, Jarvis 
& 
Gholamshahi 
(2019) 
yes r To investigate the 
damaging impact of 
maximizing shareholder 
value 
Shareholder value maximization is creating inequality through 
facilitating financialization of nonfinancial corporations.  
Denis (2016) no a Promote the idea that 
interests of society and 
interests of the 
shareholders are not in 
conflict 
There is no conflict between stakeholder theory and the 
shareholder value maximization theory, only definitional 
misunderstandings regarding for example agency model and 
finance definition of corporate governance. Enforceable 
contracts ensure that all stakeholders get fair treatment. 
Findlay & 
Whitmore 
(1974) 
no r Examine if the 
shareholder value 
maximization is viable 
descriptive theory to 
teach in business school 
Finds three different views on firm, shareholder value 
maximization, management value maximization and general 
behavioral model where constraints are enforced, and 
compromises arise. Questions the usefulness of the shareholder 
value maximization in positive finance. 
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5.1.1. Shareholder value maximization and utilitarianism argument 
The first point that Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) are making is that shareholder value 
maximization actually maximizes the value for the other stakeholders too. The argument 
is popular, and it is for example in line with Jensen’s (2001) – who is one of the founding 
fathers of the theory – argument that maximizing value for the shareholders maximizes 
the total value of the firm, and thus, it maximizes the welfare of the whole community 
and the economy more broadly (i.e. other stakeholders). This argument is probably the 
most important and the most powerful because of its reasoning is based on fundamental 
economic theories and utilitarianism which, in essence, is the core idea of virtually all 
social sciences (Jones and Felps 2013). If this argument does not hold, then the whole 
system of the modern capitalism and economic theories is endangered. For example, 
Clarke et al (2018) argue that in practice the shareholder value maximization accelerates 
financialization of non-financial corporations and through financialization the 
shareholder value maximization increases inequality. 
The angle from which Sundaram et al (2004a) arrive to this argument is somewhat 
different of Jensen’s (2001) although the central idea is similar. Sundaram et al (2004a) 
think that the control rights should be given to the shareholders rather than to anyone else 
because shareholders are entitled to the residual claims of the firm and are thus, the only 
group motivated to maximize the value of the firm. Shareholders are more willing to 
maximize the firm value than other claimants who has fixed claims on cash flows, such 
as bond holders and employees. This is simply because bond holders are only interested 
in increasing the firm value as long as the point is achieved when they will get their claims 
and not a bit more because the bond holder’s opportunities to earn value are restricted and 
an additional increase in the firm value would increase the risk which would then decrease 
the value of the bond or endanger the claims. Comparably, employees would appreciate 
steady cash flows over risky investments to ensure their remuneration and pension 
savings. Therefore, only shareholders, as residual claimants whose benefits are 
potentially infinite, are willing to maximize the total firm value beyond the levels of 
‘satisfactory’ or ‘good enough’ by taking risks that would be excessive to other 
stakeholders. Along with the control rights comes the right to manage the corporation and 
decide what to maximize, thus, Sundaram et al (2004a:354) conclude that, ‘by going 
beyond the requirements of such committed claims, managers increase the size of the pie 
for all constituencies’. 
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This view is also expressed by Easterbrook and Fischel (1983:403) who examine the 
meaning of voting in corporations and approached the issue from the legal perspective. 
Though they are not arguing to maximize anything, Easterbrook and Fischel rationalize 
that shareholders are the ones that are, and should be, possessing the ‘discretionary 
rights’. With discretionary rights authors refer to the right to choose and oust the 
management and to decide if the corporation should undertake risky projects for instance. 
Ultimately, the issue is that if a corporation would be managed by favoring preferences 
of some other group than the shareholders, the firm value would not reach the same sky-
high levels as it now does, and the economy would not prosper as it now does. In other 
words, if the corporate objective would be for example to ‘maximize the value of bond-
holders’, everyone would be worse off (Easterbrook et al 1983; Jensen 2001; Sundaram 
et al 2004a).  
The interpretation of this argument is then the following; by maximizing the value of 
shareholders rather than the value of any other stakeholder party, the management is 
maximizing the value of the firm. Then, why would maximized firm value lead to 
maximized value and welfare for all stakeholders? The rationale how maximizing 
shareholder value through maximizing the total value of the firm and hence maximizing 
the total welfare is articulated like this; if a firm’s output, products and services, are 
valued by its customers at more than what the firm valued the inputs that it used while 
producing the output, then the economy as a whole has benefited from the process because 
value added has increased (e.g. Jensen 2001:302). The value of the firm, then, is the 
market value of the cashflows that it produces in the long-term and when these cashflows 
are maximized, so becomes the amount of welfare producing outputs and the total firm 
value maximized, which, in essence, is the shareholder value maximized. In other words, 
by maximizing the market value of the firm, one is maximizing the value added to the 
economy as a whole and the value added for all stakeholders. No doubt, this must be 
intuitively correct and of course, when everybody is benefiting, it is also pro-stakeholder 
as Sundaram et al (2004a) worded the argument. (Jensen 2001.) 
5.1.2. Utilitarian argument - discussion 
There are two major critiques for the argument that the shareholder value maximization 
is maximizing the total welfare of the society; (1) externalization of costs and (2) 
exploitation of stakeholders. Of course, both of these critiques mean that the shareholder 
value maximization would not be maximizing the social welfare. Sundaram et al 
(2004a:356) themselves rise few issues with the theory. First, that even though the 
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shareholder value would become maximized the company might only transfer the value 
to the shareholder instead of investing and ‘increasing the size of the pie’ for the other 
stakeholders too. The distribution of wealth is an adequate consideration especially if 
taking into account huge CEO compensations which might well be encouraging CEOs to 
promote excessive dividends for example (e.g. Lazonick et al 2000). However, if merely 
transferring the wealth to the shareholders through stock repurchases and dividends 
instead of investing, neither the company or the CEO will be long lasting. However, the 
distribution concern is not necessary if the shareholder value maximization is treated as 
a long-term goal – as it is meant to be treated (e.g. Jensen 2001). It cannot be thought to 
be maximizing the long-term value of the shareholders (or the cashflows) if there are no 
investments in the future or into the wellbeing of the employees for example. 
Jensen’s (2001:303) logic is that because the owners of inputs are voluntarily selling them 
to the manufacturing company, they are valuing the inputs less than the company 
spending them. What if the value of inputs is compromised? For example, a factory 
worker earning €10 per hour would be according to voluntariness condition valuing his 
time at less than €10 per hour or else he would not sell the time at that price. The place 
for questioning lays in the word voluntary. Is the blue-collar worker truly and totally 
voluntarily giving up his time at €10? The negotiating power of one individual is basically 
nonexistent especially considering low paid jobs. Everything that is sold is not 
contributing to welfare of the society. People are buying things based on illogical reasons 
and there are things that people ‘must’ buy. In short, companies might exploit other 
stakeholders by low wages and value transfers for example4. 
Further problem in Jensen’s (2001) and Sundaram’s et al (2004a) argument and in the 
welfare maximization argument in general is that it assumes that consumers, or more 
broadly, people are able to value things properly, in a useful manner for the society. 
However, it is quite obvious that people might value things based on other premises than 
welfare and therefore welfare might not be maximized when the ‘value’ of firm’s outputs 
is valued by people being greater than the resources it used and the amount of production 
is maximized. The assumption is that the collage of people’s valuations is leading to 
favorable outcome in general – to set of outputs that is creating the maximum welfare – 
while the reality is that someone might value excessive consumption of fossil fuels or 
                                                     
4 This is if the markets are not competitive 
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unhealthy nutrition and the society as a stakeholder could be better off without this 
valuation and consumption. These unjustified valuations are one form of externalities. 
The problem of externalization is an important one but also complex one. Externalization 
and exploitation of stakeholders are representing one of the focal points in assessment of 
the shareholder value maximization theory. On the one hand, there are authors arguing 
that neither Friedman’s (1970) article or economic principle are – and hence the 
shareholder value maximization is not – inconsistent with the stakeholder theory or 
corporate social responsibilities (Jensen 2001; Sundaram & Inkpen 2004a:359). More 
precisely, shareholder value maximization cannot be criticized for exploitation of 
stakeholders or for externalizing social and environmental costs. If a corporation would 
be exploiting stakeholders and merely transferring value from other stakeholders to 
shareholders, the corporation would be unable to be profitable and maximize the 
shareholder value in the long-run. Freeman et al (2011:10) actually labeled Friedman 
(1970) being an “early stakeholder theorist” because accordingly, Friedman sees 
benefiting stakeholders as instrumental in achieving the maximum shareholder value in 
long-run. As visible, the fundamental logic of the shareholder value maximization is more 
and more dependable on the concept of long-run. Shareholder value maximization 
theorists dismiss wealth distribution critics and externalities critics by arguing that they 
are inconsistent with the shareholder value maximization since it must be considered in 
the long-run. The concept of ‘corporate objective’ inevitably refers to the long-run 
because corporations perpetuate themselves. 
On the other hand, there are authors who think externalization of social and environmental 
costs as being the sole and direct consequence of the shareholder value maximization 
ideology (e.g. Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; Ghoshal 2005). This view is supported by 
numerous examples of misbehaviors and wrongdoings conducted by corporations 
(Markham 2015). For example, Ford Motor company utilized cost-benefit analysis in 
designing Pinto cars and concluded that it more beneficial for Ford’s shareholders to let 
customers burn to death in a case of collision than to create safe car (e.g. Dowie 1977). 
So, there are corporations externalizing everything that is possible, no matter if it is illegal 
or immoral. Might this be a consequence of the language or symbolism used by 
economists and the shareholder value maximization theory (Ferraro et al 2005), it is not 
a consequence of the shareholder value maximization theory as it does not allow for 
immoralities, illegalities and most of all, it does not allow for engaging in actions which 
deviate from ‘the best interest of a corporation’ and the assumption of the very long time 
horizon (Jensen 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004). For example, a lawsuit, bad 
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reputation, employee turnover, dead customer, polluted environment, fines and sanctions 
clearly all deviate from the best interest of any corporation. 
If one simply accepts the argument of long-termism as a defense for the shareholder value 
maximization theory, then the most fundamental point of analysis becomes whether the 
shareholder value maximization is intentionally misunderstood or is unintentional 
unawareness of the content of the theory the reason for misconducts. Strictly interpreting, 
the shareholder value maximization advices a manager to, at any cost, increase the cash 
flow and to reduce costs and risks. One simple way to reduce costs would be externalizing 
costs (i.e. polluting excessively, or discriminate employees), but in the long run it will not 
be the best interest of the corporation and hence, according to the shareholder value 
maximization theory managers should refrain from these kinds of actions.  
If one does not simply take the long-run argument and believe that it will solve all 
problems described by Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) and Clarke et al (2018) for 
example, the fundamental point of analysis becomes the question of how we can restrict 
companies from externalizing costs? There are primarily two mechanisms through which 
corporation will stop exploiting stakeholders and externalizing its costs; market 
mechanism and government mechanism (e.g. Coase 1960). Governments impose laws 
upon corporation and markets should intervene by for example ousting the management 
if it is deemed to be responsible for misconducts. The point of (economic and managerial) 
criticism related to this, however, lays not in these mechanisms but in the economic 
assumption; that economic agents are rational, self-interested utility maximizers and that 
markets are perfectly competitive. For example, if markets are not competitive, the 
information is not evenly distributed, meaning, that shareholders are not able to oust the 
management as they do not know in real time what happens. Further, even if the 
information would be available to the shareholders, they might not be able to follow news 
streams constantly.  To the legal structures preventing exploitation there is nothing to add 
here, the discussion is provided in section four. In short, these legal structures exist, and 
they are abundant but they are no means perfect or functioning in a way that totally 
prevents companies from externalizing costs. 
Jensen (2001) acknowledged the issue that if externalities exists, the objective to 
maximize firm’s output will not maximize the welfare for the broader society and he is 
not satisfied by simply arguing for the long-termism. By externalities Jensen (2001:302) 
means incurred costs that are not borne by the individual or corporation who made the 
decision to take the actions that led to those costs. A classic example would be air 
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pollution.  Accordingly, the problem is avoided by assigning all alienable decision rights 
(i.e. property rights) to some individual within an economy because then externalities can 
no longer exist (Jensen and Meckling 1995; Jensen 2001:302).  
Jensen (2001) and Jensen and Meckling (1995) cite Coase (1960) and his groundbreaking 
work in understanding economic consequences of social costs and transaction costs to 
prove their case for how to eliminate externalities. Coase Theorem suggests that there are 
two options to overcome social costs (i.e. externalities); (1) they should be either 
bargained between the two parties or (2) regulated by the government. According to 
Coase (1960), bargaining will lead to a pareto-efficient situation (which, economically 
thinking, is overall welfare maximized) but only if transaction costs are low enough, when 
actors has a liability to compensate harms that they cause with their actions, and when 
mutually satisfactory solution is available (see Coase 1960:4-6, for a farmer vs. cattle 
riser example).5 There are again quite many assumptions and conditions for Coase 
theorem and they are aggregating the assumptions needed by the shareholder value 
maximization. However, based on Coase’s (1960) work, Jensen (2001:303) argues that 
externalities cannot exist if alienable decision rights are defined and assigned to someone, 
because then the solution will automatically be pareto-efficient.  
It should be acknowledged, that social welfare is not maximized automatically when the 
Pareto-efficiency is achieved as Pareto-efficient point can be unequally distributed. 
Monks and Minow (2011:50) suggest that government is needed to solve the tradeoff 
between corporate profits and social goals. In short, externality becomes an internality 
either when alienable decision rights are defined and assigned to someone and thus, the 
full consequences of any decision are borne by the individual, or when the government 
regulation is used to determine who bears the costs and what is the social goal. Democracy 
is thought to be the justification for the government regulation as the government should 
be able to balance and represent the interests of the society and it can be replaced if the 
society’s interests’ changes (Monks and Minow 2011:50). 
Put more simply, the discussion above would imply that for example air should be a 
property and its ownership should be assigned to some individual or otherwise social 
                                                     
5 According to Coase this could occur for example in a case between a cattle riser and a farmer when 
choosing whether to use the available land for farming or for cattle straying (if cattle destroys the crops). 
When the net gain of cultivating the land is $2, and the cattle would be destroying crops worth more than 
$3, it would be reasonable for the cattle farmer and for the farmer to agree that cattle farmer will pay $2.5 
for the farmer for not to plant any crops at all. Now both, the cost for keeping the cattle and farmer’s net 
gain, are more than they would be without bargain. 
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welfare is not maximized through maximizing the shareholder value because this 
unowned property (air) is then exploited by self-interested economic agents trying to 
maximize their personal welfare and the self-interest seeking then leads to overproduction 
and excessive pollution from the perspective of the whole society. If the decision rights 
over the air would be assigned to some individual, then an actor who wishes to pollute, 
should buy the right to pollute from the owner of such right and if the bargain is found 
between the two parties, the welfare of the whole society is maximized as both sides of 
the deal are better off with the deal than without it. However, assigning perfectly defined 
decision rights over every single thing in the world might be practically impossible task 
and hence the government is intervening into the economy by curbing polluting for 
instance. How well, is another question. The argumentative line seems to be consistent in 
paper – if the shareholder value maximization is treated as a very long-term goal, it 
maximizes the society’s welfare. The consistency in paper seems to fall apart when 
applying the shareholder value maximization in practice and as a managerial guide and 
when examining the conditions and assumptions that must be in place. 
Is the maximizing shareholder value good for the other stakeholders and for the economy 
as a whole? In short, probably yes. More jobs, more donations to charity, more great 
products with better prices, more innovations. The question is; good compared to what? 
It might be that when compared to existing alternatives the shareholder value 
maximization theory is the most simple and low cost theory to achieve the result that is 
closing the maximum social welfare available for us even though it has side effects. It 
does not mean that the shareholder value maximization theory is correct, perfect, should 
not be improved or replaced. It only means that the analysis provided so far implies that 
it is the best alternative compared to other existing ones.  
List of assumptions that must hold for the shareholder value maximization to function is 
quite massive and Pareto-efficiency is not equal to social optimum as Pareto-efficiency 
says nothing about distribution of the wealth. It seems that the theory might not literally 
or precisely maximize the welfare of the society as there are externalities, wrong doers, 
transaction costs, poor distribution of wealth and other imperfections. However, the fact 
that the theory is not perfect does not make it a bad theory or something that should be 
automatically replaced or labeled to being ‘the dumbest idea in the world’, rather, its 
weaknesses should be acknowledged when applied and taught and discussed more 
profoundly in business education. It should be large part of the management education 
that what manager should do, when the market failure appears, and government fails to 
govern. The implementation of the theory has made the economies prosper.  
120 
 
 The argument against the shareholder value maximization 
It might have been Bowen (1953) who first formally recognized the social responsibility 
of corporations and refuted the profit maximization being the sole purpose of a company 
and of a manager as he writes (1953:3):  
“The decisions and actions of the businessman have a direct bearing on the quality  of 
our lives and personalities. His decisions affect not only himself, his stockholders, his 
immediate workers, or his customers – they affect the lives and fortunes of us all.” 
In general, the only viable counter argument for refuting the shareholder value 
maximization is that the utilitarian logic does not hold, and that the shareholder value 
maximization does not lead to maximum or increased welfare in a society. The arguments 
against the shareholder value maximization are not the ones that are often presented as 
such, for example corporate social responsibility is not an argument that is against the 
shareholder value maximization as a corporate objective (see e.g. Aguinis and Glavas 
2012). The corporate social responsibility does not offer any alternative for the corporate 
objective and it is merely instrumental argument in arguing that the shareholder value 
maximization does not maximize the social welfare. Same is true for the stakeholder 
theory in which the core point is that other stakeholders suffer when corporations are run 
solely based on shareholder value maximization (Freeman et al 2011). Therefore, the only 
viable counter argument for the shareholder value maximization theory is that the 
shareholder value maximization does not maximize the social welfare. If the shareholder 
value maximization theory fails to maximize the social welfare, it has no justification 
whatsoever. However, arguing that corporations should participate in social endeavors is 
not counter argument for the shareholder value maximization theory as a corporate 
objective. 
Taken further, there are many argumentative lines within the advocates of the shareholder 
value maximization theory and within those who strive to refute the theory. For example, 
some argue that shareholder value maximization offers a decision rule for management 
that is not offered by any alternative model for governance (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
Jensen 2001; Denis 2016:471). What value does a decision rule hold if it does not lead to 
enhanced social welfare? Another example, Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a) argue that 
shareholder value maximization should be the corporate objective because if there is more 
than one objective function, management would be impossible. The argument could 
continue arguing that if the corporation has more than one objective function (e.g. to 
maximize welfare of many stakeholders), then the social welfare does not become 
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maximized. Third example, Freeman et al (2011) argue that corporations should take into 
account also other stakeholders in their decision making and that is of course because so 
the social welfare would be maximized in utilitarian sense. The point is, that in every 
single argument and in all detected streams of literature, there is inherently built into the 
arguments the overarching goal of increasing or decreasing social welfare. Nothing else 
exists in this discussion and everything else is guiding the discussion to the sidetracks 
where it has largely been. 
5.2.1. The stakeholder theory 
Because stakeholder theory has attained enormous academic attention and because the 
stakeholder theory is thematically intertwined with the shareholder theory, the short 
sidetrack is taken to review the stakeholder theory briefly. Stakeholder theory is 
developed in response to the shareholder value maximization theory and to serve as a 
pragmatic guide for managers in daily decision-making situations (Freeman et al 2011). 
Roots of the stakeholder management theory are more distinct than that of shareholder 
value maximization’s, but the roots also more recent (Freeman 1984). Stakeholder theory 
is not established in 200 years of economics research, but it is a serious competition for 
the shareholder value maximization in academia. Even though the roots lay in more recent 
history, the stakeholder theory suffers from serious definition issues (e.g. Donaldson and 
Preston 1995; Freeman et al 2011). 
Scholars defining the terms ‘stakeholder’ and ‘stakeholder theory’ have been using 
various and sometimes conflicting arguments and evidence (Donaldson and Preston 
1995:66-67). One of the most fundamental and used definitions for the stakeholder is 
given by Edward Freeman (1984) who initiated the term ‘stakeholder approach’ in his 
book Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach. Accordingly (1984:53), a 
stakeholder is anyone who is, or can be, affected by the achievement of an organization’s 
purpose – possibly even the terrorists. Freeman et al (2011:26) acknowledge themselves 
that there are several definitions for the word stakeholder, and they give another, more 
narrow definition for the stakeholder which states that stakeholders are ‘those groups 
without whose support, the business would cease to be viable’. The latter, more narrow 
definition is described with the word primary stakeholders while in the broader definition 
there are also instrumental or secondary stakeholders such as stakeholder’s stakeholders 
included (Freeman et al 2011:26). Freeman et al (2011:26) do not believe that despite of 
the thirty years of studying, the ‘true definition’ of the stakeholder is found and the 
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definition will change or evolve and further, Freeman et al (2011) extend the idea that 
there is no reason to try to define one theory that works for all businesses. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) defined a typology for the stakeholder theory. Donaldson 
and Preston (1995:66-67) argue that stakeholder theory is descriptive, normative and 
instrumental at the same time. The stakeholder theory is; descriptive because it describes 
what the corporation is a collection of interests that are simultaneously competitive and 
cooperative; instrumental because it strives to explain and measure possible changes in 
traditional performance indicators if a company applies stakeholder approach and; 
fundamentally normative placing an intrinsic value over the interests of stakeholders 
which means that desires of any stakeholder are considered in their own merit and 
regardless if these considerations promote other goals such as the shareholder value 
maximization would be. 
Already at this point it is evident that the stakeholder theory is quite ambiguous which 
might not be ideal feature of a tool for managerial decision making. Initiators of the theory 
are not able to define the stakeholder and do not believe that such a definition exists 
(Freeman et al 2011). If a theory wishes to replace the shareholder value maximization 
theory as such a general rule and change the direction of the discourse, a definition for 
the stakeholder and the stakeholder theory are needed.  
According to the shareholder value maximization theory, a corporation should be run so 
as to maximize its long run value. Analogous statement for the stakeholder theory would 
be: the stakeholder theory is ‘about creating as much value as possible for stakeholders, 
without resorting to trade-offs’ (Freeman et al 2011:28). Here, ‘not resorting to trade-
offs’ means that if trade-offs have to be made between conflicting stakeholder interests 
then the managers have to ‘figure out how to make the tradeoffs, and immediately begin 
improving the trade-offs for all sides’ (2011:28). The primary advice that the stakeholder 
theory offers for managers to handle the conflict situations is to avoid conflict situations 
by stating that ‘executives must find a way to rethink the problems so that these interests 
can go together, so that even more value can be created for each’ (Freeman et al 2011:28).  
This places responsibilities for managers that are very loosely defined. Jensen’s 
(2001:299) definition of the implications of the stakeholder theory; ‘stakeholder theory 
says that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all the 
stakeholders in a firm’. Jensen’s (2001) account on this clearly shows how impractical 
the stakeholder theory could be as a decision rule. Problems in definitions and especially 
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problems in making trade-offs with the stakeholder theory as decision rule has been 
acknowledged and for example different categorizations for the stakeholder is developed 
(see e.g. Mitchell, Bradley and Wood 1997; Bradley, Mitchell and Sonnenfeld 1999). 
The stakeholder theory is criticized for not being a theory at all because it has not derived 
testable propositions and the key terms are defined too ambiguously (Freeman et al 
2011:63). Freeman et al (2011) suggests that the theory should be treated as ‘a genre of 
management’ theory that revolves around the idea of importance of stakeholders rather 
than as a specific theory in itself. However, the theoretical sense of the stakeholder 
literature is exactly what most of the stakeholder critics are criticizing. If stakeholder 
theory would be treated as a way of thinking or as a genre of management, many 
criticisms would lack foundations. Similarly, as with shareholder value maximization, it 
seems that critics are not criticizing what stakeholder authors has meant but what has been 
quite purpose-orientally possible to interpret. However, the only valid point of evaluation 
when evaluating the corporate objective from the normative point of view, is to ponder 
whether the social welfare is increased or not. 
If the stakeholder theory strives to replace the shareholder theory as a corporate objective, 
it should be able to show how it will reward other stakeholders more than what they get 
with the current shareholder system. For example, employees cannot ever take more out 
of the corporation than what they produce. That is consistent with the shareholder theory, 
but also with the stakeholder theory. If employees would extract more than what they 
produce, the excess part would be away from the future investments and employees would 
start to suffer as the certainty and continuity of their jobs would become endangered. The 
argument is that there is no better alternative in the utility maximizing sense for the other 
stakeholders than the shareholder value maximization which is restricted by moral and 
ethics. 
5.2.2. The link between shareholder value maximization and social welfare 
Utilitarian argument for the shareholder value maximization relies on interrelated 
concepts like efficient capital markets (Fama 1970), perfect competition (Hayek 2016; 
McNulty 1968), economic equilibrium and economic efficiency (Jones and Felps 2013). 
If these concepts do not exist in the world where the shareholder value maximization 
operates, then the shareholder value maximization does not maximize the social welfare. 
This might be the strongest case against the shareholder value maximization as a 
corporate objective. It is not possible in terms of this thesis to examine and discuss in 
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detail these concepts although it would be adequate to do so. Perfect competition alone 
represents such a large body of literature that it would require a new main chapter to this 
review which is not possible. However, their meaning is discussed because otherwise the 
utilitarian argument would be left ignorant.  
The basic idea is that economic efficiency follows from perfect competition – if there is 
no competition or not enough competition, inefficiencies have room to appear and 
conversely when the competition is perfect there cannot be any inefficiencies. Tendency 
of markets to find an economic equilibrium is causal consequence of perfect competition. 
If corporations are not efficient, then they are not maximizing the social welfare even if 
their profits or share price would be rocketing. If there is no competition the corporations 
are not maximizing the social welfare as monopolies for example clearly are not welfare 
maximizers. Monopoly is an extreme example and the minimum amount of competition 
necessary for shareholder value maximization to work is discussable, but basically the 
requirement is perfect competition because shareholder value maximization is assuming 
economic equilibrium and economic efficiency. Furthermore, the problem is that unless 
also the capital markets are efficient, the share pricing system falls apart and then the 
shareholder value maximization theory is without a measure and managers are left 
without market signals. In short, market failures and externalities significantly weaken 
the possibility of shareholder value maximization to maximize the social welfare. 
(McNulty 1968; Jensen 2001; Jones and Felps 2013.) 
Then what is needed for the perfect competition? Hayek’s (2016) article is a reprint from 
the year 1946 but it summarizes perfect competition with three points that are still 
adequate (2016:362); “according to generally accepted view, perfect competition 
presupposes: 
1. A homogeneous commodity offered and demanded by a large number of relatively 
small sellers or buyers, none of whom expects to exercise by his action a perceptible 
influence on price. 
2. Free entry into the market and absence of other restraints on the movement of prices 
and resources. 
3. Complete knowledge of the relevant factors on the part of all participants in the 
market.” 
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There are other, and much broader lists of assumptions but quoted three by Hayek 
(2016:362) are those that are usually represented in all listings and they are thus perceived 
to be the most important ones (see e.g. Jones and Felps 2013; McNulty 1968). With one 
glance on the list it easy to see that perfect competition is an ideal that may not exist in 
many industries. Efficient capital markets requirements are no less unrealistic (see Fama 
1970). For example, efficient capital markets require that there would be no entry barriers 
or transaction costs. However, entry barriers and transaction costs do exist in most of the 
industries and they truly posit a challenge for doing business and competing. 
One quite strong argument against the shareholder value maximization theory is that the 
conditions that the theory would require does not exist in real world and they cannot ever 
exist. The shareholder value maximization would work, but it never can because of these 
unreal conditions. This, however, does not say that the shareholder value maximization 
theory does not provide the closest available approximate of maximum social welfare. 
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6. DISCUSSION 
Much of the discussion is accounted in suitable passages connected with the related theory 
and empirical parts of the thesis, but this chapter offers some final thoughts which could 
not be placed into the text. The assumption was that there are many streams of different 
arguments for such a large-scale theory as the shareholder value maximization. However, 
they all seem to conclude or sort of culminate to the utilitarian logic. The same goes for 
the refuting arguments as it seems that there are roughly two kinds of arguments against 
the shareholder value maximization. There are arguments that are questioning the 
utilitarian logic of the shareholder value maximization and then there are arguments that 
question some small part of the theory and do not replace its position as a corporate 
objective. The arguments that question only a small part of the theory are mostly ending 
up being criticism for the economics and abstractions that economics make. In short, all 
arguments – both refuting and accepting the shareholder value maximization – can be 
reduced to utilitarian logic and to pareto-optimal utilitarian resource allocation. It is the 
underlying objective of the whole research of economics. 
Therefore, the only real argument for the shareholder value maximization is the utilitarian 
one, and the only real counter argument would be that the shareholder value maximization 
does not actually maximize the social welfare in the utilitarian sense. In practice, the 
counter argument is the stakeholder theory or the case that the necessary conditions (e.g. 
perfect competition) for the shareholder value maximization theory does not exist. 
Everything else – literature streams like the corporate social responsibility and 
financialization for instance – are inherently built into the shareholder value 
maximization and to utilitarian argument. The strongest case would be that the necessary 
conditions for the shareholder value maximization cannot realistically exist, but still the 
shareholder value maximization theory might be the theory leading to the closest 
approximate as no viable alternatives were detected during the exhaustive literature 
review. It is not adequate to treat these independent sub-concepts of the corporate 
governance – such as the corporate social responsibility – as distinct arguments for 
refuting the shareholder value maximization theory because they can be deduced to the 
utilitarian argument. Furthermore, the corporate social responsibility or the stakeholder 
theory are not corporate objectives in the same sense as the shareholder value 
maximization is. For example, the corporate social responsibility does not provide any 
argument for replacing the shareholder value maximization theory as a corporate 
objective. Corporate social responsibility is the objective of non-profit organizations but 
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not commercial corporations. The corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory 
are built into the shareholder value maximization when it is restricted by moral, ethics 
and law. 
Clearly, problems exist; there are market failures, externalities, misunderstandings and 
opportunistic chief executive officers for example. This, however, does not mean that the 
shareholder value maximization should be replaced. Shareholder value maximization 
theory should be altered to more explicitly focus on restrictions such as the law and moral 
and responsibility – change the language of the theory. If one would like to make such an 
enormous economic reform one could either try to enhance current regulating 
institutions such as securities and exchange commission so that they create circumstances 
of perfect competition or one could try to alter the normative base on which managers 
and corporations operate (Jones and Felps 2013:211). The thesis strives to open the 
normative basis for alteration. 
 Misunderstandings in the literature 
The distinction between rule utilitarianism and act utilitarianism is important for 
understanding the misunderstandings between authors in this field. This distinction is 
explicitly articulated in the context of shareholder value maximization by Jones and Felps 
(2013). Act utilitarianism guides the agent to make decisions so as to create greatest social 
benefit with this one certain decision currently at hand, while the rule utilitarianism guides 
the agent to make the decisions so as to create greatest social benefit in the long run by 
following certain rules (Jones and Felps 2013:212). The distinction is that individual and 
separate decisions justified by the rule utilitarianism might be immoral when judged 
based on act utilitarianism. To elaborate, lawyer defending criminal prosecuted of murder 
might deliberately let him go jail by not defending him well and so fulfill the criterion of 
act utilitarianism as the murderer would be taken away and some justice would have been 
achieved. The other justification is that the lawyer could defend the criminal properly and 
so create justice system that produces social welfare in longer run which would be in 
accordance with the rule utilitarianism. 
Shareholder value maximization is normative guide and an exemplar case of rule 
utilitarianism. This means that all decisions taken under the shareholder value 
maximization might not be clearly moral and acceptable or directly creating social 
welfare. For example, shareholder value maximization might cause quite terrible 
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sufferings at individual level when a corporation is forced to lay off workers. Under act 
utilitarianism the corporation should strive to keep all the jobs at any cost, but under the 
rule utilitarianism unproductive businesses should be dismissed immediately and by so 
doing free the resources for better use. Rule utilitarianist systems require that everyone 
follow the same rules, otherwise the result might not be the desired maximum welfare or 
functioning justice system. If some CEOs are following the shareholder value 
maximization and some are not, the process falls apart. Then the question is if everyone 
is following the rules and the answer is ‘probably not’. According to very descriptive 
concluding remark from Jensen (1990:870), they are not:  
“While modern capital‐budgeting procedures are implemented by virtually all large 
corporations, it appears that the net present value (or more generally, value‐
maximizing) rule imbedded in these procedures is far from universally followed by 
operating managers. In particular, the acceptance of negative‐value projects tends to be 
common in organizations with substantial amounts of free cash flow (cash flow in 
excess of that required to fund all value‐increasing investment projects) and in 
particular in firms and industries where downsizing and exit are required. The finance 
profession has concentrated on how capital investment decisions should be made, with 
little systematic study of how they actually are made in practice.” 
It seems that many authors forget this utilitarian logic of the shareholder value 
maximization and social sciences. Everyone writing about the corporate objective seems 
to have common goal even though the means to get to that goal seem to be contrary to 
each other’s. Sundaram and Inkpen (2004b:371) summarize this thought neatly in their 
response to the dispute with Freeman et al (2004) in the Organization Science; 
“Regardless of the camp to which we belong, one premise should be clear: All of us 
seek a path to a promised land in which accountable corporations managed by ethical 
decision makers create the greatest value for the greatest number of stakeholders.” 
This indeed is the intention of every single writer that this literature review has 
encountered during the analysis. However, daunting seems to be the extent to which 
scholars misunderstand each other’s texts revolving around the corporate objective. Take 
the core dispute over stakeholder theory and shareholder theory as an example. One of 
the core arguments of stakeholder theorists (Freeman et al 2004; Freeman et al 2011) is 
that ethics cannot be separated from the business and therefore narrow shareholder value 
maximization is not appropriate objective for a corporation but rather, managers have to 
take into account desires of other stakeholders too to create value and to not to slide into 
misconducts. As Freeman et al (2004:367) put it; 
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“if making money for shareholders is my primary duty and I do not have 
responsibilities to other groups, it might be considerably easier for me to rationalize 
questionable practices that place harm at the feet of nonshareholder stakeholders (such 
as workers or suppliers, to whom I allegedly have no moral responsibilities) in the 
name of increased profitability”. 
The above quotation explicitly expresses the view that corporate misbehavior is causally 
related to the shareholder value maximization and Freeman et al (2004) themselves are 
separating ethics from business. If Freeman et al (2004) would apply their own axiom of 
inseparable ethics and business, they would realize that shareholders are themselves 
ethical and moral human beings. At least, the fault of the shareholder value maximization 
is not in its content but in how it is presented, displayed, discussed and taught. Now the 
conclusion should arrive that “even if as a shareholder, my primary motive is to maximize 
monetary value of my investment, I would still expect that managers of the company will 
act in humane and ethical ways towards all stakeholders and environment. Otherwise I 
will withdraw my investment because for me maximized value includes ethics. I would not 
accept money from dictators or from mobsters”. Shareholders as ethical human beings 
should oust the unethical management or at least withdraw the investment. Realization of 
shareholder as an ethical human being should put an end to criticism akin to Freeman et 
al (2004). 
Literally on the same page Freeman et al (2004:367) write that shareholder view does not 
‘condone’ but actually shareholder view ‘finds these actions deplorable’ referring to 
exploitation of the stakeholders. As they seem to after all understand this, it is remarkable 
that they fail to elaborate the thought any further or at least that they are somehow 
inconsistent with themselves during the same page. At first the ideology is responsible 
for decreasing ethics but suddenly they realize that it is not the case. The point that 
Freeman et al (2004:367) have right is that the language that we use and the way we speak 
tend to affect in how managers behave (e.g. Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005:9). That 
certainly is point of accurate criticism for the shareholder value maximization theory. It 
is also true that it might be very hard for shareholders to act responsibly and ethically if 
they have adopted the behavior patterns related to shareholder in shareholder value 
maximization theory. However, the criticism of language that the shareholder value 
maximization theory uses could be made without accusations of shareholder value 
maximization theory being unethical or excluding values from the managerial decision 
making. It might through the language give easier excuse for managers for their 
misconduct, but it is not the theory that is flawed. Of course, the theory must be treated 
as normative theory which it is to realize this.  
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Sundaram and Inkpen (2004b:370) are giving unambiguous reply for Freeman et al 
(2004) as they write, “managers have moral and ethical responsibilities to all 
stakeholders, including shareholders”. The core argument, the synthesis from papers 
accepting the shareholder value maximization is that the shareholder value maximization 
is inherently ethical and requires mutual value creation with corporation’s stakeholders 
because otherwise the corporation will not be sustained and the concept of ‘long-run’ is 
inseparable part of the shareholder theory (e.g. Jensen 2001; Sundaram and Inkpen 
2004a).  
Many scholars that are refuting the shareholder value maximization theory are using real-
life examples to depict how destructive the theory has been. Among these real-life 
examples most often is mentioned the collapse of Enron (e.g. Freeman et al 2004:367). 
Enron might be often mentioned because it is connected to the recession of the early 
2000s’ and many papers criticizing the shareholder value maximization theory are 
published around those times, so it has been suited example. The shareholder value 
maximization is however misguidedly criticized for those misconducts because they are 
more of accounting scandals and insider self-dealing (Markham 2015). Furthermore, the 
criminals themselves acknowledge that they were not engaging to criminal actions in 
order to benefit shareholders or because that is what they thought was right thing to do 
based on the shareholder value maximization theory (Sundaram and Inkpen 2004b). 
Enron’s chief financial officer Andrew Fastow was pleaded guilty and he faced a 10-year 
prison sentence and forfeiture of $29 million. In his plea, Fastow admitted that (The Wall 
Street Journal 2004:A14); 
“I also engaged in schemes to enrich myself and others at the expense of Enron's 
shareholders and in violation of my duty of honest services to those shareholders” 
The debate would take different routes if for example Mr. Fastow would have told in his 
plea that the shareholder value maximization is what he was doing. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
“Our argument is that it [maximize shareholder value] should be the goal because it is 
the best among all available alternatives, and thus the preferred goal for managers 
formulating and implementing strategy.”  – Sundaram and Inkpen (2004a:350) 
Dichotomization of the literature over the corporate objective is so strong, that people 
involved seem to be from the different universe. The set-up is similar to what is explicit 
and familiar in politics; there is a dichotomy between left-wing and right-wing opinions. 
The goal is the same, but the approach is different. For the shareholder value advocates 
profit is the main goal and the welfare is the side product. For the stakeholder theorists or 
for the opponents of the shareholder value maximization theory the profit is a byproduct 
of pursuing some higher cause, for example social welfare. These levels of thinking and 
operating will probably never meet, and absence of common ground hinders the 
discourse. This literature synthesis strives to bring these two universes closer to each 
other. 
The bottom line is that there is this financial and economic theory that treats a corporation 
as a nexus of contracts, that accepts everything that capitalism, classical economics and 
neoclassical economics assumes and that is justified most prominently by the utilitarian 
argument. The theory is the shareholder value maximization. The shareholder value 
maximization suggests that the corporate objective should be maximizing shareholder 
value which is measured with the market price of the share of the corporation. The 
question that needs to be addressed is how this social welfare becomes maximized 
through selfish actions of rational economic agents and maximum share price? Many 
argue that the shareholder value maximization is not maximizing the social welfare and 
that it is rather detrimental for the society and it thus fails to be justifiable theory of social 
science and it fails to be justifiable corporate objective.  
The conclusion is that the social welfare does not become maximized through the 
shareholder value maximization theory, but the shareholder value maximization still 
provides probably the closest approximate of the maximum social welfare. Furthermore, 
the latest developments in the shareholder value maximization theory and the corporate 
governance are quite positive and promising for the society as scholars and practitioners 
are calling for investors to take more responsibility and investors have responded by 
taking more responsibility (see Eccles and Klimenko 2019). Maximum shareholder value 
is no longer straightforwardly maximum amount of money and maximum share price at 
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the expense of everything else (if it ever was) – the shareholder value can also be about 
breathable clean air and greater job satisfaction. 
The evident existence of market failures and externalities significantly weaken the 
possibility of shareholder value maximization to succeed in maximizing the social 
welfare. This point taken further means that in business schools, there should be courses 
teaching what managers should or could do when market failure appears. How I, as a 
manager, am going to do the decision when market signals are mixed or flawed? Adam 
Smith’s (1776) solely self-interested butcher, brewer and baker of the 18th century is not 
very adequate starting point for theories in 21st century. Suggestions for improvement; 
1. Alter the language of the shareholder value maximization theory to be more 
responsible and not so money centered, because there are other values than 
money. Furthermore, theories tend to create behavior that they predict (e.g. 
Ferraro et al 2005). Less attention should be given for economic assumptions 
such as the self-interest because they might not be as accurate as they once were. 
2. Emphasize in business school teaching and discussion about what to do in the 
case of market failure. What should manager do when the market is not able to 
price correctly and is guiding for example towards detrimental actions. What to 
do with externalities? Students are future leaders and they should be aware of 
market failures and externalities. 
3. Support the rise of the responsible shareholder. As the shareholder power 
increases through alliances or activism, scholars should pay attention to the 
responsibilities of the shareholders and if they should increase also. 
4. Corporations should strive to maximize the shareholder value. However, it must 
be acknowledged that the value includes also other determinants than the share 
price. Investors as breathing, feeling, caring and thinking social beings are 
interested in more than only money. Such thing could be for example clean air. 
In other words, corporations should strive to maximize shareholder welfare. 
5. Future research should concentrate in measuring the social welfare and 
measuring empirically whether the shareholder value maximization theory is 
used. It would be important to stay out of the side tracks and to concentrate in 
utilitarian justification of the theory. 
Large part of the literature considering the shareholder value maximization and the 
corporate objective in general is concerned with the idea that shareholder value 
maximization somehow neglects other stakeholders. That is merely another way to say 
that the shareholder value maximization does not maximize the social welfare. Can a 
manager maximize the long-term value of shareholders without understanding or 
acknowledging interaction between stakeholders? The problem seems to be in the 
definitions and to be more precise, the conflict between the stakeholder theory and 
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shareholder theory is appearing because of uncertainty about what is implicitly built into 
the shareholder value maximization theory, and what is not? The shareholder value 
maximization is designed to serve as long-term goal, but many critics seem to neglect that 
feature. The issue is crying for attention and it is not voiced explicitly in literature. The 
similar issue appears with the critics arguing that the shareholder value maximization 
does not fit into the ethical custom. Ethics and morals are inherently built into the 
shareholder value maximization as one cannot maximize the shareholder value if one is 
violating ethics. Even the notorious Friedman (1970) article concludes that profits must 
be maximized with the restriction of ethical custom. Nevertheless, the shareholder value 
maximization theory is attacked by claims that it is unethical or immoral theory (Freeman 
et al 2011). It is not and it never was immoral or amoral. 
At the very beginning of this thesis there is the quote from the Jack Welch where he calls 
the shareholder value maximization being a “dumbest idea in the world” – the very same 
idea that he himself were so famously advocating in the 1980s. The problem in Welch’s 
– and of so many others’ – understanding is that they do not realize, or they refuse to 
realize, that the shareholder value maximization is inherently long-term goal. The 
overarching idea arising from the literature synthesis is that the shareholder value 
maximization theory and stakeholder theory or the corporate social responsibilities are 
not in anyways conflicting with each other’s but complementing each other. They are the 
same thing in the different language. In that sense, the shareholder value maximization 
could learn from the stakeholder theory given that the language of the theories is 
important. A corporation must create added value in long-term – it is the minimum 
requirement for a corporation to be viable and socially acceptable. It took 28 years for 
Jack Welch to understand what the shareholder value maximization is, and once he did, 
he didn’t recognize it being the shareholder value maximization theory. In 2009 Welch 
said that the shareholder value is the dumbest idea in the world and continued: 
“Shareholder value is a result, not a strategy … your main constituencies are your 
employees, your customers and your products.” - Jack Welch (2009) 
He also noted that share price should not be the ‘overarching’ goal but rather the increase 
in the long-term value of the company. Now, in 2009 Welch described the shareholder 
value maximization theory as it has always been – it is just that not everyone bothers to 
pay attention to understand it. This similar pattern is still happening. Someone hears about 
the shareholder value maximization and immediately thinks that “oh, okay, it means that 
as a manager I may rip off other stakeholders and maximize profits by giving away 
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employees and not investing in the future of the corporation”. It does not mean that, and 
it never did. There was not a single author found who would have academically defended 
the short-term shareholder value maximization – the long-term is inherent part of the 
shareholder value maximization. 
The major conclusion and the most fundamental insight of the literature synthesis is that 
the shareholder value maximization theory is connected to rising inequality in the U.S. 
and most likely in other economies also. This connection is rarely noted in the academic 
literature, but it is implicitly present in many papers. The relationship between the 
shareholder value maximization and inequal income distribution is deduced by comparing 
the timeline and income distribution data. By comparison of data and development of the 
shareholder value maximization theory the connection appears to be quite evident. Very 
few explicit expressions of the connection between the shareholder value maximization 
and inequality and social problems exist but for example Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) 
and Clarke et al (2018) are making this point.  
The main academic attention has been directed to the agency theory and how to align the 
interests of the shareholder and the manager. This literature review suggests that this 
attention should be redirected in developing more descriptive and viable theory of the 
firm and its objectives. In practice, the theory should be rephrased not to advocate sole 
self-interest for example. In business schools it should be explicitly taught that these 
theories are not remedy for making all decisions in this complicated world and in a 
complicated setting of business and management. It should be made explicit how long is 
the list of unrealistic assumptions that must hold in order for the shareholder value 
maximization to work correctly and produce the maximum welfare for the whole society.  
At least part of the debate between Freeman’s stakeholder theory and Friedman’s 
shareholder value maximization theory is aroused because the utilitarian logic of 
shareholder value maximization is so ambiguous or at least not obvious. That is, how is 
the shareholder value maximization maximizing the overall social welfare and so 
fulfilling its place as a normative guide for managers and corporations. Freeman does not 
understand – or refuses to understand – how the shareholder value maximization is 
supposed to maximize the welfare in whole society. Based on the analysis on this 
literature review, the problem might lay in the language that economists and the 
shareholder value maximization employ. It is not overly clear how individual agents and 
corporations acting selfishly create desirable and improved outcome for all of us (e.g. 
Jones and Felps 2013:215). Furthermore, the shareholder value maximization is 
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dependable of so many other theories, concepts and assumptions that it is only fair to 
question its position as a dominant ideology for corporate governance.  
Financial economist’s – such as Jensen and Meckling (1983) – assumptions are falling 
apart. Investors are not solely risk averted and self-interested. They care about social 
responsibility and environment and they accept value destructive projects (Eccles 2019). 
Surprisingly it seems that especially institutional investors care. The overarching 
conclusion is that shareholders do not want their monetary value maximized but their 
overall value maximized. It means that violation of shareholder’s moral, environmental 
or ethical values and preferences decreases the value of monetary wealth. For an easy 
example, a corporation that is creating excess returns by polluting environment and 
exploiting developing countries is not maximizing shareholder value – only the 
shareholder’s monetary value is maximized. Therefore, many of the shareholders will sell 
their holdings in a corporation that exercises immoral actions. The shareholder value 
becomes maximized only when the monetary value is maximized within moral 
boundaries set by the investor.  
 The responsible shareholder and stakeholder 
One of the most interesting findings of the synthesis is that it was unable to determine or 
identify anyone who would be promoting shareholder value maximization in a way that 
would disregard other stakeholders. All shareholder value maximization authors admit 
and explicitly express that stakeholders are important and that corporations cannot create 
value if they exploit stakeholders. Even Milton Friedman (1970) allows ethical 
consideration and everyone agree that society’s goals are the most fundamental interest – 
meaning – that managers may sacrifice shareholder wealth to create wealth for the society 
as a whole. The obvious question is then, why do we have this stakeholder theory in the 
first place? It is a large body of literature. 
The true understanding of the shareholder value maximization includes understanding 
that it is not about maximizing short term monetary value of the small privileged group 
of shareholders. Shareholder value maximization is, or at least it is intended, to be about 
maximizing the value of the corporation through maximizing the value of the share price. 
The very focal point is, that the share price reflects the values of the society. Or at least 
the share price should reflect the values of the society. If some stakeholder group thinks 
that a corporation is engaged in harmful business, it may influence to the share price by 
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not buying products from that corporation or through legal procedures for instance. For 
example, if society values recycling, then corporations that recycle adequately should be 
demonstrating higher sales and higher share prices. This, however, means that the 
responsibility of decisions is loaded to society as a whole and therefore corporate 
managers would be exempted from moral self-examination. Another direct problem or 
unresolved criticism is the dissemination of information – does the society have enough 
information about corporations to practice adequate moral judgement? 
The market mechanism solution is not perfect, but quite many shareholder value 
maximization critics are criticizing the theory as if the theory would imply that the share 
price and returns on shareholder’s investments should be maximized at any cost and 
anyone else’s interests are not considered in the decision-making process. A corporation 
that does not respond to moral concerns of the stakeholders will not be financially 
successful. By doing dishonorable business and unsustainable short-term decisions one 
cannot maximize the shareholder value – maximizing the shareholder value requires 
taking into account all stakeholders of the corporation and a long time horizon. The 
misunderstanding arouses from the fact that the information in the modern capitalistic 
society is in form of financial data and that creates associations. In other words, 
corporations understand only financial metrics and markets are translating society’s 
values and other relevant information from stakeholders to financial data and metrics. 
Through market mechanism the social values are, or should be, translated into a language 
that a corporation understands and to which it knows how to respond. To function, 
shareholders and all stakeholders must be responsible and moral. 
TO CONCLUDE WITH: 
“One of Sir Winston Churchill's most famous remarks was his defense of democracy; "It 
has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time."  
– Sir Winston Churchill (in Dobson 1999:74) 
 As we leave the 20th century, a similar defense could be applied to shareholder wealth 
maximization. Given its moral premise of might makes right, shareholder wealth 
maximization is the worst justification for corporate behavior—with the exception of all 
other known justifications.” (Dobson 1999:74)  
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